Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Soviet Union, Eastern Mediterranean, Volume XXIV

160. Telegram From the Department of State to the Consulate at Nicosia¹

Washington, February 3, 1956—7:25 p.m.

131. Re Cyprus: In Department’s view effort at this point should be avoid breakdown negotiations and subsequent public recriminations. Addressee posts requested make this point to governments as seems best. May wish consider following:

London: Embassy may inform HMG that while it is realized Makarios’ reply discouraging, it does not close door. We earnestly hope means be found keep negotiations alive. Hope HMG will consider some way publicly assuring Cypriots proposed constitution is democratic and representive. It is believed basic difficulty is Cypriots doubts re British intent permit democratic constitution. We inclined to think eventual agreement should be possible without meeting Makarios’ exorbitant demands.²

Athens: Karamanlis letter to President indicated acceptance possible if formula changed, but now Makarios raises new and farreaching reaching demands re constitution. In Department’s view this may well cause breakdown negotiations and thus increase Karamanlis difficulties before elections. Although not directly involved, US has tried to be helpful because Cyprus question threatened broad interests free world. In our view Greece as member NATO and free world must now take its proper share responsibility to resolve this problem which has troubled Eastern Mediterranean for many years and now, after long negotiations, balances precariously between grave deterioration and achievement reasonable understanding. Situation now so difficult we urge GOG again attempt influence Makarios to avoid breakdown negotiations.³

Nicosia: Approach Governor as suggested to London. Believe there should be no further approach Makarios this time.⁴

Dulles

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/2–356. Secret; Priority. Drafted by Wood. Also sent to London and Athens and repeated to Ankara.
2. Telegram 3247 from London, February 4, informed the Department that the Embassy had conveyed the substance of this telegram to the Foreign Office. It reported that the Foreign Office took note of the Department’s hope that the discussions would not breakdown and the suggestion that Great Britain might consider giving possible public assurances regarding the “democratic character” of the proposed constitution. The Foreign Office noted, however, that in its view the British had already made it clear on several occasions that they considered the proposals “democratic and representative”. (Ibid., 747C.00/2–456)
3. In telegram 2141, February 7, Cannon informed the Department that he had met with the Greek Foreign Minister and urged the Greek Government, along the lines of this telegram, to use its influence with Makarios to prevent a breakdown in negotiations. According to the Ambassador, Theotokis seemed ready to help, but wondered what could be done since the Greek Government was under heavy attack for its reported pressure on the Archbishop. Cannon told the Department that it was unrealistic to expect the Greeks to do anything “but follow Makarios” until after the Greek elections. (Ibid., 747C.00/2–756)
4. In telegram 199, February 7, Courtney informed the Department that he had met with Governor Harding as instructed in this telegram. According to the Consul, Harding had no intention of permiting the negotiations to breakdown and even appeared optimistic about their chances for success. According to Harding, Makarios did want an agreement, would compromise, and would finally agree to British proposals with some bargaining. (Ibid.)