Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Vietnam, Volume I

69. Telegram From the Ambassador in Vietnam (Durbrow) to the Department of State¹

Saigon, April 28, 1959—7 p.m.

2286. Parsons who left 28th at 1400 local time,² asked me send highlights talks 27th with Mau, Tho, Thuan 2 1/2 hour talk with Diem.

A. (1) No significant new info obtained from talks.

(2) All four officials dwelt on increased Communist menace giving emphasis ChiCom inspired infiltrations from Cambodia. One way or another all pointed up almost impossible work out mutually satisfactory, enduring arrangements with Sihanouk. Diem, as usual, emphasized this point but was not quite so vehement as on other occasions. We suggested trusted emissary approach through private talks to try work out initial steps reconciliation. All officials said did not believe Sihanouk would entrust negotiations to emissary.

(3) As expected, Diem indicated because of increased Communist activities GVN must improve military, Civil Guard and SDC capabilities, which impossible if US contributed only $130 million to the military budget for FY 1960 although not so pointedly as previously.

(4) Mau brought up and discussed at some length VN refugees in Thailand question. After going over past history he reiterated same points Embtel 2223.³

(5) Diem, in emphasizing stepped up Communist activities, claimed French colonials also working against free world interests for selfish reasons, which greatly aggravates matter.

(6) Thuan again urged US take over training ANL since French incapable of doing job. (See memo conversation April 25.⁴)

B. Parsons emphasized following points:

(1) Absolutely no change our firm policy against ChiComs, which proved right by Quemoy and Tibet, adding many neutralists indicating privately they now see merits our firm policy.

(2) Re Cambodia, Parsons stated firmly Sihanouk full master situation Cambodia and will remain so foreseeable future. He recalled Sihanouk had apparently urged Indian Pres Prasad to tell Diem Sihanouk desired better relations, he urged GVN act on this favorable request and work out some arrangement frontier control other than ten-kilometer hot pursuit, since this matter seems to GVN be source of most Commie activities. Parsons stated consensus at Baguio Conference that situation free world better this year than last, particularly VN Burma, Laos, Malaya and even Indonesia, with only Cambodia being possible source of danger, which made it in GVN and free world interests try to work out equitable agreements outstanding questions. Parsons added it probable that Sihanouk for various internal reasons and perhaps because of Tibet example might be more amenable working out mutually satisfactory arrangements. At least a sincere effort should be made.

(3) He underlined basic short-term-long-term necessity for economic development to win over masses as leaders Malaya, Burma and Laos endeavoring do. He agreed military force needed as deterrent and for internal security but force is only one element in bringing about stability, it more essential [gain] confidence of masses by economic development and raising living standard.

(4) He promised Mau to give further thought to VN refugee problem Thailand.

(5) He strongly backed up our efforts work out satisfactory solution Briz case.

C. We both had impression that while we may have planted lots of seeds it quite apparent Diem particularly, as well as other, probably will be very stubborn re possibility better RKG–GVN relations and they sincerely concerned re increased Communist activities.

Durbrow

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751G.001/4–2859. Secret.
2. Parsons was in Saigon April 26–28.
3. In this telegram, April 22, Durbrow reported that during a conversation held April 21 Mau had stated that his government could not absorb the 50,000 Vietnamese refugees then in Thailand, most of whom, he stated, did not wish repatriation. (Department of State, Central Files, 292.51G22/4–2259)
4. Not found.