279. Telegram From the Embassy in Indonesia to the Department of State1
1141. I told Foreign Minister Subandrio this morning that I personally was most disturbed at excesses which had taken place during agitation on West Irian question. I said these excesses had affected American property as well as Dutch and that they could not but alienate Indonesia’s friends and make it difficult if not impossible for them to help her. I expressed fear that if second stage of demonstrations scheduled to begin about November 10 should take similar or more extreme form it would have seriously adverse effect on Senators Hickenlooper and Young2 who will be here at that time and who will have influential voice in attitude of American Congress toward Indonesia.3
Subandrio said he agreed with me and that government was taking serious view of situation. While he admitted serious excesses he pointed out that government had kept Communists out of control of demonstrations to their chagrin and that Hanafi had also been sidetracked. According to Foreign Minister whole object of Cabinet is to prove to country that it is serious about West Irian problem and that Communists are not only ones interested. Foreign Minister says [Page 486] that all factions in government and political parties are united in determination to get this problem off dead center. He claims that Hatta with whom he had long talk this morning agrees, although he too has reservations about manner in which agitation has so far been conducted. (Subandrio said Hatta had expressed desire to see me soon so I shall have an opportunity to hear his viewpoint direct later this week.)
Non-Communist elements in government, including Djuanda, are convinced, according to Subandrio, that if government does not take strong stand on West Irian, Communists will take over campaign and win great popular support. I hope to see Djuanda tomorrow and shall see what he says about this. Subandrio said most solemnly that if no satisfaction given Indonesia at UN and Dutch are adamant in refusing to negotiate that serious consideration is being given to breaking off diplomatic relations with Dutch and nationalizing their commercial interests. He admitted this would have seriously adverse effect on Indonesian economy and that Indonesia needs Dutch skills and investment but he claims only alternative would be to see Communists take over which would be even worse. In present mood of Indonesians I do not think we can assume Subandrio was not serious or that government might not take such extreme action.
On other hand Subandrio expressed strong hopes that Dutch would recognize seriousness of situation and agree to negotiate in which case he indicated Indonesia would be willing to go considerable distance to recognize true Dutch interests here. Without in any way making commitment he indicated that negotiations might well include revalidation of repudiated debt, North Sumatra oil.
I believe this problem has reached stage where we cannot just sit by and say we are neutral. I would be first to admit that this agitation was, in first instance, artificially stimulated and that from viewpoint of abstract morals, Indonesia has no more right to rule West Irian than anyone else. However, we are confronted with situation where failure to act can only redound to benefit of Communists. In long run interests of Dutch as well as United States and free world position in Asia I believe we must take initiative in attempting to reach solution which will: 1) meet Indonesia’s political objectives, 2) restore at least Dutch material position in Indonesia and make it strong, and 3) meet Australian and our fears about security safeguards in West Irian if it is turned over to Indonesian sovereignty. My immediately following cable4 will give rough outlines of a plan which I have reason to believe would not be turned down out of [Page 487] hand by Indonesians and would give time in which to work out details of solution which would meet above criteria.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 656.56D13/11–457. Secret.↩
- Senators Bourke B. Hickenlooper of Iowa and Milton R. Young of North Dakota.↩
Telegram 1001 to Djakarta, November 5, approved Allison’s representations to Subandrio and requested he make a similar approach to Djuanda, pointing out “that public opinion outside world including U.S. may react unfavorably to continuation of what appears according press accounts to be campaign not only condoned by government but actually inspired by Indonesian authorities.” (Department of State, Central Files, 656.56D13/11–457)
Telegram 1194 from Djakarta, November 9, reported that Allison saw Djuanda that morning. (Ibid., 656.56D13/11–957)
↩- Infra.↩