Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Africa, Volume XIV

187. Memorandum From the Board of National Estimates to the Director of Central Intelligence (Dulles)⁰

August 22, 1960.

SUBJECT

• Implications of the Congo Crisis

Introduction

1. The breakdown of civil order in the Congo and the confused period of struggle, invective, and improvisation which has followed have deeply affected a wide range of elements and interests outside the Congo itself. The crisis has raised serious problems and emotions not only with Belgium, whose citizens, pride, and property have been directly threatened, but with other European NATO members, and has raised once again divisive questions about the direction and unity of Western policy in dealing with rampant anti-colonialist nationalism. The Bloc has been presented with substantial opportunities for fomenting trouble and extending its opportunities at the expense of the West.

2. Among other Afro-Asian states, particularly those of West Africa, the crisis has revived anti-colonialist emotions, aroused fears regarding their own unity and freedom from cold war tensions, and created hopes of extending their own influence. Meanwhile it has added to tensions in nearby areas still under white rule. For the UN and particularly Secretary-General Hammarskjold, the crisis has brought unprecedented responsibilities, involving risks of damaging UN cohesiveness and prestige as well as the possibility of enhancing the UN’s overall role in world affairs. Behind the conflict of external interests in the Congo, finally, lurks the possibility of a major East-West confrontation.

3. The situation is still too fluid to permit a useful estimate of the future course of events; indeed it is difficult to describe such a swiftly moving state of affairs. Three main elements, each of them complex enough by itself, exist and interact. First are the internal political struggles in the Congo, between Lumumba and his domestic foes, between the ideas of centralism and federalism, between Elisabethville and Leopoldville, between order and chaos. Second is the pressure of various external interests on the situation—the interests of Belgium, of the Western world generally, of the Bloc, and of the other African states. Finally there is the UN itself, desperately trying to reconcile these various pressures and interests, and in the process becoming itself a factor of power of the first importance.

The Immediate Future

4. Should there be sufficiently broad international support for a continuing active UN role in the Congo, the intensity of the internal Congolese political struggle and its repercussions elsewhere would soon be reduced, at least to some degree. On the other hand, should the UN be forced to withdraw, or should there be a serious split in the non-Communist world about the desirability of its remaining, Lumumba’s efforts to establish and consolidate his power would be more unrestrained, and the other interests involved—notably Belgium, the Bloc, and such African states as Ghana and Guinea—would probably be forced to choose between accepting increasing involvement or backing down as best they could.

5. One possibility is that Lumumba might be assassinated, or that his external support might fall away and effective internal opposition to his policies crystallize. The USSR on the one hand and the leaders of Guinea and to a lesser extent Ghana on the other appear to be developing a considerable stake in Lumumba. The USSR regard him as useful in cleaning out the Belgians and see him as a potential client. Guinea and Ghana oppose any beginnings of regional separatism and hope that Lumumba can be tied to their Pan-Africanist leading strings. However, even they may develop misgivings about overcommitting themselves to a man of Lumumba’s volatility and unreliability, especially in the face of the growing reservations of many other African and Asian states about him.

6. Assuming that Lumumba continues in office, however—and this still appears likely—the internal Congolese political struggle will probably continue unresolved for some time. Even though UN forces remain in the country, Lumumba will probably retain the initiative, since he has the only Congolese military forces outside the Katanga and is evidently willing to move ruthlessly to beat down and intimidate those opposing or restraining him, including as necessary the UN. These factors, together with the apparent absence of any other Congolese leader with comparable energy, prominence, and willingness to do battle at the national level, give him substantial advantages.

7. Nevertheless, it appears unlikely that he will swiftly be able to establish and consolidate anything more than a skeletonized government, holding power of a sort at the center but with its control over the rest of the country at least initially tenuous. The Congolese army lacks trained officers and equipment and has still to establish its unquestioned loyalty to him. His political organization is strong only in comparison to those of other, more locally based leaders. If some modus vivendi is worked out with the UN, help will be available from that quarter in averting a total breakdown of basic governmental and economic functions, but probably only at the expense of placing restraints on the pace of his consolidation of power. On the other hand, forcing out the UN, while probably increasing Lumumba’s freedom of action, would place new burdens on his own overworked security forces and threaten the loss of Western and UN technical and financial support. Under these circumstances, the USSR would probably supply economic and technical help promptly (perhaps including military instructors) and some troops would probably be forthcoming from Guinea and perhaps one or two other countries. But even if these moves were not countered by the West, the actual consolidation of Lumumba’s power would take time.

8. At least until the basic political problem is resolved, the danger of new riots and clashes will remain. Another wholesale breakdown of authority is possible, and would indeed be almost certain if UN troops are withdrawn. Lumumba seems intent on continuing his harassment of whites, possibly involving clashes between Congolese and UN forces. With the economy and administration in disarray and both Lumumba and his opponents likely to play on tribal rivalries in their efforts to gain support, new inter-tribal battles could readily develop.

