Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Western Europe and Canada, Volume XXVII

86. Telegram From the Embassy in Italy to the Department of State¹

Rome, August 19, 1955— 8 a.m.

577. Rossi-Longhi called on me August 17 at his request to report following:

The Prime Minister had sent for him yesterday to ask him to make following points to me most urgently, emphatically.

1. The general relaxation of tensions following summit meetings has had a very bad effect on internal Ital situation and has greatly accelerated demand that exists even in some quarters of DC for an opening to Nenni left and fanned discontent among DC rightwing elements. If October meetings at Geneva do not change present international climate (as it affects Italy) internal situation is sure to deteriorate in months ahead with consequent growth of neutralism.

Most immediate problem which confronts Ital Govt as result of relaxation is what to do about invitation which apparently Bulganin is seeking to visit Italy either on his way to India or at time of discussed visit to Queen of England. According Segni whole question of visits from and to Kremlin and question of cultural exchanges are becoming increasingly difficult cope with. Rossi-Longhi repeated his own suggestion that a two or three day visit from Foster Dulles—“not a stop-off between planes”—would help situation greatly.

In passing Rossi-Longhi said that he had just had a conversation with Dutch Ambassador who said he had reported to his govt the rapidly deteriorating situation vis-à-vis Italian left. He and Boon speculated on possibility of Holland or one of small countries bringing up matter of over-relaxation in NATO Council where they might say that England and USA had gone too far in friendly gestures at summit and any relaxation of tensions (especially in matter of state visits) should be postponed by USA, England until there had been some evidences of good faith on Russia’s part—Rossi-Longhi told Segni these evidences would be: 1. disarmament; 2. taking down the Iron Curtain; 3. withdrawing troops from satellites.

Segni also concerned effectiveness of recent Russian demobilization announcement.² Rossi-Longhi told him this meant nothing conclusive as peaceful gesture. On contrary it could mean:

a) the Russians didn’t need forces because of new weapons;

b) economic strain had forced the force reduction and men were needed to increase their labor-factory forces;

c) the USSR did not really intend to demobilize but was only making “propaganda gesture”.

Segni nevertheless urged that it be brought to attention of U.S. that situation following Geneva meeting was favoring Italian extremists and would accordingly lose votes for center parties both to left and right but especially to Socialists.

2. Segni wished Rossi-Longhi to reemphasize all he had told me about growing necessity in above atmosphere for U.S. backing of government’s Vanoni plan. Relaxation made it more necessary than ever for center forces to deliver electorate this popular economic program. U.S. backing for plan was indeed imperative if Christian Democrats could be expected win next elections in spring and general elections thereafter.

I repeated to Rossi-Longhi difficulties U.S. public opinion presented in generating a new extraordinary aid program for Italy. Rossi-Longhi said he had explained this to Segni and that while Segni understood in principle he wished again make it clear that without U.S. backing of plan it would be impossible contain left and some agreement with Socialists might result if govt encountered new crisis. Many would feel this arrangement lesser of two evils the worse being to be badly beaten by a combination of Social-Communists in next election.

3. Segni expressed intention to sign interim Status of Forces Agreement³ immediately but when Rossi-Longhi told Segni that we were not raising COMLANDSOUTH question Segni said he must remind us that he had clearly told me (Embtel 443 Aug 6 para 4)⁴ that any change in principle present language now covers was totally unacceptable to Italy. Otherwise he said he could never hope to get SOF passed in Parliament as question of total abandonment of sovereignty our indicated changes would imply would lose many votes of the right and perhaps some DC votes as well.

He insisted present interim document is wholly acceptable. The Italians are prepared to sign immediately.

Rossi-Longhi aware that Fechteler was working on a formula, apprised Segni of this fact. Segni said he “hoped the formula would be acceptable but that in any event no basic change could be made in the principle covered by the presently existing text” [less than 1 line of source text not declassified].

Luce

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 765.00/8–1955. Top Secret.
2. On August 13, the Soviet Union announced its decision to reduce its armed forces by 640,000 men by December 15, 1955. The stated reason was the relaxation of international tensions brought about by such recent developments as the Geneva Conference of July 1955.
3. Italy had not yet completed ratification of the Status of Forces Agreement (see footnote 2, Document 72). In telegram 217 from Rome, July 20, Durbrow reported that Rossi-Longhi had informed him that Segni had agreed that a temporary agreement relating to SOF could be drawn up prior to ratification. (Ibid., 711.56365/7–2055) In telegram 290 to Rome, July 28, the Department reported Congressional criticism of the move of troops to Italy prior to ratification of SOF and urged the Ambassador to continue to apply pressure to the Italians to achieve ratification before the bulk of the American troops arrived. The interim agreement suggested by the Italians was under study. (Ibid., 711.56365/7–2855) Discussions continued throughout the summer with agreement being reached by September. In telegram 791 to Rome, September 12, the Department informed the Embassy that although the troops were being redeployed on the basis of the interim agreements reached, the United States intended to continue to urge the Italians to promptly ratify the SOF agreement. (Ibid., 711.56365/8–155)
4. In paragraph 4 of telegram 443 from Rome, August 6, Luce reported Segni’s statement that the redeployed troops should not be stationed in Trieste or Bolzano because of possible irredentist sentiment in both regions. (Ibid., 711.56365/8–655)