175. Letter From Prime Minister Eden to President Eisenhower1
Dear Friend: John Harding is here and we have had some long talks over this anxious Cyprus business. I would like to give you for your own personal information one or two conclusions which emerge. First, as to the security situation. We have now reached the stage at which we are able to hit back at the terrorists, and to continue this process. Our forces had a marked success against the guerilla bands about a week ago. The whole operation was planned with great care and was well executed. As a result we have broken up two of the bands and have captured the leaders of two more. Harding estimates that there are probably five or six more bands, of moderate size, in various parts of the island, but their total strength is probably not more than sixty full-time terrorists. Therefore this aspect of security should continue to show improvement over the next few months.
On the other hand, there has always been a real anxiety about Greek and Turkish communal riots in Cyprus. Though the Turks say less than the Greeks it does not mean that they feel less, and their anxiety about their future has put them into a highly excitable state. They are violently determined against Enosis. There is also a considerable population of Turkish-Cypriots in Turkey itself which plays its part in moulding Turkish opinion. I believe they number a quarter of a million or more. If anything in the nature of widespread communal disturbances were to break out this would put a heavy and most disagreeable task upon our forces which would have to try to keep the parties apart and restore order. This could be more costly in casualties than anything we have to cope with now, and would divert our forces from operations against the terrorists.
We are of course also discussing the various political aspects of this problem. The truth is that the offer which we made to Makarios at the end of our last negotiations went beyond what the Turks themselves thought we should have offered. This the Turkish Prime Minister has said publicly. To attempt to get results by offering more in this direction would inevitably entail strong Turkish reactions which would have very serious consequences for the security and stability of the Middle East as a whole. Nor would I feel confident of facilities in Cyprus under present conditions unless we had control of internal security. Athens Radio has made it plain [Page 365] enough that the Greeks would not in any event be willing to allow our facilities in Cyprus to be used for any purposes connected with the Middle East. That is just what we might want them for. A N.A.T.O. base by itself would meet only part of our needs.
I do not think that either of our countries would be really happy if we were only able to counter a threat to vital oil supplies in the Persian Gulf from landing grounds in Arab lands.
You will know that Kuwait by itself has now twenty per cent of the proved oil reserves of the world, and all the indications are that the economy of Western Europe will increasingly depend on oil supplies from that area over the next twenty years or more. I just cannot take the risk of finding ourselves unable to protect these supplies should the need arise. But I did want you to know that I am working hard and will attempt to find some means of reconciling our needs with rival Greek and Turkish aspirations in the island.
If any new thought emerges from all this effort I will not hesitate to let you know, and of course Selwyn Lloyd will keep in touch with Foster.
John Harding asks to send you respectful greetings.2
Kindest regards,
Yours ever
- Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, International File. Top Secret. Transmitted under cover of a note from Makins to Eisenhower on June 7.↩
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On June 7, at 4:30 p.m., Dulles met with the President. Among the topics of conversation was Cyprus. According to the memorandum of conversation, the following exchange occurred:
“We went over the letter from Eden about Cyprus which we agreed was not very informative. We discussed generally the weakening British position, both political and economic.
“In the course of a somewhat rambling discussion, the President raised the question as to whether it was feasible to separate the Turkish population from the Greek. I said my recollection was that this was not regarded as practical because they were working in the mines and were part of the general life of the island. We discussed the proximity of the island to Turkey and the strong opposition that Turkey would have to its becoming Greek.” (Eisenhower Library, Dulles Papers, Meetings with the President)
In telegram 5670, June 8, Aldrich reported from London that Kirkpatrick had shown him a copy of Eden’s message to the President and that he was struck by the length and lack of substance of the Prime Minister’s communication. According to the Ambassador, the message was an attempt to impress the President with the fact that Britain was giving serious consideration to a solution of the Cyprus problem. (Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/6–856)
↩ - Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.↩