162. Telegram From the Consulate at Nicosia to the Department of State1
216. Reference: Deptel 142.2 I read to Archbishop in confidence [Page 342] President’s letter to Karamanlis3 and in course hours discussion urged repeatedly and as strongly as I could that if agreement now to be reached, which we firmly believe possible, each side must place necessary degree of trust on other. Department’s caution was timely and he was at pains to make explicit that US was not underwriting British offer; nor was I either advocate for British or attempting to act as intermediary. Makarios said he had not been advised by Greek Government of President’s letter.
Makarios turned immediately to question of constitution and concentrated with great earnestness on point of proportionate representation in legislature. He asked if I could tell him what form of constitution US Govt would regard as providing genuine self government. I said that I could not of course give him either official statement or personal opinion on specific constitutional provisions, but as he knew and President said Americans believed fundamentally in ideal of self-rule and right of peoples to governments of their own choice. Moreover, again there was no doubt in my mind what British intended and there was no rush carry out intention to give wide measure of self government and, in their words, work for final solution which would include satisfaction of wishes of people of Cyprus. I understood British position to be that exact definition of composition of legislature was one of several matters which could be accomplished only in open discussions and they had stated principles which they believed constitution should contain in such way as to make possible necessary cooperation of all elements. Makarios acknowledged that mutual trust was required but insisted that permission merely of “an elected majority” was not sufficient guarantee, only opened up danger of dispute with Turks later, was not necessary for Turk’s agreement now to cooperate, and did not give him sufficient reason for his confidence and understanding which I was requesting. He said this several different times in different ways but did not deviate at all from his contention, and said this was a fundamental matter of substance. Repeatedly he asked “if British intend government to be self government why can they not now make clear statement on this point?” He indicated no wish to bring up any other constitutional points and virtually said this was only remaining difference.
On question of amnesty he apparently now was quite flexible dismissing it as “subject for later discussion and agreement reached [Page 343] on constitution” and at least implying that he could not expect it to obstruct cooperation.
Comment: So far as this discussion with Makarios was concerned I could see no reason to think he meant anything less than he said. (Although it may be reflected that Makarios was quite categoric in his statements to me Feb 23 re amnesty—Contel 2114—whereas he now appears to be much more moderate.)
Believe fact that British spokesman at September London Conference (Macmillan) used phrase “proportionate representation” and they have since eliminated it, is a direct factor in reviving Makarios mistrust and has, besides, weakened their bargaining position vis-à-vis him (however necessary it might be for bringing Turks along at this juncture).
Moreover, whether Makarios right or not in contending that acceptance now of elected majority provision would mean difficulty later with Turks, it would seem dangerous if British do actually intend that Greek Cypriots should have majority in Assembly (which I believe they do) but at same time allow Turks to have impression that protection their minority rights could include device of numerically equal legislative representation.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/2–2856. Secret. Repeated to London, Athens, and Ankara.↩
- In telegram 142, February 24, Courtney was instructed that since the basic problem continued to be “mutual distrust”, he might wish to read to Makarios Eisenhower’s letter to Karamanlis, and to emphasize that no agreement could be reached until each party was willing to trust the other. The Consul was also asked to indicate to Makarios that the Department had observed the negotiations closely and it “firmly” believed that agreement could be reached if each side would show some trust. In making these remarks, the Department added, Courtney should not be drawn into implying that the United States would underwrite the British offer. (Telegram 142 to Nicosia, February 24; ibid., 747C.00/2–2356)↩
- Supra.↩
- During a discussion with Makarios, Courtney learned that in the Archbishop’s view, “total amnesty” meant that no death sentence for “political” offenses would be carried out; all sentences for “political-criminal” activities set by regular courts would be reviewed; all sentences imposed under emergency regulations would be lifted; and all political prisoners and detainees would be released. (Telegram 211 from Nicosia, February 23; Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/2–2356)↩