169. Record of Meeting0
SUBJECT
- Highlights of Discussion in Secretary’s Office October 8 on Future Moves in the Taiwan Straits Situation
PARTICIPANTS
- The Secretary
- Mr. Herter
- Mr. Murphy
- Mr. Robertson
- Mr. Reinhardt
- Mr. Smith
- Mr. Becker
- Mr. Macomber
- Mr. Parsons—FE
- Mr. Martin—FE
- Mr. Green—FE
The Secretary said the meeting had been called to discuss future moves in the Taiwan Straits, proceeding on the assumption that the one-week cease fire stipulated by the ChiComs would continue for at least a while longer, although common prudence naturally required that we take full advantage of the present situation to build up the islands’ defensive positions in the event hostilities are resumed. He didn’t feel there was anything that could be usefully done in the next three days, however, on the diplomatic front. He asked Mr. Smith if he had any ideas on what might be done.
Mr. Smith agreed that nothing could be really accomplished in the next several days, but we cannot let the situation drift on and on without [Page 350] tackling basic issues. In fact, Mr. Smith added, the ChiComs probably want things to drift on. It might suit their very purposes if we were to go back to the status quo ante, for they may feel that the current situation, kept tense and shaken up from time to time by the ChiComs, will induce further shifts in world opinion in the direction of favoring turning over the offshore islands to Peiping.
The Secretary questioned this estimate. He did not agree that the ChiComs would favor any GRC retention of the islands. Their acquisition by Peiping would be a great victory for Peiping.
Mr. Smith replied that, if the ChiNats lost the offshore islands, it would strengthen the concept of a two-China policy which is abhorrent to Peiping. By allowing the islands to remain at least temporarily in GRC hands, Peiping is provided further opportunities to “shake them up” and deepen free world fissures over our China policy.
Mr. Herter and Mr. Becker thought that the present situation provided a heaven-sent opportunity to persuade the GRC to evacuate Tatan and Ehrtan. This would permit a generally welcome change in the status quo in the direction of demilitarization.
Mr. Robertson pointed out that Ambassador Yeh had spoken to him the other day about using the present lull to evaluate forces from the Tan islets preparatory to blowing them up and rendering them useless to the ChiComs.1 However we could expect no political mileage from that action.
The Secretary was disturbed that it might be played up as a retreat which would be damaging to the GRC. Perhaps it could be done, however, as a straight military measure devoid of political implications. The dilemma we’re in is that while we might wish to make a withdrawal from the Tans appear as a retreat or concession for political purposes, the GRC cannot afford to allow that.
Returning to Mr. Smith’s thesis, the Secretary repeated his objections. He added that he had had that day separate talks with three Foreign Ministers and one Ambassador;2 and all of them had hailed the cease-fire as a great success for our policy.
There followed a discussion of our past efforts to induce the ChiNats to withdraw forces from the offshore islands. It was pointed out that divisional strength on the islands had remained constant since 1950 or thereabouts although there had been an increase of ten to twenty thousand in 1954 in actual numbers, due to the impending ChiCom assault on [Page 351] the Tachens. The over-all ratio between troops on the offshores and troops on Taiwan had remained fairly constant over the past 9 years.3
Mr. Murphy wondered why we hadn’t tried during the past three years to get the forces on Quemoy and Matsu reduced.
The Secretary and Mr. Robertson referred to the adamancy of GRC refusal to cut down the forces in 1955. There was no reason to expect a GRC change of opinion in the past three years.
However, the Secretary continued, it could be pointed out now to the GRC that it is a military liability to have so many troops on these islands which are hard to resupply and are directly under the enemy’s guns; that their defense is better staged from the air and sea rather than from the islands themselves.
Mr. Robertson questioned our ability to induce the GRC to withdraw troops from the islands. The arguments just cited by the Secretary had been used back in 1954-55 to no avail. What leverage do we have?
The Secretary replied that we had “quite a little.” It must be pointed out to the GRC that if we now get a respite from hostilities in the Straits and we do nothing but allow the situation to drag on, and if a year from now the ChiComs renew their attacks on Quemoy or Matsu, it will be extremely difficult to get any U.S. support for defending those islands. Chiang must realize, or be made to realize, that he has just had a narrow escape. We have had to strain our relations with Congress and with foreign governments to almost the breaking point to save him this time.
Mr. Robertson maintained that if the islands were evacuated as proposed by Mr. Smith, they would be lost to the Communists. As far as reducing the size of the garrison is concerned, it makes no difference to the ChiComs whether the garrison is 80,000 or 40,000.
The Secretary countered that it is not the ChiComs we would be trying to impress through garrison reductions, but public opinion in this country and elsewhere. We are trying to keep opinion supporting our policy in this situation. It was agonizing enough in 1955; it has been even worse the past few weeks. We cannot allow this crisis situation to confront us again—if indeed we are out of the present crisis.
