Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Lebanon and Jordan, Volume XI

32. Telegram From the Embassy in Lebanon to the Department of State¹

Beirut, May 14, 1958—1 p.m.

3869. I saw President Chamoun at 10:45 and went over in very great detail four points set out Deptel 4271.² I am certain Chamoun understood every word. His only comment when I indicated four points were interdependent was to say that on third item—support of Arab States in Lebanon’s appeal to US and Security Council—he could not regard this as a condition precedent as it was beyond his power to pledge action of other independent Arab countries. All the other points were matters strictly relating to himself, his government and the US. I said it was surely not intention of USG to make third point a condition for implementation of remaining three.

As forecast Embtel 3863,³ with improved security situation, Chamoun is hopeful he will never need to request intervention by US or UK. However, he asked me to express his profound thanks for this immediate and impressive manifestation of US support.

I mentioned our reservation re use of French forces. Chamoun said he readily concurred and did not believe, as practical matter, French would be in position to send troops even if they wished to. However, he felt it necessary to make démarche to three Ambassadors yesterday, because France had given guarantees to Lebanon.

I discussed leak reported last paragraph Embtel 3863 with President, expressing deep concern lest Osseiran utilize it to disadvantage of Western Powers and Lebanon. Chamoun said he had in Cabinet meeting yesterday merely informed government he had recalled with three Western Ambassadors guarantees their governments had severally given Lebanon. This would explain how Pierre Edde may have put his busy mind to work on possibility of foreign intervention. Chamoun said Osseiran had reached similar conclusion by deduction. He concurred in my assessment of danger lest Osseiran resort to some unauthorized and stupid action. Chamoun said reflectively he thought Osseiran might get “sick.”

I gave President current list of members UN Security Council and suggested (as will also Middleton) that if GOL decides have recourse to SC, it commence diplomatic preparations with view to securing maximum support for its case. As for Malik’s presentation of Lebanon’s case in his wandering press conference yesterday and what I regard as over-generalized protest to Cairo (Embtel 3862)⁴ I urged that GOL be as specific and factual as possible. I said that my British colleague and I had discussed between ourselves possibility GOL might declare UAR Ambassador Ghaleb persona non grata. Middleton would presently hand Chamoun names of three other members of Egyptian Embassy here [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] more dangerous than Ghaleb himself. I pointed out I was offering this observation without instructions from my government and on an entirely personal basis, adding that to declare an Ambassador persona non grata did not mean breaking diplomatic relations. Chamoun said, however, he thought if this action were taken, UAR would break with Lebanon.

In closing interview, President left no doubt his fullest comprehension numbered paragraph four Deptel 4271; and reiterated he hoped he would never have to ask for course of action outlined in that telegram.

McClintock

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 783A.00/5–1458. Top Secret; Niact; Limited Distribution. Repeated to London.
2. Supra.
3. McClintock reported on a meeting with General Chehab in telegram 3863 from Beirut, May 14. Chehab’s assessment of the security situation in Lebanon was “much more reassuring, although Army was stretched to its utmost capability.” McClintock concluded that the situation was currently under control. He added, however, that Chehab had serious reservations about the impact on the Lebanese army of the possible introduction of foreign forces into Lebanon. (Department of State, Central Files, 783A.00/5–1458; included in the microfiche supplement)
4. Telegram 3862 from Beirut, May 14, transmitted a translation of a protest note from Lebanon to the UAR concerning UAR efforts to foster opposition to the Government of Lebanon. The Embassy received a copy of the note from the Lebanese Foreign Ministry on Malik’s instructions. (Department of State, Central Files, 783A.00/5–1458; included in the microfiche supplement)