226. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State 1
1659. Dr Gordon Smith, American medical missionary from Danang, visited me June 22. Dr. Smith has lived and worked in Viet Nam for some thirty years, mainly among the Montagnard population in central Viet Nam. In summary, main points which Dr Smith made were:
- 1.
- Military situation and aggressiveness of GVN military and paramilitary forces have greatly improved during past six months. He thought that without increased US assistance last winter, Viet Cong would by now have taken over SVN. He was especially complimentary of work of Special Forces Units.
- 2.
- Nevertheless, popular support for GVN continued to decrease alarmingly in central coastal provinces (Quang Nam, Quang Ngai, Binh Dinh, Phu Yen) where Dr Smith has wide first-hand knowledge of conditions. He attributed this to belief by people of Communist allegations against Diem and his family and government; to lack of GVN contact with people; and to lack of efficiency in GVNʼs execution of plans for benefit of people. He said that most of his own converts. [Page 469] both Vietnamese and Montagnards, several now themselves Christian missionaries, were bitterly anti-government and thus inclined to believe promises of Viet Cong that liberation Front would be better than present government.
- 3.
- He then said that it was his strong impression that American military influence in central Viet Nam was pressing Vietnamese military in direction of a military coup d’etat against the GVN. I questioned him very closely on this. He said that many US military advisors of his own acquaintance, whose work in military field he greatly admired, had said repeatedly in presence Vietnamese officers that anti-guerrilla war was being waged in the teeth of a predominantly hostile population, made so by the inefficiency and ineffectiveness of the GVN; and that on this basis military campaigns were bound to be unsuccessful or ineffective. He said that this was almost the universal theme of American military officers in his area. He said that Vietnamese military officers, who generally inclined to this view themselves, took the American officers’ remarks to mean US military advocacy of an ARVN military coup d’etat. Dr Smith said that he himself thought that military rule would be more effective and more popular than that of the present regime. I told Dr Smith, that if his observations were correct, this was a most serious matter. I explained to him US policy of support to SVN through the constitutionally elected government, and the reasons therefore. I also mentioned certain plans, agreements, programs, and some progress in improving the performance of the GV on the civil side. (Comment: Dr Smithʼs observations, which were sincerely given and apparently without any ulterior motive, may indeed account for some of the hesitancy and suspicion on part of GVN, more noticeable in recent weeks.)
Dr Smith also discussed at length the Montagnard problem. He believes that only through generous government measures to feed, house, clothe, and eventually resettle the mountain people who have come into GVN controlled territory, can others be induced to escape from Viet Cong control. He also expressed view that tribes people had very little, if any, political convictions and would go along with the side which seemed the stronger.
On the whole, Dr Smithʼs views on the situation in central coastal provinces were discouraging. Since he intends to continue his work in Viet Nam, and is even now seeking a grant of land from GVN to establish a leper hospital near Danang, it is very important that his views as summarized above be closely protected.
I have discussed para 3 above with Gen. Harkins who is planning a trip to area involved and will take appropriate measures.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751K.5/6-2562. Top Secret; Limit Distribution. Repeated to CINCPAC for Polad.↩