Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Southeast Asia, Volume XXII

195. Telegram From the Embassy in Indonesia to the Department of State¹

Djakarta, November 21, 1956—9 a.m.

1234. Army Attaché has shown me his telegram DA–913618 (ID 34–1118).² I appreciated desire all agencies obtain fullest information any imminent coup but I believe reference telegram makes request which cannot be fulfilled and which, if attempted, might be dangerously counterproductive. I presume it is unnecessary provide full list telegrams … sent this subject. They have contained all information available on dissatisfactions and quarrels within Army, including political assessment, prepared in consultation with Service Attachés … and political officers. Staff continuing try secure and screen all information available.

I agree situation within army obscure and information scanty. Army Attaché has found increasingly difficult in recent months get in touch with army contacts. There are other evidences of increased security measures and attempts by both sides hold back from public and from foreigners information on army conflicts. Air Attaché, for example, has been told that air force officers authorized social contact with Westerners have been reduced in recent months from 18 to 5. That this tight control on information about army is Indonesian Government’s policy is also indicated by army ban on tendentious news reporting October 4 and sparseness public statements made by army spokesmen. Indonesian Government obviously feels, rightly or wrongly, that one way relieve tense situation within army is to keep details of conflict out of press. Under these circumstances it is hazardous for Indonesian Army officers talk to outsiders.

Some those officers relieved of their duties have been under house detention and presumably all under surveillance. I have instructed Army Attaché not to attempt see them. Some of these officers have previously gone to US service schools and our attempts contact them might jeopardize US program provide training Indonesian Army officers as well as jeopardize US position with Indonesian Government by suggesting our involvement in army troubles. Even if contact possible any attempt US officers would also place officers in personal jeopardy.

Army Attaché tells me it impossible identify by unit and individual commanders those supporting Nasution or Lubis. I doubt Indonesian authorities themselves could agree on or give accurate breakdown this basis as situation is fluid and activities largely devoted swing various commanders and their units behind one side or other.

I will continue provide fullest information and best estimate current army situation as available.³

I fear use word “coup” in newspaper reports here and repeated in Embassy’s reports to Department has been somewhat misleading. Situation in army obviously tense and with various attempts make “show of strength” not impossible there may be clashes, army disorders, or attempt by one army troop force will on other. Perhaps greater than danger army “coup” is that still incomplete discipline some Indonesian Army might give way in case of clash to looting and other disorderly conduct by soldiers. I have discussed foregoing with … ARMA. … has reservations last paragraph and feels attempted coup will precede any disorders.

Cumming

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 756D.00/11–2156. Secret; Limited Distribution.
2. This telegram from the Department of the Army to the Army Attaché in Djakarta, November 16, reads in part: “Incomplete coverage by Emb … on persistent coup rumors. Req priority, detailed, cont rept mil and political facts indicating possibility coup attempt.” (Department of Defense Files) A series of transfers of territorial commanders ordered by Chief of Staff Nasution had met with opposition, of which the focal point was former Deputy Chief of Staff Colonel Lubis, and rumors had been circulating that a coup attempt by Lubis and other officers was imminent. The Army Attaché reported on November 20 that the situation was “generally confusing” and it was “therefore difficult to clearly define major opposition groups”; he concluded that the recent tension had been reduced and a coup was now unlikely. (Telegram C–82 (ARMA 200830Z), sent as Department of State telegram 1233 from Djakarta, November 20; Department of State, Central Files, 756D.00/11–2056)

3. Telegram 1240 from Djakarta, November 21, reported that Foreign Minister Abdulgani had told Cumming that a plot led by Lubis to arrest Abdulgani and Nasution had been averted. (Ibid., 756D.00/11–2156) In telegram 1261 from Djakarta, November 23, the Embassy reported that the attempted coup had failed, more than 20 officers had been arrested, and the government was in firm control of the situation. The telegram concludes:

   “[Name deleted] said President is pleased at outcome situation army over last few weeks because he feels he can now contemplate compact army which he can use to drive ahead with plans reduce importance political parties. In response officer’s question whether there was possibility army under Nasution might request President take over in role dictator, [name deleted] with enigmatic smile said Sukarno now working on that.” (Ibid., 756D.00/11–2356)