Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Southeast Asia, Volume XXII

99. Telegram From the Embassy in Indonesia to the Department of State¹

Djakarta, June 10, 1955—9 a.m.

2392. For some little time I have had the uncomfortable feeling that, except for occasional tidbits of intelligence from which certain trends could be deduced, I have been out of touch with what is really going on in Indo Government circles; that my mental gears were not accurately meshing with Indo events. Until recently I ascribed this to the absorption of practically all Indo officials in preparations for and holding of Bandung Conference (except Iwa, who perhaps took this occasion to plan his subsequent move against Bambang Sugeng);² the aftermath of AA Conference which included plethora of state visits (Nasser,³ Chou); the emotional letdown on part Indo Government after extraordinary efforts of preceding months trailing off into Ramadan and then Lebaran holidays, and finally Ali’s trip to Peking.⁴ I am somewhat comforted to find, however, that my feeling of lack of contact with governmental apparatus is shared by number of my usually well-informed colleagues. All agree with me that they had reached their common conclusions only after some soul searching, during which they sought to explain away the problem by the same process I had followed.

A clue was given me this morning by Foreign Office Adviser General Abu Hanifah who, though Masjumi, maintains close personal relationships with Sukarno. Hanifah saw Sukarno privately June 6 (President’s birthday). He said Sukarno behaved like “a cornered man” and asked why Hanifah and his other friends “are deserting him”. Reply was that it was President who was deserting his friends and surrounding himself with other advisers. (Some time ago I reported similar observation by Pringgodigdo Embtel 1467, June 11, 1954.⁵) Hanifah remarked to me that Sukarno had reason to be distraught: family troubles, deteriorating economic and financial situation; tensions created by search for new C/S, and general political situation, and so forth. He thought Sukarno probably worried about leaving information [Indonesia] for his pilgrimage and state visits to Egypt,⁶ and so forth, but these commitments could not now be avoided.

As I see it today, there is no denying the political fact that Indo Governmental machinery is on dead center. Even balance of forces and counterforces clearly shown by course of developments following resignation of Bambang Sugeng. Iwa’s attempt to steal march on forces opposing him counterbalanced by Hatta’s entrance into negotiations with result that only apparent outcome so far is inability of government make a decision, thus leaving Lubis⁷ as acting C/S. Paralysis of government apparatus is also shown in continued failure, despite bold public statements, to take action against dissidents whose influence in at least south Sulawesi and Atjeh seems to be reaching new levels. Government is making only feeble efforts to cope with generally worsening economic conditions and rising prices. Instead of courageous if painful action, we see only Communications Minister Gani’s Palembang speech conjuring up the scapegoat of “Dutch capitalism” to glee of Communists and their associates. The revulsion of decent and hard-thinking Indos to such a feeble attempt to explain away without action the seriousness of the economic situation has been best expressed by the usually pro-government Merdeka and its English-language sister, the Observer (Embtel 2391).⁸ Merdeka’s editorial after chiding government officials for laziness, inefficiency and implied corruption concludes “we would like to whisper in Mr. Gani’s ears that a greater source of the present chaos in our country than the Dutch capital is our own mentality and psychological makeup”. Coming from a government paper whose editor is honest but not always pro-western this unusual, for an Indo, self-criticism is of importance.

I have already reported restiveness of some Right Wing PNI members and the efforts of at least certain officials to find an escape hatch in anticipation that PNI may take a whipping in the elections.

In the political arena there is a certain amount of stirring. Some government supporting parties are showing signs, such as PSI statement, of trying to avoid responsibility for present unsatisfactory state affairs, as well as some genuine concern that corrective action should be taken.

Opposition is stepping up attack on government. PSI, whose Congress is now planning party electoral campaign has had a hand, according to recent information in Halim letter⁹ and supporting statement of Hazairan,¹⁰ Soedibjo¹¹ and others which throw spotlight on government difficulties.¹²Masjumi continues fight in Parliament to increase strain on government by introduction land reform bill designed to make PKI squirm, continuing policy of attack which characterizes opposition’s conduct in previous session. There is some evidence also of increasing Masjumi campaign at Mosque level apparently effective enough to warrant widening of government harassing policy to include religious leaders as well as Muslim political leaders.

On top these developments, are trips of government leaders almost as though they were making last junkets at expense of taxpayer whose bellies cost more to fill than previously. Examples are had of President with state visits to Egypt and Pakistan, Hatta to India;¹³ and of course Ali to China, all of which are drawing unfavorable criticism from intellectuals who believe attention Indo leaders should be directed toward internal situation.

I do not believe that any final conclusions can or should be drawn from this state of affairs. But I believe it of interest to Department to know that atmosphere here now resembles in some respects, particularly in government inability to make decisions, Washington scene between election and inauguration day when there is to be a change in administration.

Cumming

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 756D.00/6–1055. Secret.
2. Major General Bambang Sugeng resigned as Chief of Staff of the Army on May 2.
3. Lieutenant Colonel Gamal Abdul Nasser, President of Egypt, visited Djakarta following the Bandung Conference.
4. Prime Minister Ali visited the People’s Republic of China May 25–June 7.
5. For text, see Foreign Relations,, 1952–1954, vol. XII, Part 2, p. 427.
6. Sukarno was scheduled to leave July 12 for a pilgrimage to Mecca and several state visits; his departure was later postponed until July 18, and the state visits, except his visit to Egypt, were cancelled.
7. Colonel Zulkifli Lubis, Deputy Chief of Staff of the Army.
8. Dated June 10, not printed. (Department of State, Central Files, 756D.00/6–1055)
9. Reference is to an open letter of May 28 to Sukarno from Abdul Halim, who had served in 1950 as Prime Minister of the Republic of Indonesia, then one of the constituent parts of the Republic of the United States of Indonesia.
10. Former Minister of Internal Affairs in the Ali government.
11. Former Minister of State Welfare Affairs in the Ali government.
12. information concerning the Halim letter and subsequent public discussion regarding it was reported in telegrams 2325 and 2375 from Djakarta, June 2 and 7. (Department of State, Central Files, 756D.00/6–255 and 756D.00/6–755)
13. Hatta visited India in October and November 1955.