151. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, June 4, 19561
SUBJECT
- Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission (NNSC)
PARTICIPANTS
- Mr. Arthur J. de la Mare, Counselor, British Embassy
- Mr. Youde, Second Secretary, British Embassy
- Mr. Noel Hemmendinger, Acting Director, NA
- Mr. David G. Nes, Officer in Charge, Korean Affairs, NA
Mr. de la Mare referred to a report received from the British Chargé at Peiping over the week end indicating that the Chinese Communists were now ready to accept the Swedish proposal, namely, that the NNSC be withdrawn to the Demilitarized Zone, but that mobile inspection teams continue to operate on request in both north and south Korea. From today’s press reports it appeared that the Communists had in fact made this proposal in the MAC meeting early today.2 If this were the case, his Government considered this a “most satisfactory outcome”. On instructions from the Foreign Office, Mr. de la Mare stated that his Government desired us to authorize the UN Command to accept in principle the Communist proposal, to take no action to expel the NNSC teams from south Korea, and to begin negotiations within the MAC toward the withdrawal of the NNSC to the Demilitarized Zone and toward provision for the future operation of mobile teams. Mr. de la Mare repeated that until all of this was explored his Government hoped that the UN Command would take no further action toward removing the NNSC. From today’s press reports Mr. de la Mare gave as his opinion that General Gard had rejected the Communist compromise “out of hand” and had placed us “on the hook” since in our reply to their [Page 276] April 9 note we had said that we supported the Swedish proposals. Now a few days later we were rejecting them.
Mr. Hemmendinger in reply stated that Communist acceptance of the old Swedish proposals did not cure the defect with respect to the operation of the NNSC and its teams which was the primary reason for our action. That action consisted of provisionally suspending NNSC operations in south Korea until such time as the Communist default had been rectified. Accordingly, if press reports were accurate General Gard acted correctly since anything else he might have done would have greatly weakened our position with respect to the Communist defective performance.
It was agreed that further consideration of the situation must await an accurate report of today’s MAC meeting and, in particular, a report of the true substance of the Communist proposal. Mr. Hemmendinger suggested that the Sixteen meet as scheduled tomorrow at which time the report from Panmunjom should have been received.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 795.00/6–456. Confidential. Drafted by Nes.↩
- Telegram FE 201951 from CINCUNC to the Secretary of Defense for Assistant Secretary Gray, June 4, conveyed a verbatim transcript of the 71st meeting of the Military Armistice Commission on June 4. The KPA/CPV representative opened the meeting with a prepared response to the UNC statement by General Gard at the previous meeting. (See footnote 4, Supra.) In his statement, the KPA/CPV representative denied responsibility for the difficulties experienced by the NNSC, ascribed such difficulties to the UNC, called its announcement that the NNITs would be withdrawn to the demilitarized zone a violation of the Armistice Agreement, and demanded that the announcement be withdrawn. In the charge and countercharge that followed, the KPA/ CPV representative also noted that his “side” was prepared to accede to the proposal made by Sweden in March to withdraw the NNITs to the demilitarized zone, while reserving the right to despatch mobile teams as needed. General Gard rejected this proposal as unacceptable. (Department of State, NA Files: Lot 59 D 407, Defense Cables In and Out NNSC 1956)↩