Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, China, Volume XIX

185. Draft Talking Paper Prepared by Secretary of State Dulles⁰

Washington, October 13, 1958.

The following are conceived to be the roles of the Nationalist Government of the Republic of China in which the United States cooperates:

1) To maintain an anti-Communist Chinese Government on Taiwan, which, through participation in collective security with other free governments, will be strong enough to withstand Communist assaults;

2) To prevent more Chinese from being forcibly subjected to Communist tyranny;

3) To be equipped to extend significant liberating help to Chinese of the mainland if and as opportunity presents itself as a result of organized disaffection of the Chinese people;¹

4) To help to stimulate the coming of such opportunity by providing a nearby example of political, economic and social welfare which will contrast favorably with the repressive policies of the Communist rulers and stimulate organized, revolt against them;

5) To exert an influence on overseas Chinese, particularly in free Asian countries, so that they will not become a tool of the Chinese Communist Party for the overthrow of non-Communist Asian governments. In this connection it is important for the Nationalist Government to have diplomatic representation in these countries and to exclude Chicom representation;

6) To preempt the seat of China in the United Nations so that it will not go to the Communist Chinese, giving them increased prestige and influence in the world;

7) To preserve, for the benefit of all the world, Chinese culture which is being systematically suppressed and liquidated by the Communists.

The problem is how, in the light of the present situation, the Governments of the Republic of China and the United States can best cooperate to achieve these agreed objectives.

It would seem that the formulation which best serves our purposes is, on our side, along the area of close contact, i.e., the offshore islands, to do what we would presumably do if there were an armistice, as in Korea and Vietnam; and thus, we would hope, build up a de facto armistice condition on both sides. It would not be practical or desirable to have a formal armistice, as neither the Chinats nor the Chicoms would desire this. But a situation might in fact be created comparable to that along the Korean and Vietnam armistice lines, where there is close contact but no provocations across the line, and at least some appreciable reduction of forces.

The bearing, if any, of the foregoing line of conduct upon the preceding seven points would be as follows:

1) There would be no problem on Taiwan if the matter were handled by the GRC as its program, not a US program it accepted under coercion.

2) Some appreciable reduction of forces under the conditions suggested would give comparable security to what now exists. There would be enough forces left not only to maintain internal security, but to put up a substantial resistance. The number left behind could at any time be augmented from Taiwan, particularly if additional amphibious power were provided.

It would be a necessary accompaniment of the foregoing that the Chinats should make clear that they did not intend to use the offshore islands for provocative purposes. Actually, there is very little “provocation” now by the Chinats from the offshore islands. They are not used for purposes of blockading the ports of Amoy and Foochow. Also these mainland areas are so heavily militarized and so forbidding in their geographical formation that they do not serve as a useful place for staging commando raids or introducing intelligence agents, much less for an invasion in aid of a future revolt.

It is possible—not probable—that other free world nations which now have diplomatic relations with the Chicoms could be induced to indicate to the Chicoms that they would break these relations and throw their political support to the Chinats if the Chicoms again broke the peace by a major war effort to capture the offshore islands.

It should be observed in this connection that the offshore islands are not covered by the United States-Republic of China Mutual Defense Treaty, and the President is not authorized to use the Armed Forces for their defense unless he judges this necessary or appropriate for the defense of Taiwan. Thus the Chinese Communists, by disassociating attacks on the Quemoy and Matsu islands from their claims to Taiwan and Penghu, could automatically exclude United States armed participation in the defense of the offshore islands. This makes it the more important to develop increased and broader political pressures upon the Chicoms not to engage in a further armed attack on the offshore islands.

3) As regards Point 3, the ability of the Chinats would be increased with less diffusion of their forces, with more located at a focal point such as Taiwan. From there they could be either redeployed to the offshore islands or elsewhere, rather than be immobilized on the offshore islands.

The amphibious equipment which would make a return to the offshore islands more possible would equally serve to permit their being landed elsewhere if this was appropriate to give aid and comfort to a substantial organized resistance movement.

4) As regards Point 4, the change would have some benefit in that it would tend to moderate what otherwise could be a source of division on Taiwan as between the Chinese who regard Taiwan as their home, and the recent arrivals who regard the mainland as their home. There is some evidence that the “Taiwanese” are not enthusiastic about the present dispositions which can require many of them to die for the defense of the offshore islands in which they have no sentimental interest.

5–6) As regards Points 5 and 6, we believe that some move along the lines indicated is important, almost essential, to prevent more and more nations from recognizing the Chicoms and bringing them into the UN. There is great dissatisfaction with the present situation among many nations which, in deference to the United States, do not recognize the Chicoms. They strongly deprecate a situation which, as they see it, involves them in the risk of world war because of military dispositions by the Chinats which, in their opinion, are unnecessarily provocative. They look upon the Chinat use of the offshore islands as carrying a constant invasion threat to the mainland or, at a minimum, a threat to the integrity of mainland China’s principal ports, and they are sympathetic with the efforts of the Chicoms to eliminate these threats. Actually, as noted, these threats are non-existent. But it is much better that the Chinats should themselves take steps which would emphasize the reality and do so on their own volition, rather than to lose good will with possible disastrous political consequences on account of maintaining a paper “threat” which in reality is non-existent.

7) As regards Point 7, there is no particular bearing one way or another because the place where Chinese culture is being preserved is on Taiwan not on the offshore islands.

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 793.5/10–1558. Secret; Personal and Private. The source text is marked “#3,” presumably the third draft of the paper. It is filed with a memorandum of October 15 from Murphy to Dulles commenting on “the draft outline which you may be using in connection with your visit to Taipei next week.” A covering note of October 16 from Calhoun to Dulles states that comments by Murphy, Robertson, Gerard Smith, and Becker are attached; that Macomber had no comment; and that Herter and Reinhardt had not responded. Typewritten notes with comments by Smith and Becker are attached to the source text; Robertson’s comments are not.
1. On Dulles’ personal copy of the draft, this paragraph is revised in his handwriting to read as follows: “To be equipped with some mobility to extend significant liberating help to Chinese of the mainland if and as opportunity presents itself as a result of disaffection shared by significant elements of the Chinese Red military establishment.” (Princeton University, Dulles Papers)