Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Southeast Asia, Volume XXII

404. Telegram From the Embassy in the Philippines to the Department of State¹

Manila, August 25, 1956—12:50 p.m.

517. For Hoover and Robertson. State pass Def for Robertson, Gray and Radford. Info CINCPAC for Stump by other means Priority. This message in seven parts. From Bendetsen.

• Part One: Ref Phil Milba. Your 616² acknowledged. Assumption that issue has not been squarely and forcefully put to Phil negotiators not correct. It has been repeatedly and from the start during my first conference with Magsaysay at breakfast on 29 July, during which MBA was first subject mentioned by Magsaysay, and I made firm, unyielding response covering all points mentioned in 616 plus others. Since then issue has been repeatedly raised with me by Phil panel members including the moderate and friendly Pelaez as well as by pro-US members of Phil Senate and House. 68 have consistently taken firm position not only against any revision of MBA but also against any express, implied, direct or indirect modification of 99-year term.
• Part Two: Arguments you mentioned which you appear to feel would be accepted by Phil negotiators have been advanced with no impact whatever. Under your solution or mine, if any base facilities had been deactivated and crisis later arose such as Korea, if political situation in Phils was then adverse to US, the problem would be exactly the same. It would also be exactly the same under circumstances you cite if nothing at all were to be included on this subject in ultimately negotiated package. If MBA stood with no minutes of understanding to the effect that we would consult with Phils from time to time regarding the continuing need for specific facilities, our position would also be exactly the same. If in future years we curtailed base activities here, a possibility I also foresee, and if a crisis of Korean proportions arose at a time when political climate here was adverse, the problem the U.S. would then face in reactivating such bases would as a practical matter be precisely parallel to what it would be under your solution, my solution or no solution at all.
• Part Three: Reliance on the so-called sanctity of contract in such matters as this is an illusory practice. We must rely instead on the sanctity of underlying relationships. A current example of the illusory nature of the so-called sanctity of contract is the case of Suez despite the Constantinople Convention. In order to have anything of substance upon which to rely, we must place our reliance on the sanctity of relationships between the parties. This is true of all human relations including relations between governments and peoples. In order to do this successfully, we must have good relation-] ships to begin with and we must advance and promote them in sound ways that do not prejudice US interests. Relying upon the sanctity of contract without improving upon the relationships that now exist here would be prejudicial to US interests. When I talked with Hoover before I left Washington, he will recall that he mentioned the situation at Abadan in Iran which confronted the British there. Hoover spoke to me at length about the tragic fact that the British apparently did not realize that conditions which ultimately led to expropriation had arisen many years before the blow fell; he also told me that the British authorities had placed reliance on the fine print in the contract with the Iranians instead of upon the fine points of preserving the sanctity of their relationships. We may be allowing ourselves to fall into the same kind of a trap here. If so and if we persist in this course, we too will face the equivalent of expropriation at some not too distant future date. But the opportunity for averting such an unnecessary and inexcusable consequence has not yet passed. We can still prevent it without sacrificing anything of real substance. We must be sufficiently wise and flexible to discern between narrow legalistic concepts and the practical problem of dealing with the proud sensibilities of a people who want to be our friends and whom the US needs as friends. All the Phils really ask is recognition of their sensibilities and evidence that we trust them. The things they ask we can gracefully give without yielding a single dollar and without yielding a single ounce of substance, privilege or right.
• Part Four: Up to now I am convinced our approach during the past several years as to how we go about securing our requirements here for the short, intermediate and long term has not been profitable or effective. Our relations with Phils have declined these past several years. They have neither remained static nor improved. This undeniable fact ought to prove something. So also should the fact that it took nearly a year, so I am advised, to prepare and jointly issue the relatively simple Nixon–Magsaysay statement. But what it does not prove is that our good friends of stature among the Phils are merely opportunistic, demanding, unreasonable and unreliable children. Our good friends of stature here are trying to help us in our efforts to preserve Southeast Asia for the Free World. They see the problems ahead with considerable clarity in my opinion. They sense that if we fail here we will also fail in Southeast Asia, and they know that such a failure would spell their destruction, and they are at least as deeply concerned about it as are we. They also know that US failure here could be forced by the dissident-neutralist-Communist Phil factions. They know too that they may not be able effectively to help US and themselves in maintaining a pro-American orientation here unless the United States helps them by giving them some demonstrable evidence that they can use against these dissidents. By demonstrable evidence that they can use them [garble] practical evidence that we trust; practical evidence that we do not regard them as a fourth rate nation or as a protectorate; practical evidence that we are willing to accord to the Phils whom we proclaim to be our friends, not necessarily the same but equivalent terms and conditions regarding bases, status of forces, as we accord our former enemies and our allies in Europe. We therefore need to recognize that these Phil friends of ours have not in fact asked anything unreasonable in these negotiations; they have not in fact asked that the US give up anything of substance or anything that would impair the effective and flexible use of our bases or US long range planning for such use. For example, I am satisfied I can deal with the points mentioned in a previous message on consultation regarding wartime use of bases³ without changing anything in the MBA in any way and without creating any bear traps for us.
• Part Five: On the contrary, I think we have an opportunity greatly to solidify our foundations here if we are willing to be mature and meet the process of growth and change that is going on in this country. I am convinced we can do this; that we can in fact promote the US position here without yielding anything that would prejudice US interests in fact. It is necessary to add this qualification, however. If the US considers that strict reliance on the sanctity of contract is the only way to serve our interests, then I am not sanguine about our prospects for the short, intermediate or long term.…Also it seems to me there is little real difference except in degree between relationships and contracts between governments on the one hand and private interests on the other. Most successful businessmen are more concerned about maintaining good will than they are about the fine print in their contracts. They do not hesitate to review their contracts with the other party and to modify the terms which conditions have changed. Moreover, such businessmen often voluntarily offer to change the provisions of a long term contract favorably to the other party without being importuned when they have given better terms to some other customer since the time when the original contract was executed. This practice should afford us something to consider here in this case. Since 1947 the published record plainly shows we have given better terms with respect to a similar line of merchandise (U.S. bases) to other nations including our former enemies. I would be glad to argue the quality of our position here in the face of that record if only someone would tell me how.
• Part Six: In the light of the foregoing, I urgently ask that you reconsider your 616. Under my proposal, so long as there were even one US base in the Philippines, no matter how small or how inactive, the MBA would remain in force. Only if the time came when there was not even one US base here, could we then enter negotiations for termination of the MBA. If the political climate here grows strongly adverse to the US, the MBA in its present or in some other form won’t help us. By authorizing my proposal, we change nothing in reality. We would need to consult with them anyway, and two parties to any contract can agree to terminate it any time no matter what the contract fixes as its term. So what does my proposal actually change from the point of view of the US? If it changes nothing of substance, it would be in our interest to adopt it as one of the several kinds of evidence that our Phil friends need to help the US here.
• Part Seven: However, unless I hear from you to the effect that you have reconsidered, I will proceed in accordance with your 616 and do the best I can.

Nufer

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 711.56396/8–2556. Secret; Niact.

2. In telegram 616, a joint State–Defense message, August 24, Bendetsen was given the following advice:

   “As practical matter we can foresee situation similar to 1949 where we might ourselves wish to curtail our base activities in the Philippines. If agreement were to be sharply curtailed or terminated under these circumstances later crisis of Korean proportions would inevitably lead to negotiation of new base agreement under possibly adverse political circumstances. This would not provide long term flexibility required for mutual defense planning and we believe if issue squarely put to Philippine negotiators they would appreciate this practical point.” (Ibid., 711.56396/8–2156)

3. See footnote 3, Document 402.