9. The explosive Katanga issue also remains. It is possible that the issue will eventually be resolved without open hostilities. As part of a successful drive to consolidate his position, Lumumba may in time succeed through international pressure, subversion, or perhaps assassination in isolating and toppling the Katanga government. Alternatively, the central government (though probably not under Lumumba) may become willing to reach a compromise. For the present, however, there is growing danger of an armed clash. Lumumba appears intent on building up his forces for this purpose, while Tshombe, thanks in part to some remaining Belgian advisors, has a fairly substantial defense force. Unless convinced that armed resistance would be futile or internationally disastrous, Belgium and other European NATO members would probably back Katanga and place strong pressure on the US to do likewise. Lumumba, in turn, would probably have some military support from at least Guinea among the African powers, and diplomatic and moral support (and perhaps arms) from the USSR. Although we consider it unlikely that either the USSR or Belgium and its friends would actually send troops to the scene, the result could be a major East-West confrontation in which the emotions of many Afro-Asian states would be deeply involved and the capacity of the UN to mediate might have been seriously prejudiced.

10. Katanga is not the only province where separatist sentiment exists. Some steps toward autonomy have been taken by local political leaders in three other provinces as well, and the “independent” Mining State of Kasai has already been proclaimed. Such developments will further complicate the confusion.

Further Prospects

11. As we see it at present, four possible outcomes of the present political struggle warrant attention: (a) the establishment of central authority under Lumumba; (b) the establishment of a federal type of government, most probably not under Lumumba; (c) a fragmented Congo; and (d) UN control. As indicated above, we cannot confidently predict at this early stage precisely what one solution as against the other would mean for the Congo and the various interested outside parties. However, the following projections would appear to be reasonable.

12. Central Authority under Lumumba

a. The establishment of effective central authority, for which Lumumba alone appears to have the drive and ability, would certainly involve the extensive use of authoritarian measures, supplemented by efforts to broaden the geographical and popular base of Lumumba’s political movement. Given the depth of the Congo’s tribal and regional differences, the government’s control over the hinterland would rest on its ability to discourage or repress serious resistance to its wishes rather than on genuine acceptance of central authority. It would be tenuous in many more remote areas.

b. Any Congolese government will require extensive technical and economic assistance to keep its economy and administration going. Lumumba is probably quite capable of turning again to Belgium, the UN, and the US once he has established that he is the man to deal with. The Belgians in particular will be bitter, and reluctant to do further business with Lumumba. However, the Western countries will generally be concerned to retain a UN tie with the Congo, rather than cut Lumumba totally adrift.

b. 1. In the absence of UN assistance, Lumumba will turn elsewhere, possibly first to a group of Afro-Asian countries, which would almost certainly be unable to fulfill the Congo’s needs. At the same time, he will recognize that major assistance must come from the major powers, and the Bloc is likely to be less inhibited than the West in taking over from the UN. If Congolese dependence on the Bloc became substantial, it would facilitate the expulsion or flight of Western economic interests, pave the way for establishment of Communist-type economic institutions, and generally facilitate a politico-economic development similar to that in Guinea.

c. Lumumba’s foreign policy would probably be opportunistic and quixotic. His probable dependence for support and advice on the Bloc and on such African countries as Ghana and Guinea, coupled with his underlying anti-Belgian, anti-white feelings, would make him a left neutralist, but he would probably be hard to keep pinned down. He would probably be a disruptive element among other African and Asian states. He is an obvious target for competitive efforts to exert influence over him and by his wild behavior would probably irritate the older line neutralists and pro-Western governments. Although his establishment of a dominant position would discourage separatists in other African states and reinforce the fears of white elements still dominant in other areas, his Congo state would probably long remain too weak to exert significant pressures of its own in such areas. However, under Lumumba the Congo might become a base for Bloc operations in the area, e.g., the running of arms into Angola and Northern Rhodesia.

13. Federal Type of Government

a. The abandonment of the present unitary state in favor of a federal arrangement, with more power returned to the provinces, would probably be coupled with the downfall of Lumumba, who is bitterly opposed to regionalism. This may prove to be the only practical arrangement for the present in a country as disunited as the Congo and lacking political leaders with other than a local following. However, it would involve a revamping of such elements of the Belgian administrative structure as remain in which coordination of activities on a national basis would be more difficult and efficiency lost.

b. The leading political figures in a federation would probably be disposed to rely on the UN and the West for technical assistance and economic aid, at least at the outset. They might even be willing to come to some agreement by which a substantial number of the Belgian technicians might return. As time goes on, however, these essentially opportunistic leaders would probably cast around for assistance from any outside source including the Bloc.

c. The federal solution would be a bitter disappointment to some influential African leaders who would see it as the opening wedge leading to secessionist moves elsewhere. With a weak central government the Congo would become a natural battle ground for a variety of conflicting interests including Pan-Africanists, white settlers in the Rhodesias and Kenya, and the Bloc. Because of its encouragement of regional ambitions, a federal arrangement would also stimulate agitation for new political groupings, linking tribal elements in Angola and the former French Congo with their tribal brethren in the Congo.

