Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Vietnam, Volume I

270. Telegram From the Ambassador in Vietnam (Durbrow) to the Department of State¹

Saigon, December 24, 1960—6 p.m.

1216. Re Deptel 898.² Diem didn’t receive me until 23rd.

I wrote out instructions and translated them in French and left English and French copies (texts by pouch³). My remarks covered most points Dept’s suggestions although in view current indications liberalization programs may not be too profound, only hinted Dept would be prepared publicize announcement such programs. Since my October 14th remarks⁴ included suggestion transfer Nhu, I did not specifically refer to that date although referred to previous suggestions we had made. Since GVN has already instituted plan to increase and stabilize paddy prices, I merely stated we pleased learn this and then urged granting broader credit facilities peasants. Before going into details, I reminded Diem of steps we have taken to strengthen GVN against Viet Cong such as delivery of AD–6 planes, stepped-up deliveries of electronic equipment, and told him I instructed Gardiner to re-examine with Vice President and Thuan ways and means to overcome piaster shortage. Since I did not receive Deptel 917 until after translation typed, I told him orally of approval to give him eleven H–34’s soonest. (He made no comment.)

While Diem was pleasant during hour and three-quarters of discussion, he was basically negative. Diem did not reply to my remarks immediately but insisted essential have additional 20,000 troops since would do no good to try to put in reforms, build factories, roads and bridges, etc., unless these things and people could be protected. He referred several times to the need for 20,000 men stressing need because of deteriorating Lao situation. I then remarked we had just learned that he had increased force level of Civil Guard to 64,000 and asked if this increase would not fill security force needs. Diem replied Civil Guard not trained so needs bring back 20,000 reservists. He asked that I urge Dept to give favorable consideration force level request and I reiterated matter under careful study in Washington.

Referring to my remarks he again attacked the viciousness of foreign correspondents, particularly the French, who only seek sensational news. He then reviewed in some detail economic and social progress made in Viet-Nam in the past six years which have raised standard of living here above most SEA countries and asked why correspondents didn’t report this instead of picking up Radio Hanoi reports spread by disgruntled Vietnamese intellectuals. As I had done in my remarks, I reiterated if he and other ministers had periodic press conferences and if ministers would have frank talks with correspondents they would write more objective stories.

Referring our suggestion allow assembly to carry on investigations. Diem pointedly stated that since under the constitution the executive and legislature are completely separate, and [sic] it would not be right for the assembly to investigate executive departments. I replied we had the same system and, as he knew. Congress does investigate executive departments and makes findings public and pointed out this would be very healthy development here in order to quell unfounded rumors. Diem obviously didn’t agree. Diem spent some time denouncing rich intellectuals and businessmen who do not pay their taxes and then blame the government for not doing enough for the people. Although I had not mentioned corvee labor this time. Diem stated this only way collect equivalent of taxes from peasants and that this system is in Vietnamese tradition, but peasants in Cochin-China under French had not been asked to contribute labor. Therefore they now resent corvee labor and of course would not think of paying any monetary taxes. He pointed out peasants in central Viet-Nam willingly contribute free labor instead of taxes. I remarked one reason for discontent in south is arbitrary action of officials and the failure to explain needs to peasants before forcing them to work. Diem insisted peasants had been told of needs but they just lazy.

Diem then stated while it might be necessary to find ways and means to raise taxes in general, this had to be done very carefully in order to avoid a too-high rise in prices which would cause further disgruntlement. He added devaluation would have same effect and therefore this could not be done in hurry. In this connection he again stated that Lao devaluation [had] been a failure and was one of the causes for the current troubles there. I repeated, as I had several times, that we considered Lao devaluation as beneficial and successful.

Toward end of conversation Diem reverted again to useless intellectuals who now spreading reports of another coup on Christmas or on January 20th.

On few occasions he let me talk, I urged he adopt reforms soonest since it essential to win further support of the people if Viet Cong menace is to be overcome, but he gave me no indication of reforms he may adopt. Before leaving I again expressed hope that he would accept our suggestion that he announce all liberalizing programs at one time in order to make best impact. Diem replied he would think about this but made no commitment.

Comments: We have heard that Nhu, Thuan and others have been running into resistance when urging Diem to adopt worthwhile reforms. I also received impression he very reluctant to adopt reforms and is still basically thinking in terms of force to save the day, hence his insistence several times that we approve force level increase and his action raising Civil Guard ceiling by 10,000. While I still believe it absolutely essential he adopt more liberal programs, it is not certain from his attitude and remarks that he will take effective action in these matters, although I learned later he has agreed to engage the services of a public relations expert … to make a survey of GVN foreign public relations needs.

Durbrow

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751K.00/12–2460. Secret; Limit Distribution. Repeated for information to CINCPAC PolAd. Printed also in Department of Defense, United States–Vietnam Relations, 1945–1967, Book 10, pp. 1348–1351.
2. Document 268.
3. See Document 272.
4. See Document 205.