Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Southeast Asia, Volume XXII

208. Telegram From the Embassy in Indonesia to the Department of State¹

Djakarta, February 23, 1957—11 a.m.

2110. For Allison. Following my preliminary comments Sukarno’s concept mytel 2107.²

1. Sukarno’s rejection western parliamentary democracy with political opposition and his theory he can establish special Indonesian unity is expression widespread Indonesian aversion to political conflict and desire to return to unity purpose Indonesian revolution, ignoring Communist attempt at Madiun 1948 forcefully take over leadership republic. (One of Indonesia’s biggest political puzzles whether Sukarno has changed since Madiun when he ordered army put down Communist rebellion with bloody success.)

2. Sukarno’s insistence inclusion PKI does not necessarily mean Sukarno pro-Communist but, ignoring experiences other countries, indicative his belief he can invite Communists in with impunity and control them thus eliminating strikes and other crippling blows which PKI outside might deliver.

3. Lack reference role for Hatta and only passing reference to intense feelings in provinces outside Java over Java-centrism central government and local administration is one of many glaring omissions in Sukarno’s presentation.

4. PKI accompanied Sukarno’s announcement with intense campaign of support. PKI day before speech announced full support and PKI supporters with hammer and sickle banners were, according press, prominent among throng outside palace last night.PKI and Communist influenced Indonesian Peoples Congress thus in forefront political groups announcing support Sukarno’s intention establish new style government.

5. Embassy officer told last night by brother Sultan Jogja that latter already considering invitation to participate in new Cabinet as Minister Defense. Sukarno will probably try balance participation and support by left with conservative elements. At palace last night Hatta given prominent seat next to Prime Minister, Speaker of Parliament and Sukarno suggesting his undoubted prestige among people recognized by Sukarno.

6. It is Sukarno’s intention subject concept to further discussion and probably make further alterations before any implementation will be attempted. Best evidence Masjumi and Catholics and Parkindo will not participate in Cabinet with PKI.NU divided between these willing accept and those against PKI participation.

In summary I believe outstanding aspects Sukarno’s presentation last night were (a) lack of detail or plan implementation (it remains just an idea) (b) typical looseness and incompleteness general outlines (c) insistence on unanimity of representation without clear formula how it can be achieved (d) avoidance Sumatran question. While I do not like Sukarno’s announced intention include Communists and his gratuitous gift to them of his prestige, I do not think pessimistic conclusion necessarily warranted yet. Sukarno, faced with situation in which political parties have failed provide country with decisive leadership, is trying to find effective alternative. He alone has thus far exhibited courage and imagination make this attempt. He remains open to our influence and to influence better political elements here. His plans are fluid and subject change. While I am not prepared now predict what will come out next few weeks I retain hope it will not be all bad.

In meantime and at least during next week or so I would suggest that any comment attributable to official sources in Washington be careful to refrain from suggesting Sukarno headed toward dictatorship and form any odious comparison with Hitler, Mussolini, et al., as this could be seized upon by Communist and ultra-nationalists and perhaps even by Sukarno himself as indication foreign intervention in reorganization Indo state. Extremists could well use this as base for campaign counteract criticism from more moderate Indonesian sources. I think perhaps however some good might be accomplished by American press comment pointing out dangers Communist inclusion in such sensitive spots as Cabinet and advisory council which consider most secret matters pertaining to welfare Indonesian state and people.

Communist adroitness in using instruments of political power once admitted thereto after inclusion in popular fronts et al. might also be useful. Examples would be Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, Red China, France of Leon Blum, etc. perhaps also inclusion some Nehru’s comments on danger domestic Communism might be helpful.

Indicative concern in high circles lest political tension break into demonstration or worse was fact, which I learned from wife Navy Chief of Staff at party last night, that her husband along with other Chiefs of Staff following speech joined rest armed forces confined to quarters.

Cumming

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 756D.00/2–2357. Confidential; Priority. Repeated priority to Singapore and Manila.

2. Telegram 2107 from Djakarta, February 22, transmitted a summary of a speech given by Sukarno on a nationwide radio broadcast the previous evening, revealing his “concept” for Indonesia’s government. According to the telegram, Sukarno declared that Western democracy had failed because of its incompatibility with the Indonesian character and he called for a gotong rojong (mutual assistance) cabinet, representing all factions in Parliament, specifically including the PKI, and a national council representing all the functional groups in society. (Ibid., 756D.00/2–2257) A copy of telegram 2107 was sent from Deputy Under Secretary Murphy to Robertson, with a covering memorandum of February 22, which reads as follows:

   “All of this seems pretty sad, especially the reference to the failure of western democracy and the inclusion of Communists in the Government.

   “No doubt we will have to take a hard look at our future policy line.” (Ibid.)

   An English translation of the speech was sent to the Department in despatch 418 from Djakarta, February 26. (Ibid., 756D.00/2–2657)