Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Arab-Israeli Dispute; United Arab Republic; North Africa, Volume XIII

31. Memorandum of a Conversation, Embassy Residence, London, July 27, 1958, 10 a.m.¹

USDel/MC/5

London, July 27, 1958, 10 a.m.

PARTICIPANTS

• The United States
  • The Secretary
  • Mr. William M. Rountree
• Israel
  • Ambassador Eban
  • Mr. Shiloah (Israeli Foreign Office)

SUBJECTS

• [Item 1 (1 line of source text) not declassified]
• 2. Jordan
• 3. Nasser

Ambassador Eban and Mr. Shiloah called secretly to see the Secretary at the Embassy Residence at 10:00 A.M. Sunday, July 27, 1958. Ambassador Eban began by saying that Prime Minister Ben Gurion had received with appreciation the President’s recent letter to him.² The Secretary remarked that the message had not gone as far as the President would have liked, but that the Ambassador would understand the difficulty of setting forth anything which might be interpreted as a commitment. He thought the implications were, however, clear. Ambassador Eban appreciated this and said that in any event the Prime Minister had understood the Secretary would be writing in greater detail.

[3 paragraphs (22 lines of source text) not declassified]

Turning to Jordan the Ambassador said that his government had been considering this matter carefully, and that the Prime Minister now felt that there was better alternative than maintaining a separate Jordan, even though there were great complexities involved. Any other proposals involved difficulties and dangers, but if it was, nevertheless, not possible to maintain the status quo or some improvement upon it based upon Jordanian independence, the Israeli thinking was that the western part of the country (the West bank) belonged to the land mass of Palestine. Perhaps it would be possible to bring about a union with Iraq of the eastern portion of Jordan, with the western portion established in some kind of autonomous political unit with which there could be a union with Israel. The full absorption by Israel of West Jordan would have a marked disadvantage from the Israeli viewpoint. There was a rebellious population and a very turbulent situation in that part of Jordan. Israel did not, in any event, have expansionist ideas and would not seek to increase its territory by taking over this unhappy situation, if it could be avoided. A free union of Western Jordan with Israel would not, it was recognized, be welcomed by the population in present circumstances. On the other hand, Israel did not believe that their people would wish to be swallowed up by Iraq. The problem was, therefore, to try to create over a period of time some sentiment for a union of the type suggested.

The Secretary observed that most of the population of the West bank were Palestinians who were highly emotional on the question of Israel [1 line of source text not declassified]. The Ambassador [1 line of source text not declassified] concurred that this group could be described as strongly anti-Israel. The Ambassador said it was for that reason that such a union could not occur in a week or a month, but perhaps it could in a year or two, after concerted efforts to build up a suitable climate.

Mr. Shiloah said he had had a long talk with the Prime Minister and the Foreign Minister. Both felt it best to preserve the status of Jordan. In view of events, it was clear that Jordan, as we know it, would not last forever. In that case, if some arrangements could be made with the new Iraqi government along the lines set forth by Ambassador Eban, it might be possible for the Iraqi to take over some of the refugees on the West bank, with Israel taking over some, thus reducing the refugee problem. Mr. Shiloah recalled that there had been some talk in the past by groups in West Jordan of their getting out of Jordan and joining Israel. Things had deteriorated since then, however, and he did not see any immediate chance for such arrangement. If events forced a new solution to the Jordanian problem, the Israeli government wished to avoid a situation in which hostile forces would be on its borders west of the Jordan River. Israel would much prefer an agreement on action to be taken to resolve the problem.

Continuing, Mr. Shiloah said the Prime Minister believed Jordan could be preserved only if anti-Nasser forces in the area cooperated among themselves. It was essential that the Nasser drive be halted, and those opposed to Nasser should be encouraged by the United States to cooperate toward that end. Israel had been gratified at the extent of cooperation on the part of a number of countries in the area which wished to do everything possible to defeat the aims of Nasser. The Prime Minister urged the United States to consider:

1. Doing everything possible to maintain the status quo in the area;

2. Encouraging wider cooperation among the anti-Nasser governments toward this end; and

3. Thus providing enough time to work out carefully future plans for such territorial adjustments in the area as might be required.

