Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Vietnam, Volume I

153. Memorandum Prepared in the Department of Defense¹

May 4, 1960.

Notes on State msg. Saigon 3095²

Reply. The top echelons of the U.S. government should provide mature judgement of the actions proposed by Ambassador Durbrow. Thus, Defense should with-hold any encouragement of a quick, reactive reply, as proposed by some State staff officers, to Ambassador Durbrow until it has had time to give thoughtful consideration to proposals made in evident anger, but which can have such serious consequences for our national security. The following are some suggestions for Defense consideration.

Timing.Regardless of the merits or demerits of the punitive or coercive measures proposed by Ambassador Durbrow, is this the correct time to threaten and distract President Diem from the main task, at a most sensitive moment? He is the leader in a combat situation. The several thousand casualties among combatants alone, since 15 January 1960, say that this is a serious situation. Vietnamese forces under the leadership of Diem are starting to gain success. Is this the time, then, to threaten to withdraw our support? Defense, with its generations of experience in the needs of combat leadership, should have some opinion worth heeding on this point.

Quid pro quod, [sic] Again, apart from the merits or demerits of the proposals, is the instrument (U.S. military aid items) sufficient for the task envisioned by Ambassador Durbrow? Defense might well give State a careful evaluation of the worth to a combat leader of denying to him the several actual items of equipment which would have to be mentioned by the Ambassador in his bargaining with President Diem. Would the few items involved portray the United States as a petty, nagging child, or as the world’s leading nation? These items are worth sober thought, in the context of implementing the proposal. There are few chiefs of state who would sell their nation’s honor for a handful of helicopters and swamp boats, and Diem surely is not one of them.

The Proposals. The proposals by Ambassador Durbrow merit much deeper study than is evidenced in State’s suggested reply. Essentially, it is proposed that the United States of America lecture a “naughty” President Diem on how to behave correctly, or be spanked. The reason given is that our Ambassador has scolded him in the past, again and again, with only partial success. This is a negative approach to the problem. There is no mention of any attempt to work constructively with President Diem in the past, nor any hint of failure of constructive measures. Defense, with its responsibility for America’s security, should examine the soundness of pursuing a negative approach to the chief of state of a key nation of the Southeast Asian peninsula. President Diem has indicated his own feeling of desperate need for a positive U.S. attitude. Most recently, his feeling of need for constructive discussion with U.S. officials was expressed by a personal request for the temporary assignment of a Defense official³ in whom he previously found the positive understanding of himself and his nation. To date, U.S. officials favoring the “scolding”, critical method have vetoed President Diem’s urgent request.

A Military Factor. Earlier this year, it was plainly evident that a number of U.S. officials concerned with Vietnam’s affairs believed that the Communist Viet-cong guerrillas were being increasingly successful, caused to a major extent by the alleged insistence of U.S. military advisors on conventional training and employment of Vietnamese Armed Forces. Certain U.S. officials went further and proposed that the U.S. urge the Vietnamese to turn to the British and Malayans for more successful military advice. Although there has been sufficient evidence since that the earlier portrayal of the situation of both the Vietnamese and their U.S. military advisors was far from a true portrayal, the question of the effectiveness of U.S. military advice and doctrines still persists. The U.S. military man and his thinking remain very much on trial in Vietnam. Defense should acknowledge realistically this situation it finds itself in, by insisting upon using its full, rightful voice in any further decisions affecting Vietnam. Defense opinions should be made to have their correct weight in U.S. decisions, both in the process of arriving at opinions within Defense and in considerations by U.S. policy-making groups. Defense has too much at stake to do otherwise.

Recommendations. Prior to a Defense final reply to State on its proposed favorable reaction to Ambassador Durbrow’s message, it is recommended that:

a. Acting Assistant Secretary Knight apprise Secretary Gates and Deputy Secretary Douglas of this situation involving Defense matériél and standing, as a matter of timely importance.

b. Since ISA has its senior official responsible for actions in Vietnam now present in Southeast Asia, Admiral O’Donnell should be asked to make an on-the-spot appraisal of Ambassador Durbrow’s proposals, and send this in (by a channel giving privacy to these views) to the Acting Assistant Secretary, ISA, for consideration by top Defense officials. This would permit Defense to have valuable first-hand views from a military senior other than a military senior whose position makes him subordinate to the Ambassador.

c. The views of the Chairman, JCS, and the Service Chiefs themselves, should be obtained and be given proper consideration.

d. Defense should develop some constructive proposals for a more helpful way of bettering our problems in Vietnam, for consideration at top U.S. policy levels.

1. Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, Lansdale Papers: FRC 63 A 1803, Vietnam Correspondence 1960. Secret; Sensitive. Drafter not indicated; the source text is a carbon copy. A marginal note indicates that the original was given to Robert H. Knight, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs. Attached to the source text is a note to Douglas from his Military Assistant, Colonel Edwin F. Black, in which the latter suggested that the Deputy Secretary look at the memorandum before the OCB luncheon meeting of May 4 in case Vietnam should be discussed. It continued:

   “Ambassador Durbrow has worked himself up into a lather about some apparently ill-considered actions which the Vietnamese government has initiated with respect to Cambodia. Durbrow feels that the trouble maker is Diem’s brother Nhu. While the Ambassador is certainly right that this is no time for the Vietnamese to be stirring up trouble with Cambodia, since they have a major problem of dealing with their own unsatisfactory internal security situation in the south, Lansdale fears that there is considerable danger that State will start scolding Diem about the situation rather than make constructive proposals to help him with his problems.

   “I still feel that the single most constructive action which Defense could undertake would be to send Lansdale out there as soon as possible.”

   Black’s note is stamped “Dep Sec has seen”. No record has been found of a discussion of Vietnam at the OCB luncheon meeting held May 4.

2. Document 150.
3. Ed Lansdale. [Footnote in the source text in an unidentified hand.]