Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, China, Volume XIX

90. Telegram From the Commander, U.S. Taiwan Defense Command (Smoot) to the Chief of Naval Operations (Burke)⁰

Taipei, September 14, 1958, 1:22 p.m.

140522Z. Admiral Felt has info other means. Personal for Admiral Burke, Admiral Felt, VAdm Riley,¹ VAdm Beakley.

Believe you need a roundup of picture as I see it here. Critical times are near. Political. To the extent I enter this field which is daily with Defense Minister I follow Ambassador’s pitch that GRC has gained respect of US and many Allies in their practice of restraint. That this is vital in any negotiation in any forum. That whether they like negotiations or not the US as a peace loving nation does not want war and since they don’t it is of equal interest to GRC not to initiate any provocative act which could start a war and lose the support of their Allies now so firmly established. Minister’s invariable reaction is he is strongest proponent of restraint, he doesn’t want war, our history of negotiations with Commies is not too hot, US has inched its way in public pronouncements to strong position of support OSI which if done boldly a month ago when he first asked for it would probably have prevented present precarious situation that now while the doctors consult the patient is dying. My reply indicates some of that is speculation that our President must speak in terms of US public opinion and a country’s public opinion is not easy to mold that mean while let us bend every effort to keep the patient alive within the frame work of our allowable joint efforts and capabilities. Add to the foregoing his latest argument which grows in intensity and logic that the US could still stop it by openly announcing the complete assumption of logistic support to Kinmen that the only alternative is war and we come to complete impasse.

Public relations. Matter of growing concern is US and GRC public bickering as to responsibility for failure of convoys. This is wonderful meat for Commies and must stop. Ambassador and I putting all our effort on this here but observations in home papers from responsible citizens does not help. Latest growing attack concerns our convoy operations to effect not only are they doing little good but are stimulating Commies to fire more and propagandize “this for your brave ally”. This can be serious.

We are using approach to press that of all military operations amphibious is most complicated. That Chinese have little or no experience and never against opposition. That you don’t get this experience overnight that even the simplest of military OPS are a series of action reaction counter action ad infinitum and it took the US Navy two years to perfect its amphibious technique so don’t criticize the Chinese military for a few failures over a three week period. There is a limit to the effectiveness of this approach and of course the criticism of the US military all points to the end desire of why don’t we really get in there and fight with our Ally. CIB is a big help but it doesn’t stop the reporters waiting outside my gate at quarters at night and morning.

Operations. There are really three basic factors here. First that no concept of current situation appears in any planning instrument anywhere. This amazes me. One look at the topography around Kinmen and it screams out loud. Second the peculiar and to us utterly unbelievable sense of command relations possessed by the Chinese. I’ve covered this somewhat but haven’t even begun to scratch the surface. It is an inherited trait of generations and positively the most frustrating thing I’ve ever had to face. Third and of course the critical issue getting the stuff on the beach. Quite frankly we were misled by Kinmen advisors that only observable beaches were one and two the ones habitually used. With this missapprehension we scurried to get other beaches ready and then found their beaching profiles utterly unreliable when LSM’s stopped way short of dry ramp condition. In addition fire now lands accurately on any beach we use day or night. Another factor here is fact that on 2 occasions now ATF’s towing empty LCM replacements entered area with no reaction. So they seem to know who is coming and where it is going and give with their all only when the cargo is important in quantity. To meet this we must use deception and mobile loading and are proceeding to do so. Capability will be limited but important thing now is a successful effort and soon. We have the best Chinese operational admiral down in Kaohsiung with Blackburn.² We have the best amphibious experts Chinese and American there too and we’ve given the job to them with the promise that they will not be second guessed by higher ups from remote and sundry places.

Intelligence. Chinese recon flights using cap source of provocative claims by ChiComs and invariably bring out MIGs but pattern has been remarkably defensive in nature. Past recon has been devoted to ChiCom air deployments almost exclusively but now have GRC agreement to cover the coastal areas for naval intel and to limit penetration. All intel agencies [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] trying uncover means by which Commies are getting convoy info. Most ominous to me are growing signs that GRC is planning something big they don’t want us to know about. I think MND will consult me but the President is just too calm and too quick to acquiesce to our ideas of working slowly toward getting a successful lift through. There are other signs too vague to analyze piecemeal but in aggregate are alarming. Cannot even guess what objective might be. As a hopeful summary I think we can make a fairly decent breakthrough of that last fifty yards but I don’t think it can be sustained in required quantity over the long haul. The Chinese will try but they will take losses. I believe the Kinmen garrison can hold out longer than the GRC top level echelon who will probably cry panic long before panic is a factor. I think the US will have to take over and the matter of when we do will become increasingly critical every day. We are forwarding a capability estimate of interdicting gun positions by air in separate despatch which doesn’t look good. Interdiction by Kinmen artillery is faced with hopeless odds even with the eight inch HOWs. This is not as encouraging as I would like it to be but we ain’t quitting out here. Regards. Smoot.

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 793.5/9–1458. Top Secret; Priority. Received at 1:50 a.m. on September 15. Repeated to CINCPAC and COMSEVENTHFLT.
1. Vice Admiral Herbert D. Riley, Chief of Staff, U.S. Pacific Command.
2. Rear Admiral P.P. Blackburn, Commander, Taiwan Patrol Force. Blackburn headed the Navy component of the U.S. Taiwan Defense Command, which had just been established as a Subordinate Unified Command under CINCPAC by ADMINO CINCPAC telegram 110435Z, September 10. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 218, JCS Records, 381 Formosa (11–8–48), Section 39)