Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Eastern Europe, Volume XXV

263. Report of the OCB Committee on the United Nations General Assembly Special Meeting To Consider the Report of the Special Committee on Hungary¹

Washington, September 4, 1957.

1. The 11th session of the UN General Assembly is expected to reconvene September 10 to consider the report of the Special Committee on Hungary.

2. Consonant with the approved basic policy² of the United States toward the satellites, the United States delegation will seek achievement of the following objectives, without prejudice to such actions as it may choose to take during the Twelfth General Assembly:

a. To exploit to the maximum the conclusions of the Special Committee’s report as a critical, point-by-point refutation of the Soviet version of events in Hungary last fall.

b. To seek the adoption of a resolution³ that will effectively place the weight of world opinion, and in particular Asian opinion, behind the Committee’s report and conclusions which are damaging to the Soviet position in the world.

c. To utilize as fully as possible in the Assembly discussion all suitable information about the current wave of repression, including trials, indiscriminate arrests, and mass deportations, having in mind the importance of maintaining American and other non-Communist diplomatic representation in Budapest.

3. The U.S. should seek further action focusing on the current situation in Hungary through diplomatic channels and, as appropriate, through action in the United Nations.

Considerations

4. The unanimity of the Special Committee’s report and the character of its findings and conclusions make it a telling documentary record. It can effectively be exploited to refute Soviet and Hungarian contentions regarding events in Hungary. To the extent possible it is in the interest of the United States to make every effort to enlist widespread support in the Assembly for the Committee’s findings, preferably through endorsement in a specific resolution. Adoption of such a resolution in the Assembly would serve the dual purpose of placing the Assembly on record in support of the Committee’s conclusions, thereby specifically rejecting the Soviet version of events, and putting the weight of world opinion behind the efforts last fall of the Hungarian people to achieve a greater measure of national independence. The degree to which these objectives can be achieved will depend upon the ability of the United States and other key delegations to enlist such broad support, particularly from the so-called uncommitted states in Asia. In turn this factor may result in a somewhat less forthright assertion of principle and purpose in the Assembly’s resolution than would be the ideal, but our larger purpose is likely to be better served by the degree of support for the Assembly’s action than by specific provisions in a resolution.

5. Recent events in Hungary have included shocking examples of the extent to which the Kadar regime feels required to go to maintain control. While it is unlikely that any action in the United Nations will ameliorate the situation in Hungary, it is desirable for the Assembly to place itself on record against the current campaign of repression. This can be done in limited degree by inclusion in speeches of the United States Representative and others of specific cases. Subject to sentiment in the Assembly it may also be possible to cover this aspect of the Hungarian situation by inclusion of appropriate provisions in a resolution. Such efforts should remain coupled with the use of diplomatic channels to bring such pressure as is feasible upon the Hungarian authorities, and with other publicity designed to focus attention on the situation. In view of the limited results that can be obtained, however, this aspect of the Hungarian case should not be permitted to deflect the Assembly’s attention from the broader issues covered in the report of the Special Committee.

6. The situation in the Assembly may develop in such a way that questions will be raised regarding the possibility of further means of verifying the Committee’s findings. The character of the Soviet and Hungarian defense, if any, will be determining. If it is limited to assertions that the United Nations lacks jurisdiction on grounds of Article 2(7),⁴ it is unlikely that any sentiment will develop in favor of fact-finding efforts supplementary to those of the Special Committee. In general, any attempted Communist rebuttal should be met with the same observations made in the Special Committee’s report; namely, that the United Nations would undoubtedly have profited by the data which Hungary and the USSR could have submitted but that, in view of the comprehensive and detailed documentation and testimony available, such data would not have modified the Committee’s main conclusions regarding what actually took place in Hungary, though it might possibly have changed or elaborated certain specific points in its report. Subject to circumstances, consideration could be given to the transmission of any additional documentation to the Special Committee. Primary emphasis, however, should remain upon the continuing need to permit the United Nations and particularly its Special Committee to have access to Hungary for purposes of direct observation. Soviet and Hungarian rejection of such offers would strengthen the propaganda case. At the same time care would be required to ensure that such offers in no way compromised the conclusions of the Special Committee or suggested that its operations lacked objectivity.

7. In order to carry forward standing United States objectives and to maintain such moral pressure as is available through the United Nations on the Hungarian situation, the present Special Committee should be continued on a standby basis available to serve the Assembly at any time. Since the Committee’s existing terms of reference may be generally regarded as limiting its efforts to reporting and factfinding, it may be desirable to explore the possibility of explicitly extending its terms of reference to authorize it to undertake continued observation and examination of all aspects of the Hungarian situation and to make recommendations as appropriate. Alternatively, some other instrument might be established for this purpose. If any proposals put forward as the result of such activity by the Committee proved acceptable, so much the better; if not, some propaganda advantage might be achieved without adverse effects upon the situation in Hungary.

8. A remaining problem involves the future status of Hungary in the United Nations. It is desirable at the reconvened 11th session to maintain the position taken by the General Assembly last March when it decided to take no action on Hungarian credentials (thus refusing either to reject or approve them).⁵ A motion to reconsider this action would require a two-thirds majority which in all probability could not be obtained and could deflect attention from the report. Meantime, the present action serves to demonstrate that the Assembly does not regard Hungary in the same light as all other Members of the Organization. Whether more drastic action, such as outright rejection of Hungarian credentials, should be sought at the 12th session should be determined in the light of the situation then prevailing. By extension, the argument could be applied to the status of the Hungarian diplomatic mission in Washington, possibly producing Hungarian retaliation. It may in the long run best serve our objectives to maintain primary attention on the intervention of the Soviet Union and its responsibility for the installation of the Kadar regime against the palpable will of the Hungarian people. An additional problem involves creation of a possibly adverse precedent for the United States position on Chinese representation.

1. Source: Department of State, OCB Files: Lot 61 D 385, Hungary—Documents. Secret. The OCB discussed this report at its meeting on August 21. (Ibid.: Lot 62 D 340, Preliminary Notes)
2. NSC 5608/1; NSC 5616/2. [Footnote in the source text.]
3. For text, see Document 266.
4. Article 2(7) of the U.N. Charter enjoins the United Nations from intervening in matters within the domestic jurisdiction of any state.
5. On February 12, 1957, the Credentials Committee decided, at U.S. suggestion, to take no action regarding the credentials submitted by the Kádár government. The Assembly approved this course of action on February 21 and on March 26 the Hungarian Representative complained that such nonaction was a discriminatory procedure without precedent in the history of the United Nations. (U.N. doc. A/3594, p. 41) See Document 237.