2. Letter From the Ambassador to Yugoslavia (Rankin) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Robertson)0
Dear Walter: You asked me to write down the points I raised in our recent conversation regarding the handicaps, avoidable and unavoidable, under which we are trying to implement our policy toward China. I emphasized difficulties of our own making about which something could and should be done. Certainly, our whole position in the Far East is so delicate and so grave that we cannot afford to handicap ourselves unnecessarily. This is particularly true in the case of China, since our China policy is fundamental to our policies toward other Asian countries.
For several years I have pointed out repeatedly, both orally and in writing, that United States Government operations in Taiwan were being carried on by an excessive number of American personnel and by an unnecessarily large number of independent or quasi-independent organizations. While the authority of the Ambassador is well established in principle, his immediate staff comprises only one percent of the United States officials on Taiwan. These 4,000 officials function with a dozen or more separate lines of communication and authority, making central coordination extremely difficult. Despite my representations and those of various other responsible persons, the number of official Americans on Taiwan has remained for some time around 4,000 (plus a similar number of dependents) and promises to increase somewhat during the coming months. The fact that the American taxpayer is called upon to provide perhaps $50 million annually for overhead in Free China, to carry out our programs, is less significant than the related political factors. Why are more official Americans needed to operate an aid program in a sovereign state than formerly were required to govern a colony of equivalent size? Such neo-colonialism gives substance to Red charges of American “occupation.”
Our experience seems to establish that the best hope of improving the situation lies in a consolidation of various operations, with consequent savings in overhead and housekeeping, as well as in a clearer delineation of responsibility and an undoubted gain in general efficiency. At present at least five organizations are occupied with what normally would be considered Air Force business. Five are concerned with radio broadcasting. An indefinite number are engaged in psychological warfare. [Page 3] Two or more are occupied with political reporting, and so it goes. While consolidation of such activities into single units may not always be desirable, a considerable tightening up is in order to improve coordination and efficiency, as well as to achieve economies and give a better political effect to one effort as a whole.
A majority of the American personnel in Taiwan are military, and Admiral Doyle has submitted a plan which is an important step in the right direction. It would place substantially all military activities directly under the authority of the senior American military officer on Taiwan, instead of the present system under which various units, large and small, report directly to someone in Japan, the Philippines or Hawaii. I have urged this step repeatedly since our military organizations began to proliferate in 1955. It is my understanding that Doyle’s plan has been approved by CINCPAC and is now in the Pentagon for consideration. Probably it does not go far enough, but its implementation would be very helpful.
Another set of complications arises from historic rather than rational distinctions between overt and covert operations. Genuinely covert activities by the United States Government scarcely exist in Free China today. But a variety of operations continue to be treated as more or less covert even though they involve close cooperation with the Chinese and their nature is known in some detail to various countries, including Red China. Perhaps it may not seem particularly important whether the Embassy, ICA, USIA, the Air Force or some other agency performs a given function, as long as no actual duplication exists. But when two or more organizations operate in a field which logically belongs to one, it is almost inevitable that there should be redundant personnel and housekeeping, not to mention the added difficulties of coordination. Treating some phases of certain activities as covert, when they need not be, serves only to compound the trouble.
In the field of political opinion and reporting it is essential that the Embassy have complete control. Anyone is welcome to send a memorandum to the Embassy on any subject. If it contains anything new or otherwise of value the Embassy will be glad to pass it on to the Department with appropriate comments and indication of the source, if the latter so desires. But the Embassy is not in a position to cope with reports sent in through separate channels which transmit the political opinions of American officials belonging to other organizations, particularly when such officials remain anonymous. Calling such reports “estimates” is no justification for this procedure, which may result in the dissemination among top circles in Washington of slanted material calling into question the validity of approved United States policy. (Here in Washington it would seem to me that while the preparation of NIE papers should be centered in another agency, the Department should have primary control [Page 4] of NIE papers dealing with foreign policy and prospects.) All of this is of major importance in so sensitive and vital a matter as the China policy.
In summary, I would recommend the following:
- 1.
- Approval of Admiral Doyle’s plan for U.S. military organizations on Taiwan.
- 2.
- Consolidation of so-called covert activities with related overt operations where there is no longer any valid reason for a separation.
- 3.
- Authority for the Ambassador to instruct all United States Government agencies in China to channel through the Embassy all political reporting, including all “estimates” and all economic and military reporting bearing on policy.
- 4.
- Continued efforts to reduce the number of United States Government entities in Free China and to consolidate housekeeping and “headquarters” operations, military and civilian, wherever possible.
- 5.
- In general, the replacement of American personnel by Chinese in all positions where the latter can perform substantially as well.
I would not leave with you the impression that the foregoing paragraphs reflect the existence of unsatisfactory working relationships among official Americans on Taiwan. On the contrary, there has been a most friendly and cooperative attitude on the part of all concerned. They have done the best they could under the circumstances, but they could do better if unnecessary handicaps were removed.
Sincerely yours,
- Source: Department of State, FE Files: Lot 60 D 90, Rankin. Confidential. Marked for action by the Office of Chinese Affairs. Rankin had headed the Embassy in Taipei from August 1950 through December 1957 as Chargé d’Affaires ad interim until April 1953, and thereafter as Ambassador.↩
- Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.↩