163. Memorandum for the Files0
SUBJECT
- Offshore Islands
Sunday1 afternoon, after lunch, Foreign Minister Lange, in the presence of Mr. Holmes (Canada) and Mr. Murray (Secretariat) mentioned to Mr. Barco and Mr. Cook that they had received a response from the Chinese communist Ambassador in Oslo. Mr. Lange referred in this connection to a report Mr. Lange had received from Fred Kuh, correspondent of the Chicago Sun Times, in which the latter had demonstrated he had been informed of the Norwegian discussion with the United States prior to Mr. Lange’s proposal in his General Debate speech as well as other facets of this idea. It was clear that Mr. Kuh’s source had been the Indians who had told him on Friday, October 3 that the Chinese communists had responded to the Norwegian initiative and that this answer was a clear-cut negative. Mr. Lange said that in their view, the response, which they had only received on 4 October, was not a total negative, but in fact left the door ajar.
This afternoon, I met with Ambassador Nielsen and Mr. Naevdal to obtain from them an elucidation of Mr. Lange’s remarks of Sunday.
[Page 340]Ambassador Nielsen showed me a rough English translation of the cable they had received from Hans Engen,2 reporting the response of the Chinese communist Ambassador. According to Mr. Engen’s cable, Peking’s Ambassador had expressed appreciation for Norway’s spirit of good will and understanding in having approached them on this subject and in seeking to lessen the present tension. He had rehearsed the standard arguments of the communist position. He referred to the U.S. proposal for an armistice (i.e. cease fire), saying this would only secure the position of the U.S. forces close to the mainland. He charged that the U.S. was increasing its supplying of modern weapons, missiles, etc., in the area. They therefore doubted that the U.S. was sincere in its negotiations in Warsaw. They felt only the U.S. had the power to lessen tensions, and to do this by withdrawing its forces from the “Taiwan territories.” In response to Mr. Engen’s query, the Chinese communist Ambassador stated definitely that it was their intention to continue the Warsaw talks.
The Ambassador then stated that Peking had noted with interest the Norwegian proposal for the SYG’s mediation. The Chinese communists felt that in view of the “unacceptable” situation regarding China in the UN, it would be “inappropriate for the Secretary-General to take any initiative.” Mr. Engen asked whether a settlement of the Chinese representation issue (i.e. in the communists’ favor) was a prerequisite to their accepting the assistance of the Secretary-General in this matter. The answer was in the affirmative.
Subsequently, Mr. Engen asked whether Peking would respond in the same sense to the other proposal in Mr. Lange’s speech, namely that there be a small balanced group of nations to offer good offices. The Peking Ambassador said he was without instructions on this point but personally assumed that such group would be of use if this group’s first task was “to try to influence the U.S. such that it would cease the military operation close to the Chinese coast line and over Chinese air territory.”
In the immediate assessment of this conversation made by Engen and Krogh Hansen, the Norwegian Ambassador to Peking who was also present, while the reaction had been negative, the Chinese communists definitely did not close the door on mediatory efforts. In fact, the Chinese communist Ambassador invited Mr. Engen and Ambassador Hansen to dine with him on Monday evening, October 6, to “continue their conversation”. A further report is expected regarding this matter therefore at a later date.
Engen and Krogh felt it was clear that the Chinese communists wanted no contact with the UN until it could be on a basis of equality. They nevertheless wished to keep the door open in Warsaw, and perhaps in Oslo and New Delhi also. Engen felt this all fitted in with the [Page 341] delivery by Soviet Ambassador Gubanov on October 3, of a memorandum on the same subject. This Soviet memo stated that both Peking and Moscow strongly opposed a UN debate regarding Taiwan and the offshore islands situation. Engen thought it significant that the Soviets had not previously indicated so clearly their own opposition to a UN discussion on this. The memo asked Norway (and the other governments to whom it was addressed) to instruct their GA delegations to vote against inscription of the Taiwan matter and to “raise their voice” against US activities in the area. The Soviets said this memo, and the fact of the various approaches made, were not being divulged, and they asked that it not be made public.
In response to my question, Ambassador Nielsen said they had discussed this report with Secretary-General Hammarskjold. He had taken a “rather optimistic” line, implying that there would have to be a few more probing approaches made to the Chinese communists before they would accept outside intervention. He expected that they would eventually come around to it, according to Ambassador Nielsen.
Ambassador Nielsen agreed with following assessment of the Chinese communist position at this stage: There are two aspects to the present situation in the Taiwan Straits and Offshore Islands area. There is the matter of the alleged aggression of the US against China. That is under consideration, in the communist view, in the Warsaw talks. The second aspect is the so-called internal Chinese dispute, i.e., between the Peking regime and the Chinese Nationalists. That is a matter on which now Peking’s Defense Minister has proposed discussions between the two Chinese parties. From the Chinese communist way of looking at this, the Norwegian suggestion for the Secretary-General’s mediation falls between these two aspects which in their mind are separate though perhaps related problems.
In conclusion, Ambassador Nielsen stated that they had now made their proposal in Mr. Lange’s speech; they had put the matter to Peking, and they had received a reply from Peking. Except for any further elucidation which might develop as result of that evening’s dinner in Oslo, the Norwegians did not intend to push the matter further for the time being. He did express the wish that they be informed of any significant trends or developments in the Warsaw talks which might have a bearing on any further conversations they might have with the Chinese communists, presumably at the latter’s initiative. Such information, if they were to receive it, would go no further, he said, and, he added it went without saying they would take no further steps without consultation with and approval by us.