The Secretary continued: Perhaps we should contemplate some theoretical goal such as a ChiCom renunciation of force to take the islands, the withdrawal of all GRC forces from the islands, which would nevertheless remain as part of free China, and a sanction backing up this agreement in the form of its being underwritten by a group of countries now recognizing Peiping which would sever relations were the agreement [Page 352] broken by Peiping. Perhaps there could be economic sanctions as well.
Mr. Smith questioned this proposition on the grounds that the islands, stripped of their garrison, would be easy prey for a quiet take-over from within by subversion. He preferred giving the inhabitants a choice between staying there or going to Taiwan. Undoubtedly almost all would choose Taiwan. This would be good propaganda for our side.
Mr. Robertson interjected that there is no place on Taiwan to accommodate 47,000 evacuees.
The Secretary considered it “impractical” to hand the islands over to the Communists as Mr. Smith had suggested. Perhaps to avoid a takeover by subversion, his (the Secretary’s) plan would have to be amended to allow for policing of the islands. There is no reason why subversion couldn’t be prevented.
Mr. Becker and Mr. Robertson strongly doubted that the ChiComs would ever accept the plan outlined by the Secretary.
The Secretary suggested that the plan might be put forward unilaterally. We could say to the ChiComs that since you have stopped the fighting, we are accordingly removing the troops and we have agreements with countries X, Y and Z to support the continuation of this situation through threat of employing sanctions if you violate the GRC demilitarized islands.
Mr. Robertson wondered what “stalwarts” could be found to make such a pledge of support for the offshore islands.
The Secretary accepted this objection as particularly valid but he repeated his contention that something must be done to dispose of this thorny problem.
Mr. Robertson said that we and our allies must come to realize that we get nowhere by appeasement. Our own people seem to overlook completely the fact that the ChiComs and Soviets are demanding our total withdrawal from the Taiwan area, that Peiping is trying to get rid of a rival government, the fall of which, from our viewpoint, would have disastrous results. These are the issues in dispute; not the offshore islands.
Mr. Murphy suggested that, rather than start out with a general course of policy action at this time, we might more profitably contemplate limited objectives, as, for example, an evaluation of the Tans.
Mr. Robertson was opposed to our trying to do this. Ambassador Yeh might try to influence his government. But, even if he succeeded, it would have little to do with the over-all situation. Mr. Robertson subsequently observed that it might be profitable to discuss this general problem with Yeh who is realistic and who is persuasive with his government.
[Page 353]The Secretary asked Mr. Smith if he would care to express any further thoughts on what should be done.
Mr. Smith replied that nothing could probably be done right now, but later on the prospect could be opened up of a withdrawal from the offshore islands, counterbalanced by some international guarantee and by our strengthening the GRC’s defenses through the stationing of forces there, possibly the siting of ballistic missiles on Taiwan and a show of permanent American interest in the island.
The Secretary questioned this proposition on the grounds that it tended to the 2-China concept—a concept repudiated by the GRC. At least it is a concept now unacceptable to Taipei, although it is something which seems destined to happen some day when the Chinese army is essentially a Taiwanese army. The Secretary then read two pages of Embassy Taipei’s telegram 521 of October 14 which spoke of the Taiwanese people’s opposition to the GRC’s offshore islands policy and of their tendency to a 2-China concept.
Mr. Herter stated that, with a cease-fire situation in effect, we are obliged at this moment to consider the question of removing sources of provocation.
The Secretary asked whether Beam had ever asked Wang just what provocations and harassments the ChiComs would seek to have removed. Informed that no such explicit question had been put to Wang, the Secretary suggested that we try to pin the ChiComs down on that point. This should be incorporated in the latest instructions being prepared for Beam.5
The Secretary then asked Mr. Robertson to look into the question of the Tan islets, particularly in view of the fact, reported by Mr. Robertson, that Admiral Smoot had just recommended to the GRC that it build these islets’ defenses up during the current cease-fire.
In closing, the Secretary remarked that this had been a profitable discussion. He hoped that we would all keep this problem prominently in mind and take it up for discussion later.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 793.00/10–858. Top Secret; Limited Distribution. Drafted by Green. The time of the meeting is taken from Dulles’ appointment book. (Princeton University, Dulles Papers)↩
- No discussion of the Tans is recorded in Document 165, but see Document 137.↩
- Records of Dulles’ conversations that day with the Belgian and Philippine Foreign Ministers are in Department of State, Central Files, 793.00/10–858. Memoranda of his conversations with the Panamanian Foreign Minister and the German Ambassador are ibid., Secretary’s Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 64 D 199.↩
- A memorandum on this subject from Robertson to Dulles, October 6, is ibid., Central Files, 793.00/10–858; see Supplement.↩
- Telegram 521 from Taiwan reported on major trends and developments in public opinion on Taiwan during the previous 2 weeks. (Department of State, Central Files, 793.00/10–158)↩
- See Document 170.↩