Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Soviet Union, Eastern Mediterranean, Volume XXIV

251. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom¹

Washington, July 30, 1957—1:24 p.m.

Tosec 7. Re Secto 2² and Deptel 856 to London.³

1. Departmental assessment British proposal and suggested U.S. response follow.

2. British plan in principle is consistent with U.S. desire see parties primarily interested take initiative in arriving at compromise solution. While we should join with others in influencing Greeks and Turks to attend, we do not think U.S. should participate as observer. It would involve us too deeply in Cyprus dispute and might serve to detract from role we would like Spaak to play in bringing parties together. Interim discussions before meeting should afford us long needed opportunity for frank discussions with UK concerning their intentions with respect to Cyprus.

3. Spaak should be encouraged support meeting and participate as observer. Might also be useful for him participate in interim U.S.-UK discussions, thus making London logical place such talks.

4. UK intentions with respect to meeting and to Cyprus problems generally require clarification.

(a) If meeting is largely tactical move in connection with next UNGA, UK may soon feel impelled either to leak or publicly announce meeting prematurely. This would prejudice chances of acceptance and/or success.

(b) Nature UK commitments, if any, to Turkey may influence meeting. UK freedom of action on Cyprus issue has been limited by her apparent commitment to Turkey on partition made at time of parliamentary debate on Radcliffe proposal. It would be useful to know if in approaching conference “with entirely open mind” UK will be uncommitted to Turkey.

(c) British Ambassador’s assertion essential military facilities under British sovereignty will be small and present no problem suggests sharp curtailment UK military expenditures on Cyprus. Such eventuality requires assessment in terms of future base facilities to West and of impact on viability island’s economy.

(d) We need to know UK intentions with respect to self-rule and whether, under any type of ultimate status, UK willing to assume financial burden and political risks of transitional period of self-government under UK rule.

5. Turks will probably accept invitation to London meeting. They have encouraged UK to call such meeting and presumably believe that UK views will be more in harmony with Turk than Greek views. Because of forthcoming Turkish elections, it is doubtful if Turkish Government will be able to recede at meeting from its present uncompromising position favoring partition. Turks may therefore attempt impose conditions for acceptance.

6. Greeks will undoubtedly reject invitation unless strong influences are brought to bear.

(a) They will regard this as tactical UK move to forestall UNGA discussion or at least keep it in low key. Greeks regard UNGA as one of their most important leverages on this issue and may resort to various tactics to assure full airing Cyprus problem at UNGA. These tactics may include imposing conditions for acceptance and/or leaking UK plan to press in order marshal opinion to their side.

(b) They had bad time at London tripartite conference 1955 and have repeatedly said they would not participate in another meeting where they are outvoted two to one. While success of meeting will depend on willingness all parties to compromise rather than on voting alignment, Greeks deeply distrust UK and aware fact Turk elections limit Turk Government’s capacity for compromise.

(c) Proposed meeting will put Greek Government in very difficult position vis-à-vis Makarios. Doubtful if Greek Government could participate effectively without support of and active consultations with Makarios during course of meeting. This may also lead Greeks to impose conditions for acceptance.

(d) U.S. participation as observer would undoubtedly make it easier for Greeks to accept.

7. Within context of foregoing, Department is now considering following course of action with respect UK note:

(a) Support idea of meeting attended by UK, Greece, and Turkey with Spaak as observer.

(b) Inform UK we believe we can exert influence more effectively by not participating as observer and that we are prepared to work closely with them before and during meeting.

FYI only. Should it become clear that sine qua non of holding conference is attendance of U.S. as observer, we may wish reconsider this point. End FYI.

(c) Undertake to use our influence together with that of Spaak to get Greece and Turkey to attend without prior commitments. Join with Spaak in pointing out to Greece dangers Soviet bloc involvement in Cyprus through UNGA and in urging Greece to play Cyprus in low key at next UNGA.

(d) Welcome frank discussions in London with UK (in which Spaak might also participate). Attempt to get clearer picture of UK ultimate intentions with respect to Cyprus and of UK relationships with Turks.

(e) Urge upon all parties importance of avoiding premature leaks and of minimizing publicity.

8. Comments of addressee posts desired by August 2.

9. Secretary’s attention invited particularly to paragraphs 2 and 7(b).

Herter

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/7–3057. Secret; Niact; Limited Distribution. Drafted by Jones. Also sent to Paris, Ankara, Athens, and Nicosia and pouched to USUN. Dulles was in London to attend a meeting of the U.N. Disarmament Commission on August 2.
2. Secto 2, July 29, requested a background briefing memorandum for possible side talks with British officials regarding Cyprus. (Ibid., 747C.00/7–2957)
3. Telegram 856, July 27, transmitted the full text of a British proposal for a conference on Cyprus; see footnote 2, supra.