331. Telegram From the Commander of the Military Assistance Advisory Group in Viet-Nam (McGarr) to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Lemnitzer)1

SGN 901. My sensing on certain aspects 16 December conference are furnished for such use as you see fit. From my viewpoint, conference was helpful. Expect next meeting, which recommend be held Baguio, to be more productive for you and Secretary as hope MAAG will be permitted carry ball to greater degree on those items affecting problems and operations here. Am also hopeful be given more reasonable advance notice on agenda.

In addition other actions directed and suggested, we now reviewing plans for Zone D, and feel defoliant portion properly integrated into military portion of the plan, can be effective and am convinced ARVN will need all possible assistance. Would not favor its deletion as GVN and RVNAF inserted this in the basic plan given them “under the table” by MAAG. U.S. reluctance follow through on help promised at higher level could well have adverse psychological reactions.

As mentioned in letter today,2 consider it unfortunate that reorganization and proposed changes in command structure here, plus expanded terms of reference, were not discussed at meeting. Was most gratified when learned this item on agenda and was [Page 750] appreciative of my superiors’ recognition that “man on firing line” should be allowed to participate in these discussions. Regret that circumstances did not permit. This naturally of extreme importance to me both from operational and personal viewpoint.

Due greatly expanded mission here over and above normal MAAG type operation, have long recognized we doing job of small theatre headquarters with staff and authority for MAAG Mission alone. Therefore, have made number specific recommendations to CINCPAC over period of time which designed match resources and terms of references with actual duties and responsibilities. Meanwhile have accepted these additional duties, mainly by default, and attempting discharge to best of capability. This currently made additionally difficult by failure State get more than promise by Diem nor “much closer relationship than the present one of acting in an advisory capacity only.”

On personal side, know you understand that particularly in dealing with orientals, my value could be depreciated should a Senior man be brought in to take over top spot. Such action could well react unfavorably on my present working relationship with GVN and RVNAF officials and adversely affect their present trust and confidence.

Regarding above, would appreciate any “straws in the wind” you feel able to give me and would naturally treat as personal and confidential.

  1. Source: National Defense University, Lemnitzer Papers, 1961 Eyes Only Messages. Secret; Eyes Only. Repeated to General Decker. A handwritten notation on the source text indicates that it was seen also by General Wheeler. No time of transmission is indicated on the source text.
  2. Not found.