Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Western Europe and Canada, Volume XXVII

297. Letter From the Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Whitney) to the Under Secretary of State (Herter)¹

London, April 29, 1957.

Dear Chris: As you know, I spent last weekend with Selwyn Lloyd at Chequers where he asked me for guidance as to what he could say in answer to the inevitable question “In view of the new spirit of consultation agreed on in Bermuda, what can you tell us was your information regarding the sailing of the Sixth Fleet?”²

I hadn’t anticipated this question, but I had, on my own hook, tried to find out what we knew about this matter. The answer was: nothing before and nothing after. Admiral Boone³ knew no more than his orders, nor did the Embassy.

When I enquired for guidance for him, my reply started with the statement (Deptel 7606)⁴ “Throughout present crisis we have been closely consulting with U.K. representatives Washington”. Did this consultation include the possibility of fleet movements, Marine movements? If it did, or if the plan was even being considered, I want to insist strongly that the Embassy should have been informed on an urgent basis. The U.K. is very pleased with our action, of course, but your Embassy looks foolish. Finally the same reply message suggests “If called upon to discuss Fleet movement in Commons, Lloyd may wish state Fleet has regularly been stationed in Eastern Mediterranean and this is return to normal area”. As to that, we have all read in the papers that reporters, not the least sensitive breed of humankind, were ushered from their beds in the dawn, to permit the fleet to sail.

If this sounds like the typical foreign post bleat, please believe that I would not be addressing you personally. This business of consultation, a flowering of Bermuda, a proof of our togetherness, is terribly important here. It cannot bloom alone in Washington.

I know that accidents happen and that breakdowns in “the System” may occur. But this case was not accidental. A decision of the utmost importance was taken, and I was given no information, no guidance even after the fact. I know that you will see that my Embassy will not be taken seriously by Her Majesty’s Government if this can occur again.⁵

Very sincerely yours,

Jock⁶

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 780.5411/4–2957. Top Secret.
2. In an effort to demonstrate confidence in and support for King Hussein of Jordan and his government, the United States sent units of the Sixth Fleet to the Eastern Mediterranean.
3. Admiral Walter F. Boone, Commander in Chief, U.S. Naval Forces, Eastern Atlantic and Mediterranean.
4. Telegram 7606 to London, April 27, the first and last sentences of which Whitney quotes. (Department of State, Central Files, 780.5411/4–2757)
5. In his reply to Whitney, May 6, Herter admitted that it was not clear whether Secretary Dulles had informed British Ambassador Caccia of the decision to move the fleet. He concluded: “In any event, we do, I assure you, want consultation to bloom in London as well as Washington.” (Ibid., 780.541 1/4–2957)
6. The following handwritten note by Whitney appears at the bottom of the source text: “I think I should add that this is not written with the expectation of a timetaking explanation. It is solely to stress the importance of this for the future. All the best to you. J.”