Office of the Historian

173. Telegram from the Embassy in Indonesia to the Department of State0

Djakarta, January 21, 1959, 11 a.m.

2274. Department pass Department Army for ACSI. CINCPAC also for POLAD. Pertinent portions of ARMA telegram to DEPTAR (CX–21)1 reflects widespread conviction Indonesian Government, armed forces that GRC continuing attempts supply rebels by sea, air.

This conviction most deep-seated in air force, may be responsible for difficulties encountered in establishing US rapport with AURI.

Unfortunate fact is that hand in hand with this conviction goes equally intense belief that US is doing less than best to prevent GRC activity this direction. This flows from obvious dependence GRC on US for military supplies, economic aid, and diplomatic support.

GOI reasons that US could prevent use of its aid goods this fashion by withholding them if necessary or at any rate could apply sufficient political pressure to cut off rebel supplies it so willed.

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Further, there is no prospect of alleviating plight of KMT Chinese here if this aid continues.

So long as suspicion remains alive that US is doing less than utmost to prevent supplies reaching rebels, our influence in total Indonesian picture toward stimulating anti-Communist efforts, shift away from Soviet bloc, will be less than maximum potential. There exists no suspicion that PKI or Soviet bloc are supporting or permitting support of rebellion. On contrary they most ardent, ostensibly unqualified supporters central government.

If GRC is in fact aiding rebels they undermining US policy this area not only to our detriment but their own as well.2

Jones
  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 756D.00/1–2159. Secret; Noforn. Repeated to Taipei and CINCPAC↩
  2. Not found.↩
  3. In telegram 1394 to Djakarta, February 3, the Department informed the Embassy that Robertson made a strong presentation to Ambassador Yeh on January 29 of the case for current U.S. policy toward Indonesia and the importance of GRC’s refraining from any activity that might undermine U.S. influence with the Indonesian Government. (Department of State, Central Files, 756D.00/2–359) See Supplement.↩