Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Southeast Asia, Volume XXII

227. Telegram From the Embassy in Indonesia to the Department of State¹

Djakarta, May 9, 1957—1 p.m.

2744. Following is summary of principal points developed by Prime Minister Djuanda during course of 35 minute discussion this morning.

Situation in Sulawesi is more serious than in Sumatra but at present looks as if local leaders there will agree to central government plans for reorganization of provincial military setup (see Embassy telegram cite C–46, ARMA 040511 giving report from Army Attaché²). Djuanda said he believed that Lt. Colonel Sumual was in fact glad to get out of position he found himself in as result of March 2 declaration. While leaders in Sumatra had made many public statements about their demands on central government they had not strongly pressed these demands in private talks with Djuanda when he visited them last month. Most public statements were largely for record and to maintain prestige. They said to public that Banteng Council must be recognized but in private talks this was only mentioned at end when Djuanda was asked: “Are you against the Banteng Council?” His reply was: “No, I am not against it. I think it has served a useful purpose in channeling the desires of the people and making clear their complaints. I recognize the validity of many of these complaints and the government will take practical steps to meet them. However, you cannot expect me officially to recognize the Banteng Council or the numerous other councils set up around the country”. According to Djuanda this was accepted and discussion was not pursued.

Earlier in discussion Sumatran leaders had stressed necessity of restoring Sukarno–Hatta leadership. Djuanda replied that no one desired this more than he did, but that for the time being this was not practical possibility. Cabinet would work out gradually practical ad hoc steps leading to this cooperation but this would take time. Sumatran leaders did not press the point.

Djuanda looks for difficulty when Parliament reconvenes in view of extraordinary manner in which Cabinet was formed. He complained that people are too impatient. “They want results in months whereas it will take years to do what needs to be done”. However, Djuanda said he was not pessimistic. He believed it would be possible to convince majority of Parliament that it was in their interest to cooperate with Cabinet and to give it time to show what it can do. As Subandrio had said previously to me, Djuanda also remarked that if this Cabinet is not given chance to succeed, military will take over. He does not believe members of Parliament want this to happen and that therefore in end they will cooperate.

I received most favorable impression of a dedicated, practical man who would not get lost in theories. The contrast between Djuanda and Ali is startling and in my opinion all in favor of the former. Nevertheless I am inclined believe Djuanda’s appraisal Sumatra situation somewhat optimistic in view other available information indicating continuance extreme dissatisfaction with central government. In connection Djuanda’s statement concerning usefulness Banteng Council, press today reports arrest of Ramawi who is council’s representative in Djakarta. Finally it must be said that Djuanda’s assurances, sincerely stated though they may be, fail to take into account overwhelming impediment to solution regional problem which is Sukarno himself whose statements continue indicate his failure recognize nature and gravity of situation.

Allison

1. Source: Department of Stale, Central Files, 756D.00/5–957. Confidential.

2. Telegram C–46 from the Army Attaché in Djakarta, May 4, reported that Nasution had relieved Sumual of his command in Eastern Indonesia; it commented:

   “Gen Nasution has made decision with far-reaching effects. If order is obeyed, Nasution has slowed and maybe stopped the independent actions of commanders like Sumual and Hussein. If Sumual chooses to fight this order, then results could be deadly not only to Army but Indonesia as nation. Revolt by Sumual, coordinated with move by Hussein on Sumatra, could throw Indonesia into civil war. During past crisis Army headquarters has always appeared calm, but during this visit officers appeared nervous and atmosphere tense.” (Department of Defense Files)