Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Vietnam, Volume I

266. Telegram From the Ambassador in Vietnam (Durbrow) to the Department of State¹

Saigon, December 15, 1960—6 p.m.

1175. Re Deptel 862.² Called on Diem late afternoon 14th.

In carrying out instructions reftel I combined slight carrot, i.e., our agreement to suspension conscription with memorandum covering points reftel re consideration being given 20,000 force level increase.

In letter (copy by pouch³) re conscription I underlined fact additional costs would have to be at expense GVN. Diem obviously disappointed and raised question more aid to cover these costs. I replied not question of more dollar aid but question create more piasters and emphasized this perhaps one of most important problems facing GVN—raising more piasters to meet mounting expenditures for various essential needs. Diem did not pursue dollar aid question.

I read him short memorandum (copy by pouch⁴) containing instructions reftel re 20,000 increase. Diem replied it question of timing since it essential now have sufficient troops to meet any stepped-up VC activities and particularly prevent VC from being tempted because ARVN spread very thin, to make thrust across or around 17th parallel, similar to recent Kontum attack. I asked if he believed VC would make overt attack across 17th. He referred to alleged build-up in north (Embtel 1140⁵) as indication possible overt attack, but concluded he really feared large-scale guerrilla attacks either south of parallel or in Plaine des Joncs area. Stated he also needs additional men to take over duties while Civil Guard being trained and added if he cannot give security protection to countryside it will be impossible implement some new programs. I replied since would take considerable time train additional forces even if composed reservists, our possible agreement force increase would not meet current situation which can be helped primarily by putting into immediate effect new positive military and political programs he now considering. I added even if force level increased now, would take some time before equipment could be made available for them particularly since good part equipment on hand being made available for Civil Guard under MAAG training.

Diem reiterated if could not give countryside protection would be difficult implement various new programs; for instance, further organize farmers’ associations and other similar groups, therefore it essential get additional men under arms soonest. I replied apparently quickest way give protection countryside is to use present security forces as efficaciously as possible by putting into effect suggested re-organization armed forces, setting up effective operational command, establishing firm chain of command and expediting Civil Guard training. Diem, without going into details, said this being done but insisted it imperative he have additional 20,000 to meet any emergency. He asked particularly that I emphasize to Dept the question of timing. I reiterated question being studied at highest level and decision will be based on merits and in view current military situation, adding I hoped promised new positive programs would be implemented soonest since these most essential in fight against VC.

Comment: By indicating it may not be possible carry out new positive programs unless he gets force increase, Diem seems still be thinking primarily in terms force to rectify situation. See following cable⁶ for further ideas on reforms.

Durbrow

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751K.00/12–1560. Secret; Limit Distribution. Repeated for information to CINCPAC PolAd.
2. Document 262.
3. In despatch 249 from Saigon, December 16. (Department of State, Central Files, 751K.5511/12–1660)
4. In despatch 246 from Saigon, December 16. (Ibid.)
5. Dated December 1, not printed. (Ibid., 751K.00/12–160)
6. Infra.