Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Indonesia, Volume XVII

91. Telegram From the Embassy in Indonesia to the Department of State⁰

Djakarta, May 12, 1958, 5 p.m.

4175. Department pass AFCIN–1A1, ACSI, CNO, CINCPAC for POLAD. For Robertson from Jones. Reference: ARMACX 158.¹ Situation has now developed to point where I believe we must move decisively and immediately to prevent fragmentation of Indonesia, jeopardy to US policy through fight with Indonesia in UN, possible break of relations, and Java alignment with Soviet bloc.

Following is my understanding of our objective, basic elements of present situation as of today, and recommended course of action:

The objective: An independent, politically stable, economically sound unified, anti-Communist Indonesia.

Present situation:

1. A military stalemate now exists in sense that the GOI cannot subdue the rebels if latter continue to enjoy foreign support. Conversely, rebels cannot achieve a military victory over the GOI unless rebels receive massive foreign support.

2. If fight increases in tempo, more Soviet bloc aid, “technicians” and finally “volunteers” will be accepted by GOI and rebels will call for more “volunteers” and aid from the West. Each side will damage other with no progress towards US objective.

3. Under above circumstances:

(A) Soviet bloc will become established solidly as ally of GOI and US will be regarded as enemy by majority of Indonesians.

(B) In UN GOI will brand US as an aggressor and debate with evidence supplied by GOI (see ARMA reftel) will have most serious repercussions on US foreign policy and seriously damage our position in Asia.

(C) GOI Cabinet has already debated breaking relations with US and probably will do so if military fight is intensified with continuing foreign support to rebels.

4. I believe above deterioration US position can be avoided if we act promptly. I think elements exist in present situation which can be exploited to resolve current impasse and turn tide in new direction.

5. These elements are:

(A) GOI–rebel conflict is not a fight between Communists and anti-Communists. Both GOI Army and rebels are anti-Communist.

(B) Bulk of GOI Army are sympathetic to rebel political objectives although opposed to rebel military defections.

(C) Rebel movement in its inception has primary goal of forcing political changes, not destroying military strength of GOI.

(D) Both GOI Army and rebels share US desire for a unified, democratic, independent non-Communist oriented Indonesia.

6. Successful negotiation between GOI Army and rebels on initiative of either side is now apparently impossible after failure Andi Jusuf compromise attempt (ARMA reftel). It is evident compromise becomes more difficult as lines become more sharply drawn and personal bitterness increases.

7. Since military situation is at an impasse, and since neither side can prevail without outside help, US presumably now holds balance of power to settle issue in our favor if our power is applied before Soviets induce GOI abandon West and side with Communists.

8. This balance power can be applied by exerting immediate pressure and inducements on both GOJ and rebels in following recommended steps to be taken:

(A) Inform Colonel Kawilarang and General Nasution immediately through attaché channel that US believes fighting should cease and that this is in best interest Indo and US. Tell them first steps are to stop rebel bombings, and GOI build up against Celebes.

(B) Offer unofficial US mediation to both commanders and then ascertain their respective minimum terms for settlement of military and political differences.

(C) Compare Nasution and Kawilarang terms and decide what we consider equitable basis agreement, rejecting unreasonable demands from either side.

(D) Inform Kawilarang US will exercise its full influence to eliminate rebels support unless he agrees to adjusted terms.

(E) Inform Nasution if he will agree to adjusted terms US will furnish him immediately military, economic and political support, provided he follows through his proposed plan to: (1) settle military differences with rebels and unify army; (2) bring about cabinet changes eliminating leftists; (3) exercise controls over Communists.

9. I believe exercise of our power and influence along above lines has fair chance to succeed. In any event, I believe that it is worth real try and that our efforts would be understood by both sides and might stave off imminent danger of fast GOI slide into Soviet bloc orbit.

10. I continue to urge strongly that Secretary make some public statement along lines earlier recommended to demonstrate US sincerity in last week’s démarche. Suspicion that US does not mean what it says here is apparent on all sides. “US Ambassador tells us one thing but we hear no echo of his words in Washington” is way one Indo put it. They cannot understand this silence. British and Australian Ambassadors concur in my view voice from Washington needs to be heard unless value last week’s détente be lost. If above recommendations are adopted, it is important approach Nasution in atmosphere in which he is convinced we are honestly attempting to help him and not merely playing rebel game.

11. If Department agrees above courses of action are worth undertaking, they must be pursued quickly. We have bought a little time but not much. It is essential to get off dead center. I hope I may be authorized immediately to approach General Nasution through attachés and someone must approach Kawilarang in Manila. I suggest attachés make initial approach to Nasution through deputy or assistant and that if reaction favorable, I follow up with Djuanda and Nasution. Advise soonest. Admiral Frost and attachés [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] concur.

Jones

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 756D.00/5–1258. Top Secret; Niact; Limit Distribution.
1. Document 90.