513. Outline Plan Prepared by an Interdepartmental Committee for the Operations Coordinating Board1

OUTLINE PLAN OF OPERATIONS WITH RESPECT TO THAILAND

Introduction

A. References:

(1)
U.S. Policy in Mainland Southeast Asia, (NSC 5612/1), Approved by the President September 5, 1956.2
(2)
NIE 62–54, “Probable Developments in Thailand,” December 7, 1954.3
(3)
NSC 5602/1.4

B. Special Operating Guidance.

1.
U.S. operations in Thailand should be conducted in the context of U.S. objectives which are: to prevent Thailand from passing into or becoming economically dependent upon the Communist bloc; to persuade the Thai that their best interests lie in greater cooperation and stonger affiliations with the rest of the free world; and to assist them to develop toward stable, free, representative governments with the will and ability to resist Communism from within and without, and thereby to contribute to the strengthening of the free world.
2.
In order to help arrest or reverse any tendency or draft on Thailand’s part toward withdrawal from its close association with the U.S. and the free world, special attention should be paid, in connection with U.S. operations, to courses of action in this paper to implement NSC Para. 16,5 and to OCB Courses of Action No. 2, 3, 21.6
3.

Because of the need for both the U.S. and Thailand to husband their resources, and because of a demand within Thailand for greater economic development, the impact on the Thai Government’s budgetary situation should be taken into account in the development of future U.S. aid programs in accordance with NSC 1599–e.7

. . . . . . .

5.
The bulk of U.S. information and propaganda activities in Thailand will be engaged in support of objectives listed in paragraphs 23, 25, 50 and 53 of NSC 5612/1.8 The broad anti-communist program should be phased out. Special emphasis and continuing priority should be given to reaching second echelon potential leader elements. These are defined to be:
a.
Those on the periphery of the ruling group who are accessible to American influence and who also by virtue of talent or circumstance seem likely to rise in the ruling structure.
b.
Those whose position and sense of civic responsibility make them capable of actions of significant benefit to the general welfare of the urban and rural masses.
c.
Those among the youth and the intelligentsia who are politically active and influential.
6.
In order to obtain maximum efficiency from a minimum number of personnel, seek to improve recruitment procedures of all agencies for overseas personnel so as to obtain personnel of the greatest competence. Ensure that priority is given to filling essential assistance program positions especially those which the Thai regard as most important.
7.
Although the U.S. and its citizens continue to enjoy popularity in Thailand the large scale of American representation in that country presents a potential source of offense to Thai sensibilities. American personnel should be limited to the absolute minimum required for effective operations, and should be made fully aware of the necessity for discreet and circumspect personal behavior. The general attitude toward the U.S. is friendly but there is some anti-western feeling not far below the surface.

C. U.S. Commitments and Understandings.

See Annex of U.S. Commitments and Understandings.9

[Here follow the 65 Courses of Action established by the OCB for the implementation of NSC 5612/1, and an annex detailing the agreements reached between the United States and Thailand between 1922 and 1956.]

  1. Source: Department of State, OCB Files: Lot 62 D 430, Thailand. Top Secret. On March 13, the Operations Coordinating Board considered and revised a March 1 draft of this paper. The Outline Plan printed here is the revised version adopted at that meeting. The Outline Plan of Operations was an action paper that detailed the implementation of the section of NSC 5612/1 that related to Thailand. The agencies involved agreed to implement the plan subject to later review and modification. (Ibid., Preliminary Notes on Luncheon Meetings, 1957)
  2. See Document 461.
  3. For text, see Foreign Relations, 1952–1954, vol. XII, Part 2, p. 741.
  4. “Basic National Security Policy,” approved by the President on March 15, 1956. Documentation on the NSC 5602 series is scheduled for publication in volume XIX.
  5. Paragraph 16 of NSC 5612/1 concerned U.S. participation in and support of SEATO.
  6. The numbered Courses of Action outlined the implementation of specific paragraphs of NSC 5612/1. OCB Course of Action 2 stipulated that the formulation of U.S. aid programs for Thailand should take into account Thailand’s “noteworthy contribution to free world collective defense measures.” Course of Action 3 called for publicizing the end-use of American aid to Thailand. Course of Action 21 specified that in establishing the level of defense support for Thailand, full consideration should be given to Thailand’s stand on collective defense, as well as to U.S. political and psychological objectives in the area.
  7. As adopted by the NSC on August 30 and approved by the President on September 5, 1956, NSC Action No. 1599–e noted the President’s request to plan conferences in the SEATO region to achieve agreements regarding future U.S. aid programs. (Department of State, S/SNSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95, Records of Action by the National Security Council, 1956)
  8. Paragraph 23 of NSC 5612/1 called for a special sustained effort to educate a broader statum of pro-Western leaders throughout Southeast Asia. Paragraph 25 envisioned a program of informational, cultural, and educational activities designed to increase the alignment of the people of the area with the “free world” and to inform them of the dangers of communism. Paragraph 50 encouraged the development of Thai leadership which was stable, united, popular, and pro-Western. Paragraph 53 specified that the United States should promote the development of close bonds and cooperation between Thailand and Laos and Thailand and Cambodia.
  9. Not printed.