Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Vietnam, Volume I

191. Telegram From the Ambassador in Vietnam (Durbrow) to the Department of State¹

Saigon, September 5, 1960—noon.

539. MAAG received Sept 2 JCS 982211² indicating serious concern re deterioration situation SVN and calling for special meetings Washington beginning Sept 7 with MAAG representative present to consider recommended courses of action within authority DOD designed to strengthen stability and effectiveness of Diem government. Not clear whether DOD wants recommendations for stepped up military aid or wants MAAG evaluation overall situation SVN. Gen. McGarr assumed latter and had paper prepared³ covering overall recommendations which he asked Gen. Lampert carry U.S. fourth for these discussions. I went over paper and discussed matter twice with country team but in view shortage time prior Lampert’s departure could not work out more coordinated paper.

Following are my initial views on MAP papers:

1) General. I believe we should exert every justifiable effort, both material and political, to demonstrate U.S. support of Diem in present crisis. Abundant opportunity exists for us to do this in meaningful manner.

Believe we need exert every effort improve quality of existing security forces but am not convinced that GVN needs to raise total number such forces beyond existing level of about 260,000; 150,000 in armed forces, 55,000 in or slated by Diem for Civil Guard, 40,000 in SDC and several thousand in Youth Corps and Sûreté.

2) Civil Guard. I strongly concur in proposal for MAAG training of Civil Guard using 40 specially qualified military personnel and 10 ICA financed civilian trainers due in country shortly. Since MAAG now conditionally agreeable to making spaces available within MAAG ceiling for such military personnel no ICC problem arises. I consider MAAG proposal for training Civil Guard preferable to one contained our 495⁴ since former will insure that training program will be under way in sizeable proportions at early date.

I also concur in MAAG’s proposals for equipping Civil Guard with U.S. type small arms and ammunition as soon as practicable up to 32,000 called for by Civil Guard PROAG, that Civil Guard units be supported during emergency by ARVN supply and maintenance facilities and that ICA from already programmed funds and/or other funds which can be made available reimburse DOD for such equipment and supplies, which would be obtained or replaced through MAP channels.

Do not however agree that Civil Guard should be moved from GVN Interior Department to DOD. This step appears unnecessary either for MAAG conducted training or for MAP–ARVN equipping and supplying of Civil Guard on reimbursable basis (realize this may require considerable red tape cutting). Neither is it necessary for operational purposes since centralized command control already includes Civil Guard in 5th, 1st, and capital military regions, those of greatest VC infestation. If Civil Guard turned over 100 percent to GVN DOD, it would not be long before GVN insisted that Civil Guard be fully trained and armed like regular soldiers with tanks, artillery, etc. as Diem originally asked for, eventual hope that Civil Guard will serve as provincial police force would be lost and Diem would continue his long standing efforts increase ARVN force level, most of which we pay for, while Civil Guard basically paid for by GVN.

3) Force basis of regular military forces. While military arguments for raising force level from 150,000 to 170,000 always possible, I am not convinced by case MAAG has presented and certain negative aspects also need to be considered. Among main MAAG arguments are necessity providing for rotation of battle-fatigued units and desirability maintaining four of ARVN’s seven divisions near 17th parallel and in high plateau for defense against external aggression. MAAG states military commanders in operational areas are reluctant to allow withdrawal of troops which are familiar with situation, troops and population, but MAAG believes rotation is necessary. MAAG feels however that divisions in central Viet-Nam should not be rotated because of their familiarity with defense plans against external aggression.

I am completely convinced of desirability of rotating battle-weary troops and believe on basis discussions with MAAG that this must be done at very earliest time if we are to avoid giving rise to situation where these battle-weary units now becoming more frustrated chasing elusive VC’s and if not rotated soon may infect population in south with uselessness trying defeat VC’s. This could lead to situation similar to Laos of “Let’s bury the hatchet—we’re all Vietnamese”. However in my view it is not necessary to increase force level for this purpose as such units can be exchanged with units from divisions being held to meet external attack.

My assessment is that internal guerrilla warfare is with us now and threat of external aggression seems fairly remote, particularly in view moral deterrent represented by ICC and physical deterrent represented by SEATO. Thus I would take calculated risk of rotating battle-weary troops into center and plateau for re-fitting and enabling fresh troops fight VC’s.

