Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Soviet Union, Eastern Mediterranean, Volume XXIV

147. Telegram From the Embassy in Greece to the Department of State¹

Athens, November 23, 1955—8 p.m.

1315. Reference Deptel 1478² and Embtel 1297³ In relaxed post-prandial atmosphere last night, I had opportunity discuss recent Cyprus developments at some length with Karamanlis and Theotokis. There was little need to dwell on favorable features latest British formula since Prime Minister and Foreign Minister share our belief that it represents real step forward. Uppermost in their minds now was the problem facing them as result of rejection of the British proposal by Makarios about which they had heard from Peake. They greatly feared that any attempt on their part to change negative Makarios attitude would be exploited to jeopardize their chances of success in forthcoming elections.…

Theotokis did say that he would be prepared include in Greek Government public statement opinion that British formula represented progress but that this would have to be qualified by expression to effect that decision in matter up to Cypriot people.

In latter part of conversation Theotokis inquired whether it would be possible to bring American influence more directly to bear upon Makarios. He thought this could take both public and private forms. He seemed to have in mind that whatever was said by the US Government publicly on latest British formula should be devised with eye to possible impact on Makarios and his followers in Cyprus.

Re “private approach” he wondered whether appropriate American official might not be able to convey to Makarios a warning that Cyprus case could hardly expect to receive any wide support in UN now if such forward move by British should be rejected so summarily. Asked whether he thought any American advice would be effective with Makarios, Theotokis recalled that he and Makarios had recently discussed possibility that at some difficult stage in negotiations American assistance might be required, and Makarios had agreed that this might be beneficial.

While I made it clear to Theotokis that course he was suggesting was untried and would require careful weighing of implications, and I therefore gave him no encouragement, there may in fact be some merit in such intercession with Makarios at appropriate time, perhaps through some suitable unofficial American having background which would facilitate mission.⁴

Cannon

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/11–2355. Secret. Repeated to Ankara, London, Paris for USRO, and USUN.
2. Telegram 1478, November 21, transmitted the British formula on Cyprus printed as an enclosure to Makins7 letter, supra.
3. Telegram 1297, November 22, contained a report of a meeting between Peake, and Foreign Minister Theotokis concerning the British proposal on Cyprus. Commenting on the meeting, Ambassador Cannon noted that the British formula, “though less specific than some people hoped, is definite step in direction sought by Greeks and, if saner judgment could prevail, by Cypriots themselves.” (Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/11–2255)
4. In telegram 1507, November 24, the Department informed the Embassies at Athens, Ankara, and London and the U.S. Consulate at Nicosia that the British Ambassador asked the Secretary of State to instruct Ambassador Cannon to urge the Government of Greece to recommend the Cyprus formula to Makarios. The Department instructed Cannon to make this approach as well as any other moves that would keep the British plan alive. (Ibid., 747C.00/11–2455)