Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, East Asian Security; Cambodia; Laos, Volume XXI

419. Intelligence Estimate Prepared in the Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff of the Army, Intelligence¹

Washington, undated.

SUMMARY OF CURRENT LAO ARMY CAPABILITIES (U)

1. General Status of Opposing Forces. During the past two years, a relative stalemate has existed between the opposing military forces in Phong Saly and Sam Neua Provinces. Although the Pathet Lao (PL) enjoy a relative superiority over the Lao National Army (ANL) in formal combat units in both provinces (see attached map²), this has been offset to some extent by the development of ANL “auto-defense” forces numbering about 4,000 in Phong Saly Province and 2,000 in Sam Neua Province. Pathet Lao morale probably is lower than that of the ANL, and significant Pathet Lao defections might occur in the event hostilities were resumed. The Pathet Lao logistic system is probably less effective than that of the ANL, assuming that the latter’s aerial resupply potential is utilized. Although it is unlikely that the French Air Force would utilize its aircraft to supply ANL combat operations, various Lao Government commercial contracts should provide the requisite airlift. Despite its own shortcomings and limited experience, the ANL probably would have a marked edge in staff planning and combat leadership since the Viet Minh reportedly have withdrawn their cadres and specialist detachments from the PL zone.

2. Current ANL Capabilities. In view of the above factors, and in the absence of Viet Minh intervention, it is estimated that the ANL could attack and seize most of the important towns and key communications centers in both provinces within a relatively brief period. The ANL would not, however, be capable of driving all Pathet Lao units from the two provinces, nor of preventing protracted PL guerrilla activity in the two provinces and from bases in North Vietnam. The PL are capable of creating diversions elsewhere in Laos which would prevent the ANL from concentrating sufficient forces in the north to control the disputed provinces.

3. Viet Minh Capabilities. The Viet Minh have an estimated 18,000 troops in areas adjacent to the two provinces, including one infantry division and two separate regiments. The Viet Minh are thus capable of intervening overtly in sufficient strength to save the PL from destruction, and of destroying the ANL forces if they so desire. Although the Viet Minh apparently would prefer to see the Pathet Lao attain a legal, integrated status in Laos, it is unlikely that the Viet Minh are prepared to accept the elimination of the Pathet Lao resistance movement before such an arrangement has been concluded. Because of the dangers of an enlarged conflict, it is unlikely that the Viet Minh would intervene overtly and in great strength to save the PL. It is more likely that they would seek to prevent the Pathet Lao from being crushed by infiltrating the relatively modest number of troops (perhaps the equivalent of three or four battalions) required to do so. These could be employed as “volunteers” integrated into Pathet Lao units, and their presence thereby both disclaimed and concealed.

4. Conclusions. Against the PL alone, the ANL could occupy most key points within the two provinces, but could not pacify the provinces so long as the Viet Minh continue to support the PL. If the ANL were to undertake such action, without prior, explicit warnings from the West against external “Communist” intervention, it is likely that the Viet Minh would infiltrate armed detachments to operate with the PL in sufficient strength to save the PL forces from destruction. In doing so, the Viet Minh probably would seek to conceal the nature and extent of their participation in order to avoid enlarging the conflict beyond Laos.

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751G.55/1–2457. Secret. Transmitted as an enclosure to a letter from Colonel Robert L. Ashworth of the Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, to Kocher, January 24. Drafted in response to a letter from Kocher to the Office of the Assistant Chief of Intelligence, January 18, requesting such intelligence. According to Kocher’s letter, the Embassy in Laos received a report from French advisers to the Lao Government (telegram 1136 from Vientiane, January 17) that Souvanna Phouma was considering police action against the Pathet Lao in the event his direct negotiations with them failed. The French sources wanted to know if the United States would support such action. Kocher specifically wanted information on the Lao National Army’s capabilities against the Pathet Lao without Viet Minh assistance and an estimate of Viet Minh intentions if the Lao National Army resorted to military action. Kocher’s letter is ibid., 751J.00/1–1857, and telegram 1136 from Vientiane is ibid., 751J.00/1–1757.
2. The attached map is not reproduced.