Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Southeast Asia, Volume XXII

109. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, August 29, 1955¹

Washington, August 29, 1955

SUBJECT

• Netherlands New Guinea

PARTICIPANTS

• Baron van Voorst, Chargé d’Affaires, a.i., Netherlands Embassy
• The Secretary
• EUR—Mr. Elbrick
• WE—Mr. Dunham

Baron van Voorst called under instructions from his Government to present the Dutch views regarding UN consideration of the question of Netherlands New Guinea at the forthcoming General Assembly.

For the following reasons, Baron van Voorst said, the Dutch Government will oppose inscription of this item and its consideration at the General Assembly.

1. The question was thoroughly considered last year and the Assembly did not agree to take action. No new facts have been brought forward and further debate would only be repetitive and unproductive.

2. The Dutch Government is anxious to develop improved relations with Indonesia and sees this opportunity now with the new and more moderate government in Djakarta. However, they fear that their efforts would be thwarted and that public opinion in the two countries would be poisoned, if there were to be further consideration of New Guinea at the forthcoming UNGA.

3. The Dutch feel the time of the UN could be more profitably used otherwise, as they see no prospect of a solution in further UN consideration of the New Guinea problem. Further negotiations at this time, they believe, would be fruitless. They have undertaken negotiations in the past, but they have been in vain since the Indonesians have insisted that they must begin on the basis of a transfer of sovereignty which is, of course, unacceptable to the Dutch.

4. Dutch control in New Guinea has been described as a last vestige of colonialism. However, colonialism would not be destroyed simply by toning Dutch sovereignty in New Guinea over to the Indonesians. Furthermore, the Dutch have responsibilities to the UN for the administration of this area including the right of the people to self determination, a situation which would not obtain if the area were in Indonesian hands.

The Dutch Government strongly hopes that the U.S. will be able this year to give up its past policy of neutrality, which caused great disappointment in the Netherlands, and to support the Dutch position. If this should not be possible, however, they hope that the U.S. will at least be able to advise other delegations, particularly the Latin Americans, that U.S. neutrality does not imply that the U.S. feels other delegations should follow the same course.

The Secretary thanked Baron van Voorst for his presentation and said that we are now studying this problem anew. From our point of view, it is necessary to consider this question in a fairly broad prospective [perspective]. We would like to see Indonesia move toward as close and friendly relations with the West as possible. There has been some progress in this direction and the Secretary thought that our policy may have helped to some extent. The Secretary indicated that he was not in a position to say definitely what our decision would be on the New Guinea item, since we had not yet completed our study. However, while he realized the Dutch were disappointed at our position last year, he hoped that the Dutch would appreciate that, whatever our decision might be, it was motivated by this broader desire to bring about a situation in Indonesia which he felt sure the Dutch Government is also seeking.

The Secretary remarked that, in discussing this subject with the Australian Ambassador,² he had noted that although Australia’s position would be affected by a change in New Guinea’s status, it would be even more seriously affected if Indonesia should fall under communist control. While the Dutch, understandably and quite properly, because they are differently situated, are considering the question of New Guinea from their standpoint, we are thinking of it necessarily in these broader terms, taking into account also the views of our allies, among whom are The Netherlands, as well as Australia, New Zealand, the Philippines, the Chinese Nationalists and others. In conclusion, the Secretary told Baron van Voorst that he could assure his Government that the matter is receiving our earnest attention and we hope that, whatever our final decision, they will understand the considerations which lie behind it.

Baron van Voorst thanked the Secretary and, after leaving his office, presented the attached brief summary of the Dutch views.³

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 756C.022/8–2955. Confidential. Drafted by Dunham, Officer in Charge of Swiss-Benelux Affairs.

2. Secretary Dulles had discussed the subject with Ambassador Spender at a private dinner in New York on August 25; Dulles’ memorandum of the conversation, dated August 30, reads in part:

   “I said we would probably follow a policy of ‘neutrality’ as we had in the past; that the present developments in Indonesia were to the good and we did not want to make things more difficult for the new government. I indicated this did not involve any departure from the prior position we had taken of not wanting the somewhat unstable rule of the Indonesians to be further extended in vital areas.”

   “Sir Percy expressed the hope that we would help get sufficient votes to defeat the Arab-Asian resolution in the event that it came up. I said we had no objection to the resolution being defeated but I did not know if we could be active in this respect.” (Ibid., 656.56D13/8–3055)

3. Not printed.