Office of the Historian

280. Memorandum of Conversation0

USDel/MC/16
Washington, October 9, 1959.

SUBJECT

  • USSR-Iran Relations1

PARTICIPANTS

  • Dr. Manuchehr Eqbal, Prime Minister of Iran
  • Mr. Amir Khosro Afshar-Qasemlu, Under Secretary, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Iran
  • Dr. Ali Qoli Ardalan, Ambassador of Iran
  • The President
  • The Secretary
  • Assistant Secretary G. Lewis Jones
  • Mr. Charles Sedgwick, Interpreter

The Prime Minister of Iran called the President’s attention to the courageous resistance of his government and people to recent Russian propaganda attacks; he considered this a worthwhile experience as it proved the internal stability of Iran and constituted a major defeat for the Soviets who had expected that, after only a few days of propaganda, they would be able to overthrow the Iranian government. The President asked the Prime Minister to convey to the Shah and Iranian government his congratulations on the courage shown in resisting the Soviet propaganda attacks. He noted the serious results which can come from such propaganda and recalled that during the war in Europe it had been hard to keep up the morale of our soldiers because of German propaganda.

In answer to the President’s inquiries about the current intensity and sources of Russian propaganda, Dr. Eqbal replied that it had stopped for about ten days during the Khrushchev visit to the United States and had been resumed after that visit. He commented that the clandestine station “National Voice of Iran” attacks both the Shah and the government while Radio Moscow criticizes only the government. He said that American experts had located the clandestine station near the town of Nakhichevan in the Soviet Caucasus and added that this station, as well as stations in Baku, Moscow, Stalingrad, and East Germany [Page 658] had all concerted their attacks. This was not very adroit, because when Moscow stopped its attacks, the others also stopped theirs, thus showing that all emanate from the same source.

The Prime Minister said that his government had decided not to try to jam the Soviet stations because this would be a sign of weakness and because the Russians would claim that the Iranian government was preventing the people from hearing the truth told by the Soviet stations. Hence, his government was adopting an attitude of indifference toward the propaganda. The President agreed that this is a good technique.

  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.88/10–959. Secret. Drafted by Department of State translator Charles Sedgwick and Nussbaum and approved by the White House on October 20.↩
  2. In addition to this topic, Eisenhower and Eqbal discussed CENTO and petroleum and the Iranian economy. The CENTO discussion is printed in part in Document 76. A separate memorandum of conversation reports on a discussion of the decline in oil prices between Eisenhower and Eqbal. The President suggested that Iran might look to markets in India, Southeast Asia, and the Philippines to sell additional oil. Eqbal noted that because the international consortium controlled 88 percent of the oil produced in Iran, it was really its decision. (CENTO USDel/MC/17, October 9; Department of State, Central Files, 888.2553/10–959)↩