14. A Fragmented Congo. A fragmented Congo—i.e., a complete separation of Katanga from the rest of the Congo, or a further division into separate and independent states—would almost certainly be a source of weakness and contention in the area. It is strongly opposed not only by the Africans but by most European powers, who fear the impact of regional separatism elsewhere. Even the present Katanga leadership is seeking autonomy, not independence. Thus the persistence of an independent Katanga would represent the continuation of an unresolved battle rather than any viable solution and would be a continuing source of political if not military skirmishing.

15. UN Control. The question has frequently arisen whether the Congo might not be best served by a further period of tutelage under the UN pending the development of an adequate corps of political leaders and administrators. Such an arrangement would probably involve a UN administration set up under the Secretariat or under a group of UN trustee countries rather than under the single trustee nation arrangement inherited from the old League of Nations mandate system. It might involve de facto UN control of a nominally independent Congo government through extensive use of UN administrators and advisers.

a. An attempt at such a solution might prove unavoidable in the event of another drastic breakdown of civil authority within the Congolese republic, and moves toward de facto UN administrative control might take place under any moderate successor to Lumumba. If the Belgian link is in fact broken beyond repair, this might prove the only way (other than resort to the Bloc) of providing the thousands of administrators needed to replace Belgians m the government.

b. Over and above the managerial problems of recruiting and organizing a large-scale UN administrative team, however, the venture would involve difficult political problems and would be hard to sustain for more than a brief period in which little real preparation of Congolese leaders could take place. In time virtually all Congolese leaders would become increasingly restive over outside domination, even on an international basis, and in this they would be supported by the other African states. The problem of financial relations would be a serious one. Finally, the arrangement would be conditioned on a long-sustained consensus in the UN, involving the Bloc and the Afro-Asian group, that such a solution was the best for all concerned. This would be certainly difficult to maintain. Even if UN control was not directly attacked, the UN would have to cope with a wide range of attempted political manipulation and proselytization within the Congo.

16. General Comments. In addition to the foregoing, certain general conclusions can probably be advanced on the probable effects of the Congo crisis:

a. The Belgian future in the Congo is bleak. The Belgian presence—administrators, economic enterprises, etc.—is eventually likely to become minimal or nonexistent if Lumumba continues in power. Although his replacement by a more moderate leadership would probably open the way for a formulation of new arrangements for continued Belgian-Congolese cooperation in administrative, financial, and economic matters, too much fear and bitterness has been aroused on both sides for such arrangements to persist for very long.

b. Thus, the crisis will achieve one of the important Soviet objectives in the area, to end the political and economic dominance of the Western powers over what is in terms of resources one of the richest areas in Africa. The USSR will also have substantial opportunities for developing its own influence and moulding the state and economy along radical lines, particularly if Lumumba remains in power. Given the primitive level of political development in the Congo, however, we consider it unlikely that the Congo would become an actual Communist state at any early date. Moreover, the crisis might result in the USSR becoming heavily committed to Lumumba’s success but unable or unwilling to provide the necessary support.

c. These prospects will almost certainly be a source of deep uneasiness not only to Belgium but also to France, Portugal, and other European NATO members. We are not prepared to say that this would adversely affect NATO military posture. However, it will almost certainly stimulate further European pressure—directed primarily at the US—for the development of coordinated policies for meeting the joint challenge of nationalism and communism in Africa and other underdeveloped areas.

d. For the UN, the crisis provides unprecedented opportunities and risks. It may emerge with a much enlarged role in preserving peace and stability in the underdeveloped world. If it succeeds, this would probably involve welcome indication that on this issue at least, the USSR was willing to cooperate in limiting the risks of East-West competition. The UN organization may, on the other hand, become overextended and discredited, with Hammarskjold perhaps forced to resign. An additional danger is of critical cleavages within the UN between the Bloc and the non-Communist world, or between the Afro-Asian group and the West.

For the Board of National Estimates

Abbot Smith
Acting Chairman

0. Source: Department of State, AF/AFC Files: Lot 65 D 261, U.S. Intelligence Board. Secret. A covering memorandum from Chester L. Cooper, Acting Assistant Director of National Estimates, indicated that the memorandum was intended for the U.S. Intelligence Board and had been prepared pursuant to its directives. The text printed here was sent to Ferguson by Robert D. Baum, Chief of the Africa Division in the Office of Research and Analysis for Mid-East and Africa, Department of State, with attached comments, stating that the CIA had resisted efforts by other agencies to amend the document and make it a USIB document. The proposed amendments included the replacement of the first sentence of paragraph 6 by the following: “Although there have been reports of plots to assassinate Lumumba, it is improbable he will be killed. The practice of political assassination, which exists north of the Sahara, has not yet developed to the south, and no major African leader has yet been killed by fellow Africans. It is much more probable that Lumumba will not be removed by force, and that the internal Congolese political struggle will continue unresolved for some time.”

   The following was proposed as a replacement for the first sentence of paragraph 13a:

   “The adoption of some form of federal government, as proposed by Lumumba’s opponents, would strengthen the provinces. This would probably be coupled with a diminution of Lumumba’s power or possibly by his downfall as prime minister.”