Another MAAG argument for increasing force level is desirability adding 5,000 support troops for supply and maintenance of Civil Guard. This seems unnecessary since Civil Guard has some supply forces and should be possible create others as required to assist in performing necessary increased logistical functions under ARVN direction. Civil Guard cannot be all trained at once and at outset main thing they need is training given by US officers, US ARVN ranges, loan of some equipment and material.

Since arguments for increase in force level are not compelling, I strongly feel that increasing force level would play to Diem’s proclivity for thinking in terms only of security and survival and of using force to solve his problems. It would increase his tendency to neglect adequate political and psychological measures. In addition increased force level would intensify GVN’s already sizeable piastre problem. While this aspect should not of itself bar an increase it does mean that an increase should be clearly justified on other counts which I do not think is the case at this time. Well trained Civil Guard needed to protect population in areas pacified by ARVN, relieve ARVN of most static guard duties and supplement ARVN forces when necessary in particular operation. Mere relief ARVN static duties would increase troops available for training and combat.

4) Relationship between above MAAG proposals. MAAG states that its willingness take over Civil Guard training is linked to its recommended increase in force level and it cannot carry out former without latter since would detract from its main mission training ARVN. I fail to see this relationship for following reasons. With about one third ARVN engaged in operations until CG can take over some of its load, not too many ARVN forces available for training and therefore in my opinion there are sufficient MAAG trainers not fully occupied so they can train CG; to start out now to recruit additional ARVN troops on recall reserves would take longer than giving immediate better training to CG so they can effectively assist ARVN. Therefore as matter of fact giving training to CG should be both easier from personnel standpoint and more immediately effective from security standpoint.

5) Increased MAP support. I fully support increased MAP assistance for ARVN for whatever equipment is needed and believe this together with training, equipment and arms for Civil Guard will forcefully demonstrate our continued support of Diem regime.

6) Increased budget support. I do not concur with MAAG that we need to increase greatly our military budget support and thus suspend balance of payments basis for determining DS aid level. MAAG recommendation based on psychological and military preparedness factors as well as underestimation (which became clear in discussion of DOD message) of full implications of basing level of aid on piastre requirements. Psychological factor already dealt with in para 5 above and in addition could be dealt with by general political assurances. As for other factors I do not believe that at this time we could justify action which on one hand would simply add our dollars to Viet-Nam’s foreign exchange reserves and on other hand supposedly would be designed to achieve result (creation additional piastre resources) which it is already within GVN capability of achieving itself. GVN is beginning show will to do so. Even if GVN finds it is politically difficult or impossible to devalue or increase taxes much beyond rises recently effected, it can resort to increased deficit financing (as it has done with respect commando forces) without adverse political effects, at least during early stages. I would not rule out that if no other means could be brought bear we might decide open up floodgates to luxury goods for benefit of rich in order increase L–543 revenue, but this should be last resort.

What is needed are 1) better trained CG to assist and relieve ARVN; 2) more political and psychological actions by Diem to win confidence of people, not just crush them with more armed force; 3) deficit financing, loans, more taxes or devaluation; and 4) delivery of specialized equipment such as H–34 helicopters etc. where particularly needed for anti VC operations.

7) Political actions. Our G–79⁵ reports political and other actions already taken by Diem, partly in response our prodding. Additional political actions are necessary and we have this matter under study not only in connection with DOD message which led to MAAG study but also because of situation described our 528.

8) Recommendations. Recommend that DOD authorize use MAAG personnel for Civil Guard training and use MAP channels for obtaining supplies and equipment for Civil Guard, that ICA agree reimburse DOD for such supplies and equipment and that DOD promptly supply additional items required under MAP for regular armed forces. Political recommendations will follow.

Gardiner concurs.

Durbrow

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751K.5–MSP/9–560. Secret. Repeated for information to CINCPAC PolAd. Sent with instructions to pass to the Department of Defense for General Lampert of MAAG, Vietnam.
2. Document 189.
3. Supra
4. Document 187.
5. See footnote 3, Document 187.