Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Soviet Union, Eastern Mediterranean, Volume XXIV

145. Telegram From the Embassy in Greece to the Department of State¹

Athens, November 10, 1955—4 p.m.

1226. Reference: London’s 1907 to Department.² In conversation with me October 19, before Harding’s departure from Cyprus for consultation in London, Prime Minister Karamanlis made strong plea for exercise by U.S. Government of its influence with UK in order bring about resumption of talks between Makarios and Harding. He pointed out that initiative in this respect should come from British side. Since press accounts indicated Harding consultations would probably lead to resumption of talks with Makarios we refrained from recommending US intercession on that point.

Assuming from London’s reftel that Cyprus may come up in Secretary’s talks with Macmillan Embassy submits following general observations.

Cyprus question is becoming central national issue of Greek electorate in approaching elections. Whatever may have been true in earlier years, I am convinced Cyprus question is genuine political and national problem of paramount importance in both Greek internal and external policy. We have done our best to warn Greek authorities of danger to Greece of permitting Cyprus question to become touchstone of their relations with outside world and particularly of their relations with US, which are of such tangible benefit to Greece in economic and military spheres. Leader of present government is fully aware of this danger but is perhaps at moment even more keenly sensitive to deep-seated sentiments of electorate on which he will depend so soon for his political future.…

Because of this situation it is of utmost importance that we be as clear-headed as possible as to fundamentals of our position on Cyprus question and that we not be tempted to take positions either diplomatically or publicly which we may later have to modify or abandon. While present Greek bitterness and resentment over our position on Cyprus is largely irrational and unjustified, they do have some grounds in reproaching us for, as they see it, our strong pressure in inducing them take part in London tripartite talks since they reason that we should not have done so unless we had sufficient assurances re British and Turk intentions to make sure conference would not be the unmitigated failure they felt it to have been.

As a case in point I would refer to Deptel 840, September 20,³ which, as part of our endeavor to persuade Greeks not put Cyprus on UNGA agenda, authorized me to assure Greek Government that “US will actively and vigorously use its influence induce and assist UK to move toward” self-government. I did so inform Greek Government. In US “talking paper” handed to the Greek Foreign Minister at about same time in New York,⁴ the US merely pledged itself “to continue to interest itself in the Cyprus situation”. Similarly restrained language was used by Ambassador Lodge in his public presentation before UNGA general committee.

That we shall continue to interest ourselves in Cyprus question is obvious. If, however, we intend to adopt an active and vigorous policy, that is another matter. These differentiations are not lost upon Greeks.

The same talking paper refers to deep embarrassment of Turkish Government over anti-Greek riots and its disposition seek amends, and accepts this assertion as an argument in favor of Greece’s pursuing quiet policy on Cyprus. Turkish Government has recently made it known that its position on Cyprus remains unchanged. We have also noted that in Macmillan’s letter to the Secretary, October 21,⁵ Turkish objection to any form of self-government until Greek demands or self-determination withdrawn is described as “a formidable obstacle”. If Turkish position remains as stated and is accepted by British as virtual veto, there would appear to be little point in encouraging Greeks to believe that a solution is in sight. Moreover fact that British Government persists in belief that it is “internal exigencies of Greek politics which have inflamed situation in and about Cyprus and that trouble will go on so long as Greeks continue to foment it” (Macmillan’s recent message to Secretary) shows that British Government appraisal of situation fundamentally different from ours. (See paragraph 3 above.)

Unless we have intention and capability of giving Greece effective support on Cyprus issue within the limits of a formula including early self-government plus some assurance for an evolution which could lead to self-determination, we should refrain from risky course of holding out hopes which British and Turks can frustrate.

Deptels 1364 and 1365⁶ just received appear to make more cogent value of careful delimitation scope our efforts henceforth.

For Department only. This message should be considered as follow-up to paragraph 2 (B) Embtel 1136.⁷

Department repeat other interested posts at discretion.

Cannon

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 747C.00/11–1055. Secret; Priority. Repeated to London and Geneva.
2. In telegram 1907, November 8, Aldrich informed the Department that the Greek Ambassador at London had asked him to approach the Department and the Secretary in hopes that some formula might be found to resolve the situation in Cyprus. According to Aldrich, the Greek Ambassador found this a particularly opportune time in view of the fact that British officials, including Prime Minister Eden, were discussing the Cyprus question in London. Ambassador Aldrich informed the Department that he had told the Greek Ambassador that he was certain that in view of the strategic importance of Cyprus, Macmillan and Dulles would have the problem of Cyprus on their minds in their forthcoming talks in Geneva. The Ambassador added that all he could do was to inform the Department that Field Marshal Harding would soon be returning to Cyprus. (Ibid., 747C.00/11–855)
3. Document 134.
4. Not found.
5. Document 142.

6. Telegram 1364, November 9, contained instructions to repeat Delga 231, from New York, November 7, to Athens. (Department of State, Central Files, 747c.00/ 11–755) Delga 231 contained Lodge’s recommendation that Aldrich call on Eden to urge his support for Harding’s plan that Cyprus be given dominion status. Lodge added that Aldrich should point out that it would be impossible for the United States during an election year to assume the “strong anti-Greek” position that it took the previous year. (Ibid.)

   In telegram 1365 to Athens, November 9, the Department replied that in view of Dulles’ past representations to Macmillan for progress on the Cyprus issue and the Foreign Secretary’s “clearly expressed” intentions to make headway on the issue of self-government for Cyprus, further representations to the British before Macmillan had a reasonable time “to make good” would be counterproductive. The Department instructed the Embassy to inform the British that it considered “closing no doors” and continuing discussions between Governor Harding and the Cypriots the best way to resolve difficulties in view of the problems of the tripartite approach. (Ibid.)

7. Paragraph 2(B) dealt with Cyprus. Telegram 1136, November 2, is not printed. (Ibid., 781.00/11–255)