301. Memorandum From the Acting Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (Bundy) to the Secretary of Defense (McNamara)1
SUBJECT
- Vietnam Command Arrangements
I have reviewed the JCS proposal,2 approved in principle by you, during the week with Alexis Johnson, and with representatives of AID and CIA. Concurrently, Admiral Felt’s 290301Z3 has laid out his ideas on the charter. This memorandum sets forth the views and issues, with my recommendations.
1. State View. Alexis Johnson reported yesterday that Secretary Rusk accepted his, Alex’s views, as follows:
- a.
- That there should be no new title for the present, although the powers of Chief, MAAG, might well be extended in the economic and intelligence areas as needed, and to cover clearly the command of forces introduced on the existing policy basis.
- b.
- That it was not essential that the officer selected have a 4-star rank.
- c.
- That the co-equal status of the officer with the Ambassador was acceptable, but would need minor clarification for protocol purposes.
I said that you would surely disagree on a. and b. His argument was that appointment of a US “Commander” would amount to an irrevocable and 100% US commitment to saving South Vietnam. I disputed this, and said it would be no more than a slight addition in a situation where, in the eyes of the world, we were already overwhelmingly committed. I also said you regarded the 4-star rank as crucial to the positive impact of the change.
. . . . . . . . . . . .
3. AID View. The preliminary view (Frank Coffin) is that the key issue is control of the allocation of local currency generated by the commodity import program. This is now in the Ambassador, who [Page 703] also retains the final refereeing of any disputes between USOM and the military. These two do have a working agreement, under which all military-related projects (roads, telecommunications, village communications, police support) are subject to full coordination; disputes are said to have been minor in recent months (I have heard the contrary about earlier periods).
Coffin’s view is that the present system should be maintained (which could be accomplished by substituting the word “Coordinate” for the words ‘Supervise and direct …4 Diplomatic Mission” in paragraph 5 e. of the JCS draft) or that the whole direction of USOM should pass to the military commander-that there was no happy middle ground. I think there is a strong case for the second action as we go along, but would be much influenced by Felt and McGarr’s views. Again, Felt has not included the point in his draft of proposed powers.
4. Summary. The CIA and AID issues seem resolvable, although there should certainly be a high-level meeting of minds and fully coordinated instructions both giving the text and glossing it. However, the State view strikes at the heart of the whole proposal, and is not acceptable in my judgment. I recommend that you:
- a.
- Take up the matter with Secretary Rusk (perhaps with a name in hand) to urge that the title “Commander” be used and that a 4-star appointment be made.
- b.
- If State continues adamant, that a charter be dreamed up embodying the JCS text, modified to meet the CIA points and to the less forceful position vis-a-vis AID (a senior military officer still called a Chief,MAAG, could hardly take over more economic power), together with the more specific points of Admiral Felt’s cable, as the best possible solution now obtainable.
- Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OASD/ISA Files:FRC 64 A 2382, Viet-Nam 1961-2 Dec. Top Secret. Copies sent to Gilpatric, Lemnitzer, and Wheeler.↩
- Document 271.↩
- A copy of this telegram was attached to Bagley’s memorandum of December 1 to Taylor, in which Bagley characterized CINCPAC’s view of how the command should be set up in Viet-Nam as “your ‘normal model’ with an on-the-spot CINCPAC representative superimposed, but without the ‘Korea model’ responsibilities.” (National Defense University, Taylor Papers, T-185-69)↩
- Ellipsis in the source text.↩