Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Japan; Korea, Volume XVIII

24. Memorandum of Conversation⁰

Washington, September 9, 1958, 11:30 a.m.

SUBJECT

• State–Defense Discussion Concerning Revision of Japanese Security Arrangements in Preparation for Meeting Between the Secretary and Foreign Minister Fujiyama

PARTICIPANTS

• Department of Defense:
  • Mr. Mansfield Sprague
  • Mr. John Irwin
  • Admiral Arleigh Burke
  • General Lyman Lemnitzer
  • Mr. William Lang
  • Captain Thomas Howe
  • Captain Elwood Baldridge
• State:
  • FE–Mr. Robertson
  • FE–Mr. J. Graham Parsons
  • Ambassador MacArthur
  • L–Mr. Loftus Beckre
  • S/P–Mr. George Morgan
  • H–Mr. John White
  • FE–Mr. Marshall Green
  • NA–Mr. Howard L. Parsons
  • NA–Mr. James V. Martin
  • FE–Mr. J. Owen Zurhellen
  • S/S–Mr. Thomas Cassilly

[Here follows the beginning of the memorandum; see Supplement.]

Copies of the draft mutual security treaty (which had been prepared by our Embassy in Tokyo in the first instance, and amended in the Department) were passed around the table. Ambassador MacArthur said that the draft represented a relationship broader than a mere military alliance. The draft mentioned economic cooperation and so on, and contained the standard language up to Article V–the operative article.

Mr. Irwin raised the question with respect to the phrase “constitutional processes”. Mr. Becker said we hoped Japan would change its constitution to allow its forces to be used abroad. Ambassador MacArthur said that the Japanese constitution did not forbid self-defense. The reference to “constitutional processes” meant that Japan would not want to send its forces to non-Japanese territory for the present. But neither had any other ally of ours agreed in advance to send forces to our aid.

General Lemnitzer asked where the mutual aspect was. Ambassador MacArthur asked where the mutual aspect was in NATO, SEATO, the Philippine Treaty¹ or ANZUS. This draft was the same. It provided for collective security arrangements in our interest. General Lemnitzer asked whether we could use Japan in conducting United Nations operations in Korea. Ambassador MacArthur replied in the affirmative and pointed out that this matter was treated not under the Security Treaty but by an exchange of notes relating to the Peace Treaty and that it would still be valid although the Security Treaty were replaced. He then read aloud the operative portion of the exchange of notes between Secretary of State Acheson and Japanese Prime Minister Yoshida dated September 8, 1951.² He said this language would not be tampered with.

Mr. Irwin remarked that this would not help in United States action in the Taiwan Straits. Ambassador MacArthur agreed it would not help unless it were a United Nations action.

Ambassador MacArthur underlined the fact that in his estimation by entering the proposed mutual security treaty we would be putting our security relations with Japan on the same basis as that of all our other allies. Mr. Irwin acknowledged this but noted that possibly an exception would be the limitation the Japanese would put on our use of Japan in defense operations. Ambassador MacArthur in turn agreed by pointing out that we could not use British territory either, without their consent. To this General Lemnitzer responded by saying that if we were to ask Japan we would be refused, while we would not be refused if we were to ask England. [9 lines of source text not declassified]

Ambassador MacArthur commented that the Japanese Foreign Office had a draft treaty calling for consultation and agreement on the introduction of nuclears. The British formula of 1952, omitting joint decision and putting in joint consultation, might be sold to the Japanese–at least in a package with the new treaty. Mr. Kishi could table the Socialist resolution in the Diet on the grounds that discussions covering these problems were in process with the United States.

Admiral Burke did not like the idea of consultation and pointed out that it would stymie us in the Taiwan Straits. Admiral Burke remarked that the British would agree to let us use their bases in emergency. Ambassador MacArthur did not think that this was certain. He pointed out that we could not use bases in Europe in countries not involved. If we were to use bases in Japan against Japan’s will, we would close off the Japanese labor force and the utilities used by our bases. Take Greece, he said. Admiral Burke interrupted to agree that the Greek and Japanese situations were similar. Ambassador MacArthur said we could not treat Japan differently from our other allies. If we did so, we would go out of business. Should there be an attack on Taiwan, we would, no doubt, get the consent of the Japanese to use our bases there, but not if the attack were only against the off-shore islands.

