297. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Burma1
301. Following is text, for delivery Prime Minister, of President’s reply to U Nu’s November 13 letter re Vietnam.2 Signed original being airpouched:
“Dear Mr. Prime Minister: I am happy to have your letter of November thirteenth expressing your concern over the situation in South VietNam. It is in no sense an intrusion, and I want you to know that I will always welcome your thoughts and counsel. We [Page 695] share the same objective of maintaining the peace and promoting the well-being of Southeast Asia. I am sure that I need not tell you that the United States has no ambitions for itself in the area; our only desire is that independent countries of the area should be able to maintain their independence, free from threats of force and from externally supported subversion and infiltration. Unhappily, this is not now the case in South VietNam.
“It is good to know that you have expressed to the Government in North Viet-Nam your concern on this point; a continuation of its present course cannot but endanger the peace. Although we are satisfied that the Government of South Viet-Nam is prepared to live peacefully within the Geneva Accords, the authorities in North Viet-Nam have done little to conceal their disregard of those Accords and have openly and systematically fomented efforts aimed at the violent overthrow of the Government in South VietNam. This policy was openly proclaimed in the declaration of the Third Lao Dong Party Congress in Hanoi in September 1960, which called upon its members to ‘liberate South Viet-Nam from the ruling yoke of the United States imperialists.’ Three months later Hanoi announced the creation of a ‘front for liberation of the South.’
“There have been many other public statements in the same vein from Hanoi, and it is clear that there has been established in the South an elaborate guerrilla organization supported, directed and supplied from the North. The October 24, 1961, letter of the Government of Viet-Nam to the International Control Commission3 set forth in what I am satisfied to be an objective and factual manner detailed information and evidence with respect to the massive infiltration from the North.
“While there may be varying assessments and points of view with respect to the domestic policies of the Government of VietNam, it is the legitimate government of an independent country and the freedom of the people it represents is endangered, I am sure that you would agree that it would be extremely difficult for any government, unaided, to cope with externally supported attacks of the intensity of those now being mounted with increasing crescendo against the Government of South VietNam. I know that your own experience enables you, especially, to appreciate the dangers which are now threatening the Government and people of South VietNam.
“We are gravely concerned not only by the danger they face, but also by the threat which Communist domination imposed from the outside would present to the nations of Southeast Asia. I am sure you will agree that this is a question in which our common interests are deeply involved.
[Page 696]“The intention of my Government is to help South Viet-Nam by continuing and considerably increasing the military assistance program which we have been providing. At the same time we will step up economic aid in connection with damage caused by the recent flood.
“In reply to the point raised in your letter, I would like to assure you that we are not sending U.S. combat forces to VietNam. We are profoundly aware of the grave questions which would be involved in such a decision and I earnestly hope that we will not be faced by such an eventuality.
“As to the nature of the crisis in VietNam, we are convinced by extensive and detailed evidence that the increase in internal disorder and the expansion of military operations against the Government are caused by a massive campaign of infiltration, subversion, and terror directed and reinforced from the outside. While this form of aggression is indirect, it is very real.
“I am gratified that you have undertaken to let me have your views on this grave matter and I believe that on most points our views coincide. Certainly as events unfold and as this Government considers future actions to help the people and Government of South Viet-Nam stop the forces which threaten their independence, I shall have in mind your thoughts and welcome counsel.
“Sincerely, John F. Kennedy.”
White House and Dept do not plan release text. Suggest you confirm with Burmese our assumption they will not release.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751K.00/11-1461. Confidential. Repeated to Saigon. Previous drafts of the enclosed letter, one of which bears the handwritten notation “changed by White House 11/27/61,” are ibid., 751K.00/11-2261.↩
- Document 248.↩
- Not printed. (Department of State, Central Files, 751K.00/11-861)↩