Office of the Historian

402. Memorandum of a Conference With the President, White House, Washington, August 21, 1956, 10 a.m.1

Washington, August 21, 1956, 10 a.m.

OTHERS PRESENT

  • Secretary Robertson
  • Admiral Radford
  • Colonel Goodpaster

The meeting was held to consider whether the U.S. should agree to the flying of the Philippine flag, in addition to the American flag, on U.S. bases in the Philippines. Mr. Robertson handed the President a memorandum on the subject, and discussion centered on the effect of taking this action in the Philippines, and the effect in other areas in which the U.S. has bases.

The President indicated he was inclined to favor the flying of the Philippine flag as a symbol of their residual sovereignty. It must be made clear that such flying is symbolic, and no more; local commanders must be polite but firm in making this clear.2

The President asked if he was correct in his understanding that the U.S. has only two bases in the Philippines, and Admiral Radford confirmed that this was true and that the bases are Clark Field and [Page 668] Subic Bay. There are some outlying radar stations and the like, and there is negotiation concerning dispersal bases, but these are of a different character.

During the discussion of effects of this action that might be felt elsewhere, the President advanced a suggestion that the U.S. might take the initiative by asking host countries if they would have any objection to giving us the privilege of flying their flag at installations we may have on their territory. Initially he thought this procedure might be tried in the Philippines. Inasmuch as the Philippines have already advanced the proposal, and there are other matters under negotiation, he later indicated he would be agreeable to having this question included as part of a “package” arrangement. He thought the matter should be taken up with the State Department by Defense. In the case of the Philippines we could say that since this matter has come up we have considered it and we are, as a mark of courtesy, asking other countries if we might fly their flags in the same way.

Admiral Radford mentioned that Philippine negotiators have raised the question of a requirement for consultation in event of hostilities as to whether the bases in the Philippines could be used.3 The President felt this was an entirely different kind of question than that relating to the flags. It would be impossible to plan and make preparations if we were uncertain as to whether the bases were available. If such an issue were raised, and if we foresaw constant trouble being created over the use of the bases, the proper course might well be simply to pull out. Viewing the question of bases more broadly, he felt that we should not adamantly oppose all change, since times and conditions change markedly from those existing when agreements were first made, and he thought we must be very skillful in adjusting to change in a manner which maintains an attitude of friendship and cooperation with the host countries, and at the same time gives the assurances on which planning and preparations are dependent.

A.J. Goodpaster4
Colonel, CE, US Army
  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 711.56396/8–2256. Secret. Drafted by Goodpaster on August 22. In an attached memorandum for Fisher Howe of the Executive Secretariat, Goodpaster instructed him to forward copies of this memorandum to the Departments of State and Defense in connection with discussions which Defense was scheduled to have with State regarding the President’s suggestion.↩

  2. Another memorandum of this conversation, prepared by Reuben Robertson, amplifies the President’s remarks:

    “He pointed out that the experience of the British of holding back and yielding the minimum in respect to any points beyond their base agreements had, over the years, resulted in unhappy situations in Suez, Cyprus and Iran. He felt in today’s world it was better to recognize these symbolic matters relating to sovereignty in the beginning.” (Undated memorandum; Department of Defense, OASD/ISA Files,FMRA Records, Philippines)

    ↩
  3. This was one of the points raised by the Tolentino Committee in its report of July 10. See footnote 2, Document 398. In telegram 461 from Manila, August 20, Bendetsen and Nufer summarized the issue of prior consultation as follows: “It is evident that Phils are thinking about U.S. use of such bases in hostilities where U.S. might intervene where no attack had been made on either U.S. or Phil or on territories or forces of either.” (Department of State, Central Files, 711.56396/8–2056)↩
  4. Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.↩