Mr. Shiloah emphasized this had been put to the United States only and would not be repeated to representatives of other countries.

Mr. Shiloah said that Nasser’s last public speech had made it clear that he had in mind as his immediate targets Sudan, Lebanon and Jordan. The Secretary observed that the popularity of Nasser in the area was due partly to pan-Arabism, and it was also due partly to the aura of success which he had generated. He had gone from one thing to another, and his tactics were such that he could not stand still. He thought Nasser’s anger at the presence of American Forces in Lebanon and British Forces in Jordan was not so much because he thought those Forces constituted a military threat to the UAR, but because they tended to check his success. If his success could be interrupted, his prestige would quickly go down. Mr. Shiloah agreed fully. He said that Nasser was not popular in his own right, but that his ability to achieve one success after another had rendered it difficult to generate effective opposition to him. Inside the UAR things were not as happy as they seemed on the surface. The Syrians had had second thoughts and wanted more independence. Nasser already had been forced to make certain concessions to the Syrians. For example, although political parties had been banned, the Ba’ath Party had been reluctant to go out of existence and Nasser had now allowed some latitude. He said that the Ba’ath Party had been encouraging Iraq not to merge with UAR but to retain some independence.

The Secretary referred to his meeting in Bonn with Chancellor Adenauer³ and said the Chancellor had apparently gained the impression from Mr. Fischer of the Israeli Foreign Office that Nasser would be no danger if the Western Powers would concentrate on the economic development of Egypt. Ambassador Eban was surprised to hear this and expressed the conviction that Mr. Fischer had not intended to give that impression. The Israeli view was that Nasser needed a period in which to consolidate progress which he had made. They believe he should not be given such a period, and that pressures should continue against him. The West should stall in widening the Canal without cancelling contracts; credits given by West Germany should be slowed down in implementations, although they should not be withdrawn; other measures should be taken to stall and slow down Nasser’s progress in order to frustrate him without creating a situation in which he would have a useable justification for retaliation. The Ambassador said he would undertake to arrange for Mr. Fischer to clarify with the German Government the Israeli view, without relating any further contacts to conversation with the Secretary.

The Ambassador turned to the question of the Summit meeting. He said Israel would ask for the right to participate as a matter of principle if the Arab States participated. His Government had not, however, changed its basic view that the Arab-Israel question should not be brought before a Summit meeting at this time. The Secretary inquired as to the Ambassador’s attitude upon the possibility that a high-level meeting of the Security Council might be used as an occasion to get started on peace efforts between Israel and the Arab states. The Ambassador responded that progress in this connection must be in stages. As a first stage it was necessary to stabilize the security situation in the area. If this weren’t accomplished, nothing could be achieved on substantive issues. The second stage would be to approach the question of settlement in a stabilized atmosphere.

Mr. Shiloah quickly interjected that he would not wish to give a definitive response on the Secretary’s question without reference to his Government. He would ask specifically for the Israeli attitude in this regard.

An hour after the meeting Ambassador Eban sent a letter to Mr. Rountree expanding upon certain points. A copy of the letter is attached.⁴

1. Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 63 D 123, CF 1061. Secret. Drafted by Rountree. During this meeting, Eban and Dulles also discussed Israeli cooperation with the Sudan. A memorandum of this part of the conversation is ibid.
2. On July 25, President Eisenhower wrote to Prime Minister Ben Gurion [less than 1 line of text not declassified] stating that Israel could “be confident of United States interest in the integrity and independence of Israel,” and noting that Dulles would write to him in more detail. (Eisenhower Library, Herter Papers)
3. Documentation on Secretary Dulles’ trip to Bonn, July 26, is in Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 63 D 123, CF 1064.
4. Not printed.