Mr. Irwin said that the Ambassador had pointed out the logistic use of our bases in Japan. If you were to remove both the Japanese and Philippine bases, we would have no real bases west of Guam. If you could not use bases in Japan and the Philippines and if our national policy was to defend Quemoy and Matsu, you were saying that the Defense Department must be prepared to operate from Hawaii, Guam, and the West Coast. Ambassador MacArthur disagreed, pointing out that this was true only of operations and not of logistics. Mr. Irwin said he thought we had a problem. Ambassador MacArthur did not think we could afford to base our plans on invalid assumptions.

Admiral Burke thought we had better pull out of Japan if we could not count on her. Ambassador MacArthur said we could count on Japan for Korea, Taiwan and the Pescadores, but not for the off-shore islands. However, this was academic. If we did not move now, Japan would confront us with a demand and we would have no recourse but to comply. Japan was one of the four major industrial complexes in the world. Japan’s position in Asia and the world was steadily becoming more important. If Japan went neutral, our military men could scratch South Asia. These other Asians would run foot races to Peiping. Admiral Burke agreed.

How did we then align Japan with us, Ambassador MacArthur asked, and answered himself by stating two means: (1) economic arrangements, and (2) acceptable security arrangements. Moreover, we would have to meet this problem before the Diet convened.

Admiral Burke asserted that Japan needed us more than we needed Japan. We would not want to force Japan into neutralism, but we would gain nothing by trying to buy Japanese favor. We could not give Japan more control over our operations than we gave to the Philippines or to the Taiwanese. Ambassador MacArthur said that Kishi had already told the Diet that the “new era” required the United States to get Japan’s agreement prior to bringing in nuclears. There was no point in our driving Kishi out of business.

Mr. Irwin suggested that we be more clean cut in the agreement and say “joint decision” rather than just “joint consultation”. Mr. Sprague expressed his preference to keeping “consultation” but if the Japanese did not buy it we would have had it anyway. He felt that our taking this up with them now was the best insurance of keeping their cooperation in the future. Admiral Burke thought that this would make the use of our bases uncertain. Mr. Sprague said we would have that problem anyway. He asked Ambassador MacArthur whether his formula language covered nuclears. The Ambassador said that it did in the phrase “forces and their equipment”. He did not want to make a special category of nuclears.

[1 paragraph (6 lines of source text) not declassified]

General Lemnitzer said he took it that Ambassador MacArthur was for a new treaty. He himself had been in on the NATO Treaty presentation to the Senate Committee with General Bradley³ and they had taken a terrible beating on the “mutuality” aspect. Ambassador MacArthur said that he had appeared on the SEATO Treaty. A lot of water had gone over the dam before SEATO and no problem had arisen at that time. He foresaw no difficulty with respect to the mutuality aspect of the proposed treaty with Japan. He had talked, he said, with Senators Sparkman and Mansfield ⁴ and some others over the past year and they were all for a mutual security treaty.

Mr. Sprague remarked that if we were starting from scratch, their making available of bases itself would be a great concession toward mutuality. Of course, we would have to face the necessity of revising our arrangements with the Philippines.

Mr. Becker, speaking to the Defense people, said that they wanted the United States to get from Japan a commitment it would let us use bases in Japan whenever we were carrying out our treaty obligations with other countries. Our President could not give such a commitment and Mr. Becker doubted if any Government could.

General Lemnitzer asked what if we should wish to send fighter bombers from Japan to Taiwan. Ambassador MacArthur thought this merely a matter of deployment and that it would raise no problem. The problem was in mounting strikes from Japanese bases.

[1 paragraph (2 lines of source text) not declassified]

Ambassador MacArthur reiterated that the present treaty was no longer viable. This was our chance to align Japan firmly with the United States. If we failed to move we would be faced with a demand which would stymie us.

