289. Telegram From the Secretary of Defense (McNamara) to the Commander in Chief, Pacific (Felt), and the Chief of the Military Assistance Advisory Group in Viet-Nam (McGarr)1
Def 906345. Personal for Felt and McGarr from McNamara. Situation in Viet-Nam obviously causing great concern here. I have consulted with JCS on creating continuous personal contact to re view progress and see what more we can do within framework present policy. For this purpose I would like to set up a first meeting at HQ, PACOM with CINCPAC, CH MAAG SVN and the Chiefs of his air and naval sections just after NATO meeting in Paris. I would have with me General Lemnitzer, possibly General Taylor, Deputy Assistant Secretary Bundy/ISA, Brig/Gen Brown, and will arrive Hawaii 1530Z 16 Dec.
Political uncertainty of Diem’s position and doubts as to his willingness to take steps to make his government more effective must not prevent us from going ahead full blast (without publicity, [Page 680] until political discussions are completed) on all possible actions short of large scale introduction of US combat forces. Timing of putting these actions visibly into effect in Viet-Nam will be affected by political development, but we cannot let this slow down our making all necessary preparations and movements. This is philosophy behind series of decisions reached by me yesterday with JCS and being communicated to you separately.2
Fundamentally, we must adjust ourselves to a perennially unclear political framework and to a policy that for overall national reasons sets limits on military action. However, that policy already gives us considerable scope, and I will do my utmost to get authority for any new ideas you may suggest which are not now covered. What we must do is wring the last ounce out of present possibilities and I feel that we have sometimes been slow, both here at DOD and in the field, in devising and carrying out feasible actions. Cost considerations particularly should be secondary in your search for new approaches.
Re Diem’s position, President yesterday3 emphasized importance all US personnel avoiding criticism his regime outside official channels. Recent adverse publicity making job much more difficult both domestically and in achieving a better partnership. Please stress this within your commands.
December 16 meeting should be intense one-day session. I have in mind later meetings at about monthly intervals.
- Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, McNamara Files: FRC 71 A 3470, South Viet-Nam 1961-Taylor Recommendations. Top Secret; Priority. Time of transmission is not indicated on the source text. William Bundy’s draft of this telegram, which differs only slightly from the final version as sent, is in Department of State, Bundy Files, 1961 Chron.↩
- This message has not been found.↩
- See Document 285.↩