Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Vietnam, Volume I

89. Telegram From the Ambassador in Vietnam (Durbrow) to the Department of State¹

Saigon, September 2, 1959—5 p.m.

698. Reference: Saigon 679.² Complete provisional returns Aug 30 elections show following breakdown successful candidates: NRM 78; Socialist 4; Social Democrats 3; VN Restoration Party 2; independents 36 (of which 3 received labor support). Winners include 9 women. Of 73 former deputies running 50 reelected (40 NRM).

Continuing Embassy- … reassessment of 14 “independents” who it seemed had defeated GVN-supported candidates reveals following: 5 won in districts where GVN in fact took neutral stance and they not considered genuine independents; 3 were acceptable alternatives but had to fight to defeat their GVN-supported opponents (these can be considered more or less independent); 4 (all in Saigon) won against active GVN opposition (two of these; Phan Quang Dan and Phan Khac Suu, considered oppositionist; other two, Tran Sanh Buu, Tran Van Ngan considered real independents); remaining 2 winners, one in CVN, not known and GVN attitude their candidacies not yet ascertained. Summary: GVN supporters 114; opposition 2; independents 5; unknown 2. Complete tabulation by pouch.³

During call on Diem Sept 1 with Steeves, I took following line re election results: congratulated him on outcome both because of handsome majority obtained by govt in Assembly and because election some independents demonstrates to world that voting conducted freely. Noted that latter fact would enhance Viet-Nam’s international reputation, help counter allegations in some press circles abroad about authoritarianism GVN, and should assuage some of criticism expressed by Vietnamese intellectuals. Stressed particularly excellent propaganda value of election results vis-à-vis Communists in north where elections not held to date and if held will not be free. Said this propaganda advantage would be hard for Communists to overcome.

Diem appeared delighted with results himself. Boasted many intellectuals elected (engineers, doctors, pharmacists, two women with U.S. degrees), added Assembly will have more people with degrees than any other parliamentary body in southeast Asia. Stated intellectuals sulked during elections three years ago and afraid then take sides because of sect problem. In view present stability of govt now willing participate governmental affairs. We urged him put out full analysis composition new Assembly through Embassy outlets abroad, and reiterated favorable propaganda effect vis-à-vis north as well as in free world countries. I made no specific mention Dan to Diem, but my general line designed get across impression would be politically wiser not eliminate candidates because of election law violations. Diem gave no hint govt would prevent cheating. He said one of three labor-supported victors may be crypto-Communist, but did not even seem particularly worried about this.

I also told Diem we struck by absence Communist incidents election day and fact voter participation about 85 percent despite Viet Cong efforts to convince people not to vote. He immediately replied one incident election morning in Plaine des Jones area when Viet Cong coming from Cambodia threw grenade near polling place and wounded two persons. (Embassy comment: this incident apparently not known to Minister Interior and was news to MinInfo when I told him. Believe VOA should use interior communiqué as reported Saigon’s 697⁴ without change.)

In later talks with MinInfo Thanh and SecState for Presidency Thuan successively at dinner for Steeves, I repeated views expressed to Diem. Thanh pleased and said results much better than expected. Asserted he wrote memorandum for presentation at cabinet meeting prior elections in which he took position it would be bad to scratch candidates convicted election law violations and thus be accused rigged elections. Also said Diem returned from Pleiku just in time prevent this from happening. Thanh raised Dan’s infringement election law, and I took direct line that unless blatant would be better forget about it. Thanh said unfortunately law even prevents any even fined under law from being seated, and I retorted law can be gotten around, for example by resort to Court of Cassation. Thanh then indicated he ready let such victors take their seats and suggested I talk to Thuan.

I took same line with Thuan about Dan and others who might have infringed law, pointing out bad propaganda effect in north and other Asian countries like India if they not permitted take seats and adding that Dan always claimed not opposed to Pres and might with responsibility of Assembly seat develop into loyal opposition. Thuan did not commit himself re Dan, and left distinct impression GVN apparently about ready eliminate some successful candidates and our recommendations hard to take.

At joint press conference Ministers Interior and Info Sept 2, former stated successful candidates convicted electoral law violations could appeal to Court of Cassation and if appeals rejected their cases would be presented to special commission of National Assembly. MinInfo added in response correspondent’s question as to whether those refused seating could run in by-elections that commission provided for by electoral law would determine whether candidates in by-elections qualified.

We believe conversations with Diem, Thanh and Thuan have given GVN pause and might produce desired result since we had definite indication through independent sources Diem and others were anxious have our reactions to elections.

Durbrow

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751G.00/9–259. Repeated for information to Bangkok, Vientiane, Phnom Penh, Hue, and CINCPAC PolAd.
2. Supra.

3. In despatch 116 from Saigon, October 9, the Embassy provided the following summary evaluation of the election:

   “Only in Saigon did the vote represent an election in the Western sense of the word. In the provinces, the campaign was not a political activity but an educational one. This educational process was limited to teaching the peasant the basic fundamentals of how to cast a ballot. The balloting itself went off without large scale direct interference on the part of the government. Nonetheless, with the exception of Saigon, the elections were characterized by almost complete government control.

   “In analyzing the significance of the elections the following factors must be considered: 1) the very fact that elections were held in South Viet-Nam contrasts with the fact that in North Viet-Nam elections have not been held to date; 2) the high percentage of voter participation indicates the failure of the Viet Cong’s tactics of threats and propaganda designed to dissuade the voters from casting their ballots; 3) the election of some independents and the freedom permitted the press could be expected to somewhat assuage intellectual discontent, to enhance GVN international prestige and to provide a further propaganda advantage vis-à-vis the North; 4) the expected refusal of the GVN to seat those convicted of violating the election law, particularly Phan Quang Dan, will limit to a considerable extent the advantages set forth in 3) above; 5) the GVN’s position is that the refusal to seat Dan and Tran is based on law and precedent; and 6) the election of other independents may represent a gain in representative government. (End Summary)” (Department of State, Central Files, 751G.00/10–959)

4. Telegram 697, September 2, contains a summary of a Vietnamese Department of Interior communiqué. The summary reads as follows:

   “During July and August VC stepped up underground activities to sabotage elections; murdered, wounded and kidnapped nationalist cadres. However, police and GVN security officers, youth organizations and various nationalist groups undertook intense activity rural areas, especially remote villages, with result 36 VC killed, 9 arrested; guns, ammo, equipment and documents seized. Thanks to preventive measures by armed forces and cadres, elections Aug 30 took place throughout VN ‘in perfect order without any security incidents’.” (Ibid., 751G.00/9–259)