472. Editorial Note
On March 8, the Planning Board of the National Security Council, at the request of the President’s National Security Adviser Gordon Gray, discussed the Cuban situation. According to briefing notes which Gray subsequently prepared for the Council, the salient points of the Planning Board’s discussion and some of the conclusions reached were the following: [Page 827]
“In considering U.S. interests in Cuba in the present circumstances, the Planning Board concluded that, in order of priority, they were as follows:
- “First—Denial of Cuba to the influence and control of hostile interests.
- “Second—The Guantanamo Naval Base, about which I will have more to say later.
- “Third—The effect our Cuban policy has on other Latin American countries, i.e., a possible loss of U.S. prestige and encouragement of other revolutionary groups on the one hand, or a possible favorable reaction to our policy of non intervention and restraint.
- “Fourth—Safety of U.S. citizens in the present circumstances, in which there seems to be no threat to them. “Fifth—U.S. business interests.
“The Planning Board believed there was no clear prospect for satisfactory relations with the Cuban Government, as now constituted, which would allow us fully to protect our interests. However, the responsible agencies did not rule out the possibility that a change for the better could evolve. For its part, the U.S. Embassy in Havana believes there is no hope the U.S. will be able to establish a satisfactory relationship with the Cuban government so long as it is dominated by Castro and his like-minded associates.
“In these circumstances, the question was posed to the Planning Board: Must we continue to tolerate the Castro government in view of the effect its policies are having on our interests? The Planning Board concluded that no overt action against the Castro regime would, at the present time, be in U.S. interests (a) because of the absence of any apparent alternative to the present government, (b) it would tend to solidify Castro’s support—indeed, Castro may be trying to provoke such action, (c) the obligations we have to the OAS and the need of having its support for any measures taken, and (d) because of the effect on world opinion.
“Notwithstanding the conclusion just reported, it was felt that the U.S. might consider undertaking to pay Cuba world prices instead of the subsidy price for sugar and depositing the difference in the Bank of International Settlements on behalf of U.S. citizens who have had properties expropriated without adequate reimbursement by the Castro government; subject to adjudication by the World Court.
“The Planning Board also believed every effort should be made to get members of the OAS and, to the extent appropriate, the organization itself interested in the dangers involved in the Cuban situation, especially the Communist threat. Toward this end, it also was recognized that the U.S. should take initiatives in publicizing Cuba’s hostile actions.
“With regard to the Guantanamo Naval Base, the Planning Board recognized the possibility (a) that the U.S. might be asked to evacuate with a deadline or (b) that physical action might be taken. The Planning Board noted that there was no clear statement of U.S. policy as to what the U.S. should do in the event either situation developed. In this connection, there is some reason to believe that the Castro government [Page 828] is questioning the legal basis for the existence of the Guantanamo base.” (Eisenhower Library, Project “Clean Up” Records, Cuban Situation)