Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Southeast Asia, Volume XXII

389. Memorandum From the Director of the Office of Southwest Pacific Affairs (Bell) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Robertson)¹

Washington, May 18, 1956.

SUBJECT

• Military Bases in the Philippines: Points for discussion with Admiral Stump

Our plans for the negotiations are as follows:

1) Ambassador Nufer will be briefed here shortly after June 1. He will take leave in the latter part of June, and we hope he will reach Manila before July 4. He will presumably need time to become established, present his credentials and make personal contact with President Magsaysay before starting to negotiate. The earliest date for negotiations would thus seem to be shortly after August 1.

2) We expect that the Ambassador will start negotiations by brief, highly classified talks with President Magsaysay and as few other Filipinos as possible. These talks should be brief, and will be intended to create firm agreement as to what ground the formal negotiations will cover. It is important that major problems be identified and solved during this phase, so that the formal (and inevitably publicized) negotiation will be concerned with details and not with basic questions. It is for this first phase that Admiral Stump’s services will be required, as we believe that Magsaysay’s confidence in and respect for the Admiral make him the best person to explain the military desirability and value of the proposed expansion.

3) Formal negotiations directed by the Ambassador with the assistance of Admiral Sprague² would follow, to work out the details of the executive agreement. This work might take several months, but we hope it can [be] finished in a few weeks. The exact metes and bounds of the land areas involved in the exchange would probably be contained in an annex to the new agreement, this annex being completed after the necessarily lengthy technical surveys have been conducted.

4) We now foresee two principal problems which will cause trouble if not corrected:

a) The title issue. The Philippine Senate has recently passed a resolution stating that the Philippines has title to our bases, and Magsaysay’s closest adviser on bases, the usually very pro-American Senator Pelaez, has told the Senate and the press that the title problem can and should be settled before negotiations start. We believe that it can be settled, in the sense that it can be removed as an issue, by following through on the statement of principles which President Magsaysay desired to make last month. This matter is discussed in the attached memorandum, our recommendation being on pages 4 and 5.³

b) We believe that the Filipinos will desire modification of the Bases Agreement, and that President Magsaysay will feel compelled by public pressures to be insistent on this point. We should refuse wholesale revision of the Agreement, but believe we will have to accept suggested changes which save Philippine face but do not adversely affect our essential control of the bases. This question is also discussed in the attached memorandum, our recommendation being on page 5.⁴

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 711.56396/5–1856. Secret. Drafted by Cuthell.
2. Admiral Thomas L. Sprague was appointed by the Department of Defense to serve as an assistant to Ambassador Nufer during the base negotiations.

3. The attached memorandum, not printed, drafted by Cuthell, includes the following recommendation:

   “Our long term goal must continue to be what it has been in the past, that is, an arrangement which permits the operation of an effective bases system over which we have effective military control, and which at the same time does not offend fundamental Filipino political sensibilities.” Two courses of action were suggested to improve the public attitude toward the negotiations and increase the chances for successful negotiations:

   1. Elimination of the question of title: “The real value which title to the bases has for us lies in the possibility that it can save us the expense of buying new base lands. The solution to this problem lies along lines suggested by President Magsaysay’s proposed press release in which he undertook to set forth the principles governing negotiations. It is suggested that we encourage a public statement along these lines, but that the form of the statement should be changed and that it should emerge as a formal statement of principles, possibly contained in an exchange of notes between the President and our Chargé d’Affaires. It is further suggested that we should accept substantially the language most recently proposed by the Philippine Government in which it is stated that the Philippines will contribute the land areas required and that we are prepared to withdraw (or release) our claim to title. This statement is the strongest we can reasonably expect from President Magsaysay and, if incorporated in a formal document, will be as binding upon him as anything short of a treaty.”

   2. Agreement to changes in the Military Bases Agreement of 1947 that would not jeopardize the U.S. basic position, but would be politically helpful to the Filipinos: “These changes could be made in the Agreement itself or, preferably, could be contained in (a) a separate executive agreement or (b) an ‘administrative annex’ of the sort used in connection with the Spanish Bases Agreement. It is not suggested that we should enter negotiations prepared to make major concessions to the Filipinos, but rather that we should be prepared to give sympathetic and prompt consideration to the points they raise. In order to be able to do this, we should now conduct a survey of the Agreement to determine whether concessions could be made in the exercise of rights which are not essential to us, or which would actually improve the Agreement. When this survey is completed we will be able to backstop our negotiators quickly and effectively, and will be able to avoid the lengthy delays which could be fatal to successful negotiation.”

4. On May 25, Robertson sent a letter to Gordon Gray that explained the position set forth in this memorandum and requested Gray’s views on these questions as soon as possible. (Department of State, Central Files, 711.56396/5–2556)