Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Vietnam, Volume I

170. Memorandum From the Director, Far East Region (O’Donnell) in the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs to the Assistant Secretary (Irwin)¹

1–1426/60

Washington, June 6, 1960.

SUBJECT

• Training of Civil Guard in Viet-Nam

Subsequent to the discussion regarding the OCB proposal for training the Civil Guard held in your office on 26 May,² the Joint Chiefs of Staff have approved paragraph 25 (Recommendations) of the CINCPAC study, “Counter-Insurgency Operations in South Vietnam and Laos.”³ These recommendations are as follows:

“25. That the U.S. Government:

a. Encourage the GVN and RLG to:

(1) Adopt a national emergency organization to integrate civil and military resources under centralized direction for the conduct of anti-terrorist operations.

(2) Develop coordinated national plans for the progressive reduction of Communist influence.

b. Authorize and direct U.S. agencies to support the training for and conduct of emergency operations.

c. Negotiate necessary governmental agreements to permit CHPEO to engage in tactical training of and operational advice for the FAL.

d. Provide matériel and extraordinary budgetary support requirements for these emergency campaigns.”

This action by the Joint Chiefs of Staff indirectly disapproves the assignment of U.S. military personnel to USOM to train the Civil Guard. Instead, CINCPAC proposes a national organization which will assign responsibility for training and operational control of the Civil Guard for the duration of the emergency to the GVN Department of Defense.

Paragraph 12 of the CINCPAC study is as follows:

“12. National Organization: As learned both in the Philippines and in Malaya, the anti-terrorist activities of the civil and military authorities can be most effectively coordinated by an emergency operations control system. A type control system which can be modified to apply to both the GVN and RLG follows:

a. National Security Council. The Council should be responsible to the government for the overall conduct of the campaign and should provide for full integration of civil and military efforts. Although councils of this type may exist, they do not function properly. They should be headed by the President or the Prime Minister and should include the principal cabinet members and the chiefs of the military and police forces.

b. Director of Operations. This position should be occupied by an experienced General Officer, responsible to the Minister of Defense for the overall conduct of operations. He should issue instructions to Regional Executive Councils. In each country the position should be occupied by an officer designated by the Chairman of the National Security Council. The Director of Operations should be assisted by a small staff with civil, military and police representation.

c. The Commanders Sub-Council. This Council should consist of the Director of Operations and the principal police and military commanders. Based on National Security Council policy, the Commanders Sub-Council should make plans for the employment of all national resources in the anti-terrorist campaign.

d. Regional Executive Councils. An Executive Council should be organized for each of the five military regions within each country, composed of the provincial chiefs and the senior military and police commanders in each region. Each Council should be responsible for assisting the designated commander in waging the ‘war’ in its respective military region.

e. Provincial Executive Councils. Councils should be formed in each province, consisting of the Provincial Chief and responsible civil, community, military and police leaders. They support the conduct of operations in their respective provinces.

f. Village Executive Councils. In both South Vietnam and Laos the council system should be carried to the village level, with care being exercised to insure ethnic minority representation. Local leaders should direct the local emergency efforts involving home guard, civic action, and propaganda activities.”

Paragraph 13. b of the CINCPAC study is as follows:

“13. Force Structure:

b. In South Vietnam, the Secretary of Interior is primarily responsible for internal security. The Secretary of Defense is responsible for protecting the country from external attack. Consequently, the Chief MAAG has no responsibility for training the Civil Guard and other police forces; this is a USOM responsibility. Under the governmental organization proposed in paragraph 12 above, the Secretary of Defense would be primarily responsible for protection of the country against both the external and internal threats. Accordingly, for the duration of the emergency campaigns, the Civil Guard should operate under the Department of Defense and CHMAAG Vietnam should be assigned primary responsibility for their training. USOM should support CHMAAG Vietnam in this effort and should continue to program for necessary equipment and supplies for the Civil Guard.”

In view of JCS approval of CINCPAC’s recommendations, I strongly recommend that the Departments of State and Defense prepare recommendations for the Country Team’s consideration and presentation to the GVN in consonance with CINCPAC’s recommendation.

The CHMAAG Viet-Nam has never had any responsibility for the training or supervision of the Civil Guard. During the past two years, USOM’s training, equipping and supervision of the Civil Guard has been ineffective. The Department of Defense should be very hesitant to assign military personnel to another agency to accomplish a mission which is not the responsibility of the Department of Defense. This is especially true in view of indications that USOM has failed to utilize existing resources effectively.

If the above recommendation is unacceptable to the OCB, it is recommended that the following be submitted as a fall-back position for the Department of Defense:

“Continue the present Civil Guard program as now constituted under USOM and the Minister of the Interior for administration and funding. Recommend to the Government of Viet-Nam that basic military training and certain elements of special training be conducted in military training establishments of the Ministry of Defense. Recommend further to the Government of Viet-Nam that during emergency situations that the operational control of the Civil Guard be transferred to regular military commander either country-wide or region-wide as dictated by the situation.”

E.J. O’Donnell⁴
Rear Admiral, USN

1. Source: Washington National Records Center, OSD/ISA Files: FRC 64 A 2170, 342.5 Vietnam. Secret.
2. No record of this meeting has been found.
3. Not printed. A copy of this study, April 26, is attached to a memorandum from Irwin to Parsons, September 16, 1960. (Department of State, Vietnam Working Group Files: Lot 66 D 193, 97 VN 1960, Over-all Security Plan) Another copy, but dated April 24, is in Center of Military History, Williams Papers, CINCPAC Study (109).
4. Printed from a copy which bears this typed signature.