Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Vietnam, Volume I

172. Telegram From the Secretary of State to the Embassy in Vietnam¹

Washington, June 10, 1960—10:56 p.m.

2230. Joint State–ICA-Defense Message. Embtel 3168.² We strongly support your estimate of urgent requirements anti-guerrilla training for Civil Guard. In order avoid further delays in view fact placing Special Forces personnel under USOM direction would present chain of command and other problems for DOD, request your early views following proposal which can be implemented quickly if you agree:

1. ICA/W after establishing positions would recruit and finance ten civilians who thoroughly qualified give anti-guerrilla training. As civilians they would be completely under USOM administration (thus avoiding chain command problem) and would not require as much cover as would Special Forces personnel placed under USOM (thus also avoiding problem finding slots for them in MAAG or under ArmAtt). Understand three such personnel recently placed on USOM staff and remainder can be picked in short order from well screened list.

2. Slots for Civil Guard to be made available at ARVN anti-guerrilla training centers as practicable.

3. If suitably qualified Civil Guard personnel available they could receive anti-guerrilla training in Okinawa.

In this way problem would be attacked simultaneously on three fronts. It is envisaged program would remain completely under USOM.

ICA/W sending separate message on implementation.³

Herter

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751K.5/5–1060. Secret. Drafted by Wood, cleared with SEA, Parsons and Steeves of FE, with ICA/W, U/MSC, and DOD/ISA in substance; approved by Merchant. Repeated for information to CINCPAC PolAd.
2. In telegram 3168, May 10, the Embassy observed that notwithstanding reports of low-level proficiency of the Civil Guard, the Guard performed an important role in fighting the Viet Cong and was taking 100 percent greater casualties than the regular forces of Vietnam. The Embassy recommended that the Civil Guard remain under civilian control, operate in larger units to cut down losses, and be trained by U.S. Special Forces assigned to the U.S. Army Attaché’s office, or failing that, MAAG. The Embassy considered this alternative preferable to anti-guerrilla training in Okinawa (where the trainees would be out of the country and unavailable) or to training Civil Guards at ARVN schools (where slots would be very limited). (Ibid.)
3. Not found.