Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Western Europe and Canada, Volume XXVII

84. Telegram From the Embassy in Italy to the Department of State¹

Rome, August 10, 1955— 5 p.m.

1. I saw Segni August 9 at his request.

2. Deployment. Segni believed progress would be made on points outlined Embtel 443.² He gave no evidence that he had changed his mind in any detail since our last conversation.

3. Oil. Segni told me oil question had become so difficult that time had come to send group of experts to US, Canada and elsewhere to make on-spot study workings of oil legislation. He indicated that until experts had made study, doubtful whether there would be any oil legislation. Hoped study could be concluded rapidly and that legislation could then be completed to protect Italian interests and to provide for foreign private participation. He said experts would wish discuss question with appropriate US officials Washington and promised to send me names of experts when they had replied his invitation.

4. Vanoni plan. Believing that Vanoni plan should now be translated in practical program, Segni asked whether US would send experts to Italy to assist in study of plan and its materialization in more concrete form. His government had pledged itself to realization of plan and situation would become difficult if US did not indicate its support and assist in making it reality. Necessary also to determine what economic steps Italy might be expected to make in exchange for US aid.

I told Segni that sending of experts would raise major problems: (1) would prejudice OEEC approach which we had supported; and (2) would unnecessarily raise hopes that US had by this act committed itself to moral and material support of plan; and (3) question of US Congressional attitude. If experts were needed, there were plenty attached to Embassy. I also stressed to Segni that Italy had abundance of its own most able economists, and I would suggest that he and Vanoni enlist aid of these men to draft concrete plan, which might thus be completed by next spring, at which time mission would study it with view to making recommendations to Department.

I then told Segni that US had been sympathetic to idea of realistic plan from outset, and had urged Italian Government to produce workable scheme. Vanoni plan had certain features in it which my economic advisers doubted could be politically put over in Italy, i.e. consumer controls and wage freeze. When he replied that PSI would support austerity program, I expressed doubt since PCI opposed to plan and has control of CGIL. I also pointed out that Vanoni plan had got unfortunately mixed up with widespread talk about opening to the left, and was considered by many as vehicle to go to a monocoloreDC government depending on Nenni support.

I expressed view that one way out of difficulty might be to produce another plan, which would (a) be more concrete in nature; (b) be more limited in scope than 10 years; (c) contain best features of Vanoni plan and other features such as sound utilization of Italian means and resources necessary to its consideration; and (d) steer clear of involvement with Nenni’s support.

Segni said 4-year plan already existed but it would be absolutely impossible change name of plan since Vanoni would resign, causing cabinet crisis. He defended Vanoni as not being Socialist and said US support for any type of plan would have to be given to Vanoni. Segni said that on basis our conversation he could request Vanoni to get down to business of formulating limited, practical plan for US consideration.

5. Rome press carried reports of meeting with Segni, with majority papers relating conversation to deployment. However, Rome Daily American reported that possible US aid to Vanoni plan had been discussed.

6. Memorandum of conversation which expands on conversation being airpouched.²

Luce

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 765.00/8–1055. Secret.
2. Under the terms of the Austrian State Treaty, the deadline for full withdrawal of all Allied occupation forces from Austria was October 25, 1955. The U.S. contingent was due to be withdrawn from Austria to Italy in September, to augment NATO forces there. The details of the redeployment were discussed by Italian officials and Embassy personnel throughout the summer of 1955. In telegram 119 from Rome, July 12, Chargé Durbrow reported his impression that Italian officials favored the redeployment because they believed it would give moral support to the anti-Communist forces in Italy. (Ibid., 711.56365/7–1255) In telegram 443 from Rome, August 6, Luce reported on a conversation she had had with Gronchi in which various technical details of the redeployment had been discussed, such as housing, NATO designation, and availability of training areas. (Ibid., 711.56365/8–655)
2. Sent to the Department as despatch 318 from Rome, August 11. (Department of State, Central Files, 865.00/8–1155)