Admiral Burke said that if the draft treaty were accepted we would have to have a new Administrative Agreement. Ambassador MacArthur agreed and pointed out that conservatives in Japan were now studying what type of administrative agreement would best suit the needs of our forces in Japan. Ambassador MacArthur gave his opinion that if we meet Kishi’s two requests we would have no other problems with respect to matters covered by the Administrative Agreement. General Lemnitzer asked whether the Japanese had indicated what part of the Administrative Agreement they wanted abolished. Ambassador MacArthur replied that they had not done so; they merely wanted the two points mentioned to appear either in the Administrative Agreement or in an exchange of notes. We certainly did not want it in the treaty. General Lemnitzer said that we did not want it in the Administrative Agreement. Mr. Becker thought that Article VI was broad enough to include the points in the Administrative Agreement. Ambassador MacArthur suggested that the formula might appear in a minute of the negotiations; the Japanese would not care.

Mr. Lang noted that the Administrative Agreement already provides for consultation in the event of hostility. Ambassador MacArthur thought this referred to activities in the area of Japan itself.

General Lemnitzer noted that according to the draft this treaty could be abrogated with one year’s notice. We had no other treaty like that, so far as he knew. Ambassador MacArthur replied that we have such treaties with all the SEATO countries. Moreover, the President last year had told Mr. Kishi that we did not wish to keep forces where they were not wanted. This assertion had taken all the steam out of Japan’s move to get our forces out. The Secretary had frequently said that any treaty was durable so long as it reflected the interest of the parties and that it failed when it no longer reflected them. General Lemnitzer brought out that the Philippine base agreement had 89 years to go⁵ and that the NATO arrangements were based on 20 years duration. Ambassador MacArthur responded that even under the present Security Treaty we would have to pull our troops out if Japan denounced it.

Mr. Becker noted that Article V of the draft treaty made the treaty operable in case of attack not just in the area of Japan but anywhere in the Pacific. Admiral Burke said he preferred “naval” to “sea” in Article VI, referring to the types of United States forces in Japan, since “naval” included the Marines. Mr. Sprague said it would be better if there were a long-range commitment on Japan’s part to provide bases for our forces. Ambassador MacArthur noted that it was in Japan’s economic interests to keep our forces. General Lemnitzer said that those economic interests were not superior to the political push to get our ground forces out of Japan last year.

Mr. Sprague stated his opinion that it would not be possible to get a final decision on these points at the present meeting. He asked what the State Department wanted to tell Prime Minister Kishi. Ambassador MacArthur said that the Secretary of State would table no papers, that he would tell the Japanese we would study their proposal with interest. He would agree that the time had come to make certain adjustments, that while in principle we were disposed to enter a mutual security treaty and get a mutually acceptable agreement on the two points, the question of a treaty would raise the need to consult the Senate. Congress was out of session but we would talk to individual Senators and we would plan to be ready to sit down early in October to negotiate.

Ambassador MacArthur remarked that he himself was anxious for tactical reasons to start with our papers rather than theirs in such negotiations. The Secretary had told him last night that he might have minor changes to recommend in the draft. There was no problem in changing “sea” to “naval” and so on. We would discuss these changes with the Defense Department when it was determined how the Secretary viewed them.

Admiral Burke said that what they needed to do in the Defense Department was to work out how they would want the formula and treaty interpreted. Ambassador MacArthur said that Kishi had already given his interpretation, namely, that the President would consult on the two points concerned and would not move without Japanese agreement. Mr. Sprague said Defense was willing to go along with the position which Ambassador MacArthur had described, without mention of specific wording of the agreement. General Lemnitzer said that it was necessary to spell out the United Nations matter. Ambassador MacArthur said that he would do that when he sat down with Kishi. It posed no problem. General Lemnitzer said that this removed a big problem so far as he was concerned. Mr. Sprague said that the Secretary could be informed that Defense agreed to his assuring Mr. Fujiyama that the United States was ready to consider a mutual security treaty and related arrangements.

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 794.5/9–958. Secret. Drafted by Martin on October 13.
1. The U.S.-Philippine Mutual Defense Treaty, signed at Washington August 30, 1951, and entered into force August 27, 1952. For text, see 3 UST (pt. 3) 3947.
2. For text, see 3 UST (pt. 3) 3326.
3. General Omar N. Bradley.
4. Mike Mansfield of Montana and John J. Sparkman of Alabama, both members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.
5. According to the terms of the memoranda of understanding signed on October 12, 1959, it was reduced to 25 years. See the memorandum on base negotiations by Mein, January 27, 1960, vol. XV, pp. 946–957.