Office of the Historian

427. Telegram From the Embassy in Laos to the Department of State1

Vientiane, February 25, 1957—5 p.m.

1391. If negotiations between two brothers should break down anticipate immediate need meet Lao disposition place responsibility on US for bringing about defeat and therefore for coming up with alternate constructive course of action. On purely personal basis pending Department’s comment, I expect put forward following ideas if approached:

1.
Laos stands for peaceful reunification all Lao of good faith. Therefore, despite any breakdown RLG–PL talks and immediately [Page 900] thereafter, RLG should proclaim its intent continue observe ceasefire.
2.
US doesn’t pretend advise on Lao psychology but RLG might consider further step of propaganda campaign directed to all Lao on some such theme as “unification and reconstruction through peace”.
3.
RLG might further announce would welcome all Lao of good faith from two provinces who wish demonstrate their independence of Viet Minh and their desire enter national community. Laws of Laos would apply and RLG would extend amnesty and avoid reprisals as amply evidenced during RLG–PL negotiations which failed due excessive demands PL leaders and finally indications they were agents of Chinese and Viet Minh. Honorable future guaranteed to those who rally to national community by appearing at designated reception (screening and reindoctrination) points. (Embassy currently analyzing various RLG–PL agreements to determine what specific provisions unobjectionable from US viewpoint and safe to offer to PL defectors.)
4.
Intensified civic action, developmental and medical assistance programs in 10 loyal provinces with US assisting in background to extent funding and other existing limitations permit. Particular emphasis on good showing in RLG territory adjacent PL pockets.
5.
RLG analyze what promises could be made for betterment conditions two provinces once RLG authority restored. Crown Prince quoted several times of late as believing discontent there widespread owing failure of PL (and thus Viet Minh) take better care populace.
6.
In addition foregoing, am uncertain if it would be useful for RLG document its extraordinary efforts since July 1956 reach agreement in recital destined for Geneva co-chairmen. Advantage of placing blame on PL for breakdown might be over balanced by other factors.

Would appreciate comment, also any evaluation from Saigon or Washington on Viet Minh reaction and courses of action in event RLG–PL negotiations broken off. While this is possibility now, issue hangs in balance as Embtel 1381 indicated.2

Parsons
  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/2–2557. Secret; Priority. Repeated to Paris, London, Saigon, Phnom Penh, and Bangkok.↩
  2. Dated February 23, not printed. (Ibid., 751J.00/2–2357)↩