83. Department of State Position Paper1

KAR D–6/5

OPERATION FIRM LINK

(Statement to be used if subject raised at foreign initiative)

On January 21, 1956 the Thai Ambassador to Washington suggested the possibility of a U.S.-Thai bilateral military exercise designed to demonstrate that mobile forces were readily available for use in the SEATO area.2

The U.S. fully concurred in this suggestion and, after checking with the appropriate U.S. military officials, ascertained that an exercise had already been planned by the U.S. Navy for the Iwo Jima area on February 15, 1956. It was found possible to modify these plans to include an exercise at Bangkok if the Government of Thailand so desired.

[Page 178]

The Navy schedule, however, had been worked out some months in advance because of logistic factors and on the basis of rotation of U.S. military and Naval units between the Far East and the United States. It was difficult, if not impossible, therefore, to postpone the Iwo Jima exercise regardless of whether it was held near Iwo Jima or in Bangkok.

After receiving a formal invitation from the Thai Government, the United States modified its plans for the exercise to include one phase at Bangkok. Considerable time elapsed unavoidably in working out agreement on all details of this complicated exercise between the two governments.

The close timing on which this operation had to be organized, therefore, left relatively little opportunity to notify other governments and discover their degree of interest.

Note: The British allege that the U.S. announced Firm Link in Tokyo 24 hours before the Thai. CINCPAC reports, however, that the U.S. Navy release in Tokyo in fact succeeded the Thai statement by five hours.

Discussion

There follows a chronology of the important actions connected with Operation Firm Link.

January 21—Ambassador Sarasin suggests on a personal basis the utility of a joint US-Thai exercise linked to SEATO. (Deptel 2403 Bangkok.)

January 25—The Secretary approved U.S. participation in Firm Link. (Summary of Decisions.3)

January 26—Ambassador Sarasin informed of U.S. willingness to participate if the Thai Government should extend an invitation. (Deptel Bangkok 2405.4)

February 1— CINCPAC formally approaches the Philippine military on their participation. (CINCPAC 011829Z.5)

February 1—Ambassador Sarasin conveys to the U.S. official Thai invitation. (Deptel Bangkok 2466.6)

February 3—Thai Government sends invitations to all SEATO members to participate. (Bangkok 2228.7)

February 6—0700 GMT. Thai Government publicly announces it has sent invitations to SEATO members to participate in Firm Link. (Bangkok 2267.8)

[Page 179]

February 6—1200 GMT. CINCPAC publicly announces Operation Firm Link. (061024Z CINCPAC.9)

February 8—The Pakistani Government indicates its irritation at being given such short notice. States it received Thai invitation on February 7. (Karachi 1506.10)

February 9— UK Ambassador Manila states he read of Firm Link from Tokyo press release dated February 5, 1956. (Manila 2198.11)

February 10—Thai released text of “War Game” with which Firm Link connected. (MA 0489 092158Z Bangkok.12)

February 12—Thai Government announces publicly that all SEATO members accept. (MA 0510 120815Z Bangkok.13)

February 13—Thai Government publicly apologizes for short notice given to SEATO members.

February 14—Embassy London received pointed complaint from UK on lack of previous coordination. (London 3394, Bangkok 2424.14)

February 16 through 18—Operation Firm Link successfully conducted.

February 19—Embassy Bangkok assesses Firm Link as a signal success. (Bangkok 2392.15)

  1. Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 62 D 181, CF 656. Secret. No drafting information is given on the source text. It is attached to a note dated February 28 by Kirk which states it had been cleared with MacArthur and Sullivan.
  2. Ambassador Pote Sarasin’s remarks are summarized in telegram 2403 to Bangkok, January 26, not printed. (Ibid., Central Files, 792.54/1–2656)
  3. Not found in Department of State files.
  4. Dated January 26, not printed. (Department of State, Central Files, 792.54/1–2656)
  5. Naval telegram; not found in Department of State files.
  6. Dated February 1, not printed. (Department of State, Central Files, 792.54/2–156)
  7. Dated February 3, not printed. (Ibid., 792.54/2–356)
  8. Dated February 6, not printed. (Ibid., 792.54/2–656)
  9. Dated February 6, not printed. (Ibid., EA/RA Files: Lot 67 D 143, 313.1 SEATO Military Advisers 1955–62)
  10. Dated February 8, not printed. (Ibid., Central Files, 792.54/2–856)
  11. Dated February 9, not printed. (Ibid.)
  12. Dated February 9, not printed. (Ibid., EA/RA Files: Lot 67 D 143, 313.1 SEATO Military Advisers 1955–62)
  13. Dated February 12, not printed. (Ibid.)
  14. Dated February 14 and 22, respectively, neither printed. (Ibid., Central Files, 792.54/2–956 and 792.54/2–2256, respectively)
  15. Dated February 19, not printed. (Ibid., 792.54/2–1956)